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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation presents a multilevel comparative approach to investigating the degree 
to which Japanese knowledge-driven work systems are implemented and internalised in 
the UK business system. The focus is on processural and structural limits to accepting 
structural, cultural, control-related and technological practices of Japanese multinational 
corporations. The study addresses the national and local institutional, organisational and 
group levels in order to consider the contextual embeddedness of work systems. There is 
an interest in examining the interplay between the context and process of diffusion. 
Whitley's (1999) work on divergent capitalisms is furthered here by linking structures to 
micro-level social action in which they are implicated. 
The study is based on qualitative case studies that systematically compare the ways in 
which Japanese knowledge-driven work systems are adopted in two UK subsidiary firms 
and an Aglo-Japanese technical collaboration. It draws on 73 semi-structured interviews 
conducted in the UK and Japan between August 1998 and April 2000, participant 
observation carried out in the subsidiary firms over one week and factory tours in Japan. 
The study concludes that firms face a double barrier in the adoption of work systems in 
the form of, first, institutional embeddedness at the national level, and second, 
embeddedness of tacit work systems at the firm level. Nationally distinct social 
institutions show divergence in business systems across countries and local institutions 
point to divergence within a particular national business system. Organisational and 
group characteristics highlight the role of actors (management initiatives and 
interpretation of alternative work systems by adopters). The research findings suggest 
that firms attempt to locally interpret alternative work systems rather than submit to 
environmental pressures towards isomorphism. There is an enactment through social 
patterns of interaction in organisations, hence a variation in actors' response to similar 
practices and procedures diffused from highly institutionalised settings. 
Keywords: historical neo-institutionalism, divergent capitalisms, embeddedness, 
diffusion of Japanese work systems, tacit and explicit knowledge, limits to 
internalisation, UK national business system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the influence of national and local institutional variation on 
the internalisation of Japanese work systems in the UK automotive manufacture sector. In 
this introductory chapter the context of the study is discussed, and the research questions, 
which have guided the research process, are made explicit. The discussion on the 
significance of the research is followed by an outline of the research design and an 
overview of the general structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
There is a growing body of literature on work systems diffusion (e. g. Richter and Vettel, 
1995; Mowery et al., 1996). Researchers have adopted a comparative research approach 
to work systems diffusion from a variety of angles such as the following: the labour 
process and the lean production perspectives within the Japanisation literature (e. g. 
Stewart, 1998; Womack et al., 1990 respectively), the user-oriented perspective in the 
innovation processes literature (e. g. Scarbrough et al., 1998); and the historical neo- 
institutional perspective within the neo-institutional literature (e. g. Whitley, 1999b, see 
Chapter 2). However, there are marked differences across these perspectives with regard 
to: (i) a processural or structural/technical focus, (ii) an intra-firm or inter-firm level of 
investigation, (iii) a reference to universal or embedded framework and (iv) the objective 
or context-dependent view of work systems diffusion (see chapter 2). This study adopts 
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the historical neo-institutional perspective to highlight the institutional limits to the 
diffusion of work systems across nations. Few attempts have been made to shed light 
upon the difficulties in implementing alternative work systems in cross-national settings. 
For instance, tools requiring human interaction can be more complex to diffuse to a new 
institutional setting, given their high tacit component (Lillrank, 1995). Although attention 
is paid to the influence of institutional characteristics on the extent to which work 
systems are diffused within the innovation processes literature (Swan et al., 1999), this 
has not provided a systematic comparison of the context-bound nature of work systems 
diffusion. Moreover, work systems themselves are not considered as a key learning 
activity in the innovation processes literature. There has been limited attention to macro 
diffusion processes at an industry or a national level and the focus has been on internal 
processes of innovation design particularly within `knowledge-intensive' firms. Although 
an investigation of both the structural components and processes of work systems 
diffusion in the manufacturing sector can benefit from the arguments drawn from the 
innovation processes literature, a more systematic approach to identifying structural and 
processural limits to diffusion as that provided by the neo-institutional theory is needed in 
the present study. 
Research on work systems diffusion commonly adopts the objectified view of diffusion 
processes that reflects the interest in tangible characteristics such as structure and 
technical systems (see Chapter 2). This is illustrated by economic accounts of work 
systems diffusion within multinational operations (e. g. Marton, 1986; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Bresman et al., 1999). For example, Kogut and 
2 
Zander (1992) propose that multinational corporations economise on the costs of 
diffusing knowledge embedded in work systems through `a set of high-order organising 
principles'. There is an attempt in such studies to link knowledge to a performance 
outcome (e. g. Leonard-Barton, 1995; Makino and Delios, 1996; Buckley and Carter, 
1999). In this sense, the firm is treated as a repository of capabilities or competence, and 
knowledge is seen as an objectified commodity (Winter, 1988; Barney, 1991; Fransman, 
1994; Teece and Pisano, 1994, see Section 2.1.2 in Chapter 2). The social dimension of 
work systems diffusion, which is taken as situated or context-dependent in the present 
study, is ignored in the objectified view. The limits to the diffusion and embeddedness of 
work systems in institutional settings are not acknowledged. In contrast, there is a 
growing consensus among neo-institutionalists that the institutional environment is an 
important influential factor with regard to inter-organisational structures (e. g. 
Hollingsworth et al., 1994). In other words, social institutions, such as the state or the 
public training system, can hinder or facilitate the diffusion of work systems (Whitley, 
2000b). As will be explained in Chapter 2, the key social institutions that are seen as 
shaping capitalist systems, and, in turn, work systems or organisational practices, include 
the state, financial system, public training system, legal system, authority relations and 
union strength. Crucially, social institutions can constrain or promote the diffusibility of 
work systems across different countries. This debate is highlighted by the convergence 
versus divergence arguments in Chapter 2 (see sections 2.1.3.2 and 2.1.3.4.1). A 
systematic research into work systems diffusion, which incorporates the role of actors in 
internalising new practices by infusing them with values, can further macro-level 
explanations of the diffusion process. Although a number of comparative studies on this 
3 
subject have shown variation in the internalisation of work systems across different 
capitalist systems (e. g. Sako, 1992; Lane, 1996), evidence from these studies is confined 
to the macro level. The dynamics of how diffused work systems are shaped within the 
firm have received less attention. Clark's (1987) work on macro- to micro-level analysis 
of the way `work templates' are appropriated is one of the few exceptions. Actions are 
seen as predetermined by institutional legacies in such comparative, studies, and hence the 
role of management and the editing of alternative work systems by employees remain 
largely ignored. The diffusion of work systems embedded in institutional processes and 
organisational members' mental constructs and norms of conduct (Child and Rodrigues, 
1994) can be constrained by the regularised patterns of human interaction in 
organisations. An attempt is made in this research to complement the national level 
discussions with the firm level by providing an analysis of the social patterns that shape 
the internalisation process. Both `structure and flow' aspects of the diffusion process are 
addressed (Sorge (1996), see Chapter 2). 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
This study investigates the structural and processural elements in the diffusion of work 
systems from Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) to affiliate firms in the UK. 
Affiliate firms in this context represent UK subsidiary and collaborating firms of 
Japanese multinationals. Furthermore, work systems are defined here as organisational 
practices that are driven by people's knowledge, ideas and suggestions. They are, hence, 
labelled as knowledge-driven. They constitute work patterns that are "the product of over 
three decades of continuous improvement in Japan" (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et ah, 
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1998: 17). ' 
The research focuses on the degree to which Japanese work systems are implemented and 
internalised within the UK business system (see Chapter 2). Japanese companies are seen 
as providing a diverse example of work systems that conform to institutionalised rules. 
The distinctive aspects of Japanese firms are based on the premise that dominant 
practices in relation to specific areas, such as work systems, reward systems, and 
employee governance, combine to form distinctive configurations that may be identified 
as a `national business system' (Whitley (1996), see section 2.1.3.4.2 in Chapter 2). 
The present study focuses on the degree to which strongly institutionalised Japanese work 
systems can be diffused to the UK context. There is an emphasis on the internalisation of 
Japanese work systems by employees rather than a mere replication of a source 
company's systems. The aim is to reflect the active process of internalising that goes with 
implementing work systems, as well as to highlight the structural limits to accepting 
alternative work systems. When knowledge-driven work systems are highly localised in 
character and acquired through engagement in specific action contexts, they can prove to 
be `sticky' to diffuse to foreign firms (Szulanski, 1996). This is especially the case in 
Japan, where the activities of a `highly co-ordinated' business system (Whitley, 1999b) 
are generally carried out in accordance with highly implicit rules and social norms. 
`Compromise' (Sharpe, 1997), or `hybrid' (Abo, 1994) solutions are common where 
Japanese belief systems, which are not readily compatible with those of the adopter firm, 
I In other words, particular means of solving problems, carrying out tasks and arriving at decisions become 
institutionalised over time with the influence of past and present actions, beliefs and interests. 
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are diffused to `foreign' contexts (e. g. Besser, 1996; Mair, 1998b). Work systems, in this 
study, are seen as embedded at two levels: in the form of institutional embeddedness at 
the national level and tacit embeddedness at the firm level (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
Embeddedness, which reflects behaviour that is aimed at sociability, approval, status and 
power, incorporates the impact of social structure and social relations on production, 
distribution or consumption (Granovetter, 1985). In this study, macro-level 
embeddedness addresses the nationally distinct characteristics of social institutions, such 
as legitimacy of Japanese and UK business systems, including structural characteristics of 
organisations and human resource management (HRM) systems. Micro-level 
embeddedness addresses the difficulty in the diffusion of work systems due to the tacit 
nature of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems (see Chapter 3). 
This study specifically investigates the extent to which structural (shift to team structure), 
cultural (value and norms that constitute the philosophies which underlie the structural 
and technical elements of continuous improvement schemes such as emphasis on 
training), control-related (perceived exercise of power) and technological (advanced 
production systems technology that is needed for the efficient running of technical 
systems) practices are accepted and put to use by UK adopter firms. In order to do so, the 
nature of the influence of local institutional (such as location site and skills base of 
labour), organisational (such as company size and age, nature of diffused work systems) 
and group (such as attitude of teams towards alternative work systems) characteristics on 
work systems diffusion is examined. The institutional (such as business systems 
compatibility), organisational (such as organisational structure and culture) and group 
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levels (such as commitment by the adopting team) are addressed in an effort to consider 
the contextual embeddedness of work systems. 
With regard to the aim of this study, the central question may be formulated as follows: 
What is the impact of national and local institutional variation on the 
diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems in multinational corporations' 
internationalisation efforts? 
This question can be subdivided into theoretical and empirical questions: 
At the theoretical level: 
i. What are the key attributes of work systems diffusion? 
ii. Which characteristics at institutional, organisational and group levels are likely to 
have an impact on the diffusibility of work systems across nations? 
At the empirical level: 
iii. Which characteristics are likely to either hinder or facilitate affiliate firms' 
adoption of multinational corporations' work systems? 
The answers to questions (i) and (ii) are drawn from the literature and form the building 
blocks for the construction of an analytic schema. This schema guides the field study and 
the subsequent analysis involved in this research, which are intended to provide the 
empirical answer to question (iii). The answer to question (iii) forms the basis for 
addressing the central research question. 
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1.3 Significance of the Study 
Empirical studies of the social constitution of work systems have been limited despite 
exceptions such as-Sorge (1991) and Kristensen (1996). To date, research has tended to 
focus on technological (e. g. Marton, 1986; Jeremy, 1992) and/or structural characteristics 
(e. g. Littler, 1982; Womack et al., 1990) of such systems. It is too common merely to 
look for pieces of the work system that one can benchmark and adopt. Rather, the overall 
approach to work and an integrated understanding or insight into these systems merit 
more attention in establishing similar systems overseas (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 
1998). In the light of the current state of development of the literature, this study is aimed 
at explaining the influence of institutional peculiarities on the internalisation of Japanese 
work systems in the UK. The study incorporates a process-oriented perspective to look at 
the underlying reasons for the difficulties encountered in the diffusion of work systems 
from `strongly institutionalised' contexts to those of `weaker institutionalisation' (e. g. 
Inkpen and Dinur, 1998, see Chapter 3). It investigates not only power and governance 
(as do the advocates of the labour process perspective within the `Japanisation' literature) 
and technological and structural contingencies (as do the advocates of the lean production 
perspective), but also the social dimension of work systems diffusion, such as the role of 
people in blending and redesigning work systems. In crude terms, this study examines not 
only structures, but also workers' response to those structures. 2 It acknowledges the idea 
that employees are a vital component of work systems, based on the premise that 
"technology [cannot] be separated from the knowledge, skills and motivation of the 
workforce" (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1998: viii). 
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At a firm level, the study addresses the need to explore the impact of tacit knowledge or 
experiential, practical knowledge that is embedded in habit, skills, routine, practices 
and/or teamwork (Polanyi, 1966) on the diffusibility of work systems. Tacit knowledge is 
increasingly seen as an important constituent of scientific and technological inputs to 
innovation (e. g. Pavitt, 1984; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). For instance, Pavitt (1984: 343) 
contends that "most technological knowledge is not information that is generally 
applicable and easily reproducible, but specific to firms and applications, cumulative in 
development and varied among sectors in source and direction". Furthermore, Senker 
(1995a: 106) argues that 
external sources contribute around one third of all knowledge used in 
innovation... Of the remaining two thirds which are obtained internally, half 
is knowledge which is personally held by company staff as a result of 
previous education and work experience, whilst the other half is generated 
mostly as a result of RD&D. 
Senker acknowledges that tacit knowledge is an important element of the knowledge 
diffused through personal networks. 
This research constitutes a multilevel, interdisciplinary study, drawing upon arguments 
from and contributing to both the historical neo-institutional perspective within the neo- 
institutional literature and the user-oriented view in the innovation processes literature. It 
exposes the historical neo-institutional perspective to the appropriation of knowledge at 
2 As Florida and Kenney's (1991) research suggests, examination of structures alone can easily lead one to 
conclude that the `Japanese' model is successfully diffused to the foreign context. 
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the front-line of manufacturing or engineering operations within organisations. The study 
also incorporates a more processural discussion of work systems diffusion into the 
historical neo-institutional perspective, where the research focus tends to be at a macro 
level. As regards the user-oriented perspective in the innovation processes literature, this 
study extends the discussion on knowledge to a new empirical context-the shop floor of 
a car component manufacturer-away from widely-researched context of 'knowledge- 
intensive' firms. Attention to the internalisation of alternative work systems by factory 
operators has essentially been disregarded by researchers operating in the innovation 
processes literature. Rather, scholars have tended to limit their investigations to sector- 
specific knowledge diffusion processes in consultancies, software companies and 
innovation centres (e. g. Lahti and Beyerlein, 2000). Their focus has been on the process 
of technology development rather than on the process of diffusing organisational 
structures and processes, including HRM activities. 
In addition, micro firm-level discussions of the appropriation of work systems in this 
study are supplemented by macro-level arguments of embeddedness of work systems in 
distinct institutional settings at the national level. The study addresses multiple levels 
(specifically institutional, organisational and group levels) in order to attain theoretical 
saturation3 and a robust explanation through comparative study, as well as to elicit the 
context-bound nature of arguments. Investigation of the diffusion of work systems may 
not be revealing unless it is carried out alongside an examination and comparative 
analysis of when and how the phenomenon occurs. The consequences for management 
and workforce in various groups, both within and across firms and nations, also need to 
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be considered. The multilevel approach is identified as a useful method for integrating 
macro- and micro-level constructs, for variables from multiple levels of analysis can 
influence the diffusion of work systems (e. g. Kostova, 1999). 
Although the historical neo-institutional perspective adopted in this study addresses the 
historical context of work systems or path dependencies that provide a sense of 
mechanisms and limits to diffusion (see Section 2.1.3.4.1 in Chapter 2), it is not sensitive 
to possible divergence in the internalisation of work systems across different local 
institutions within the same national business system. Hence, the framework here is 
further refined by acknowledging the likely impact of local institutional characteristics, 
such as the location site of a firm, on the diffusion of alternative work systems. Few 
studies (e. g. Porter, 1990) have suggested the likely impact of national differences on the 
diffusion of technological innovation. However, these studies have been "inadequate in 
explaining the dynamics of innovation diffusion processes" due to their neo-classical 
approach to explaining different rates of adoption across nations (Swan et al., 1999: 906). 
1.4 Research Design 
This research adopts a comparative approach to investigating the ways in which Japanese 
work systems are adopted and sustained in affiliate firms of Japanese MNCs in the UK 
automotive manufacture sector. The process of diffusing work systems forms the central 
unit of analysis. From a methodological perspective, the study looks at underlying 
processes (e. g. Sharpe, 1999), not only structures (e. g. Abo, 1994). This enables ongoing 
3 In other words, the national level differences in outcome can be supplemented by the firm level. 
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processes to be examined in a nonstatic manner. It is assumed here that an investigation 
of processes can reveal a set of meanings attached to work systems that is interwoven 
with structure and technology. The structural elements incorporate work systems that are 
infused with value. The challenge here is to understand both the structural aspects and the 
subjective meanings attached to them. Moreover, the diffusion process is largely 
investigated from the adopter company's perspective, as it is felt that "diffusion begins 
not with the sender but with what Rogers4 terms the adopter" (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 
1998: 42). However, it should be noted that the supply side of the diffusion process is not 
neutral and detached as is assumed by Rogers (Clark and Newell, 1993). As powerful 
parties, the supply side can influence decisions to hinder or facilitate the potential users' 
ability to use an innovation (ibid., p. 70). 
Qualitative case studies, which draw on semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, factory tours and document analysis, are conducted in the UK subsidiary 
firms of Japanese MNCs (a brownfield and a greenfield site) and in an Anglo-Japanese 
5 The aim here is to observe the degree to which institutional technical collaborations 
variation between Japan and the UK influences the internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems in the UK. The two countries involved in the study are 
seen as constituting contrasting institutional settings (Whitley, 1999b). The fundamental 
line of reasoning underlying this study is that institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics can hinder or facilitate the degree to which source company's work 
systems may be internalised by adopter firms (see Figure 1.1). 
4 The authors refer to Rogers' (1983) work, entitled Diffusion of Innovations, third edition. New York: 
Free Press. 
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Figure 1.1 Schema for Diffusion of Work Systems' 
National and 
local institutional Organisational Group context 
contexts context 
Implementation of work systems 
1 
Internalisation of work systems by the adopter firm 
L 
Existing 
j LTranslation/ 
Resulting 
work editing of nature of work 
systems work systems 
systems 
Source: See text 
In the schema in Figure 1.1, which will be further developed in Chapter 2, the 
implementation and internalisation of work systems (which are seen here as the 
components of the diffusion process) form the central unit of analysis. The degree of 
internalisation by employees at the adopter firms may be explained by linking it to the 
nature of institutional, organisational and group characteristics. The three-level 
characteristics that are considered particularly relevant in this respect are drawn from the 
literature and are labelled here as key characteristics. 
Bearing in mind the aim of this study, the sampled cases need to contain detailed 
5 The choice for the selection of this methodology will be detailed in Chapter 4. 
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descriptions of the extent to which work systems are diffused and the nature of social 
institutions at the national and local levels in the automotive manufacture sector. In this 
way, key institutional, organisational and group characteristics that can influence the 
degree of implementation and internalisation of alternative work systems may be 
identified (e. g. Whitley, 2000a). 
The empirical setting of this study is the automotive manufacture sector. It represents an 
important industry from the standpoint of national competitiveness. The number of 
Japanese manufacturers in Europe increased by 16 during 1997 to a total of 859, with UK 
retaining its lead (247 manufacturers, 30 per cent of the EU total) over the rest of the EU. 
The UK also had the highest number of new investments during 1997. "Fhere were 362 
at end-1997, of which the UK hosted 127 (35 per cent), Germany 66 and France 50" 
(News and Notes section of Euro-Japanese Journal, 1999: 59). It is claimed that "the 
adoption of the latest working practices [in the UK] has resulted in a revolution in 
manufacturing skills and performance" (Invest in Britain Bureau, 1999). Furthermore, the 
quality and productivity of the output from UK factories is said to rival the best in the 
world-including Japan-due to the diffusion of `lean' manufacturing systems and a 
commitment to continuous improvement. The selection of the automotive manufacture 
sector allows one to investigate the possible limits to the adoption of Japanese work 
systems due to the heavy emphasis on the transfer of the `Japanese' model to this sector. 
The number of Japanese investments is greater within the automotive sector than it is in 
other sectors, such as semiconductors; chemical, plastic, pharmaceutical and health-care; 
6 The flows in this schema should not be seen as uni-directional. 
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textile and apparel; and food and drinks? (see Table 1.1). Hence, these companies serve 
as more influential players in the host country's economic performance than those in 
areas of lower investment. The influence they exert in diffusing work systems to the UK 
can be more easily observed. There is also the argument that innovative activities are 
concentrated in most countries in relatively few firms, which make particularly 
significant contributions within the chemical, electrical and electronic, aerospace and 
automobile sectors (Pavitt, 1991). The MNC, in this context, is seen as an important 
social institution that acts as a decisive world-wide vehicle for technological innovation 
and its diffusion. Its catalytic role in the growing density of cross-border linkages among 
nations and firms makes it one of the major agents for organisational change (Ghoshal 
and Westney, 1993). 
Table 1.1 Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the UK by Product Category 
Sector Number of Companies 
Semiconductors related industry 4 (2%) 
Automobile and automobile parts 35 (15%) 
Machinery and engineering 34 (14.5%) 
Chemical, plastics, pharmaceutical & 
health-care 
27 (11.5%) 
Textiles and apparel 17 (7%) 
Food and drinks 8 (3%) 
Electrical and precision, machinery, OA 
equipment, information and 
communication industry and components 
93 (40%) 
Others 16 (7%) 
Total 234 
Source: Invest in Britain Bureau (1995) 
7 However, the number of companies in the automotive sector is fewer than that in the combined category 
of electrical & precision, machinery, Office Automation (OA) Equipment, information & communication 
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Although the literature on Japanisation provides an extensive study of the automotive 
sector, it does not sufficiently explain the social process of work systems diffusion and 
the way artefacts are understood by human actors. Whilst the study of patterns of 
knowing as a dynamic activity is better addressed by the innovation processes literature, a 
majority of this body of work do not address the impact of macro institutional structures 
on work systems diffusion at a sector or an industry level, but rather focuses on human or 
technical processes underlying technology diffusion at a project or a national level (e. g. 
Clark, 1987). The present research emphasises the diffusion of knowledge-driven work 
systems within production-related operations. It adopts the historical neo-institutional 
perspective to link characteristics of work systems to path dependencies within particular 
institutional settings. 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
provides a closer examination of the concepts of work systems, work systems diffusion 
and their embeddedness at the national and firm levels. The thesis is positioned with 
respect to different perspectives on comparative research approaches to work systems 
diffusion, specifically the labour process and `lean production' perspectives within the 
`Japanisation' literature, the user-oriented perspective within the innovation processes 
literature and the historical neo-institutional perspective grounded in the neo-institutional 
literature. The institutional embeddedness of actors is discussed with particular emphasis 
on Whitley's divergent capitalisms argument within the historical neo-institutional 
industry and components. 
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perspective. Further in Chapter 2, an analytic framework is provided in order to 
systematically compare the process of work systems diffusion across three affiliate firms 
of Japanese MNCs in the UK. The likely influence of potential key institutional, 
organisational and group characteristics on the diffusion of work systems is outlined. 
This is followed in Chapter 3 by a discussion of the application of the analytic framework 
with references to the diversity of the capitalist systems and the emphasis on different 
types of knowledge in Japan and the UK. This discussion is reflected in five propositions. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological aspects of the empirical study. The case studies 
conducted in the UK affiliate firms of Japanese multinationals in the automotive sector 
are detailed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the results of the case studies are presented and 
the institutional limits to the diffusion of work systems are discussed. The resulting 
insights serve as inputs for the systematic analysis of work systems diffusion across the 
greenfield and brownfield subsidiary and the technical collaboration sites. Furthermore, 
the results of the analysis are compared with the analytic framework developed in 
Chapter 2 and the propositions formulated in Chapter 3. Finally, in Chapter 7, study 
outcomes are used to provide answers to the central research question, and the theoretical 
and practical implications of the research findings are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WORK SYSTEMS DIFFUSION: NEO-INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
This chapter provides a review of the concepts of work systems and work systems 
diffusion. Work systems are seen as embedded at two levels: in the form of, first, 
institutional embeddedness at the national level, and second, tacit embeddedness at the 
firm level. The chapter provides a working definition of the diffusion of work systems at 
the firm level with reference to the view of work systems as knowledge-driven. This is 
supplemented by a review of comparative research approaches to work systems diffusion. 
These are specifically perspectives in the `Japanisation', innovation processes and neo- 
institutional literatures. The four major perspectives on work systems diffusion are 
reviewed in an attempt to situate the framework used within an appropriate theoretical 
perspective. On the basis of this review, the neo-institutional arguments on the diffusion 
of work systems are identified as providing the most appropriate conceptual foundation 
for the construction of an analytic framework. Two different perspectives within the neo- 
institutional literature (the rational-choice and historical neo-institutional perspectives) 
are highlighted. The neo-institutional framework is further developed by strengthening it 
with concepts from the innovation processes literature. An analytic framework is 
constructed to offer a set of concepts that help to answer the following two questions. 
First, what are the key attributes of work systems? Second, what characteristics at the 
local institutional, organisational and group levels are likely to have an impact on the 
diffusion of work systems across nations? 
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2.1 Diffusion of Work Systems 
2.1.1 A Working Definition of Work Systems 
According to Whitley (1999c), work systems are distinctive inter-related patterns of task 
organisation and control, workplace relations between social groups and employment 
practices and policies. In this study, there is a focus on work systems that are essentially 
organisational practices, which are dependent on continuous improvement in operations. 
The study highlights work systems as driven by people's knowledge, ideas and 
suggestions and as "premised on harnessing the knowledge at the point where products 
are made or services are delivered" (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1998: 69). Bearing this 
definition in mind, work systems are referred to here as knowledge-driven. It is not the 
purpose of this study to draw an analytic distinction between work systems that are 
knowledge-driven and those that are not. On the contrary, the study aims to acknowledge 
the knowledge-driven nature of all work systems. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
tacit work systems, as those emphasised by Japanese firms, are argued here as driven by 
people's knowledge, ideas and suggestions to a greater degree than explicit or 
decontextualised work systems, as those reflected by Anglo-Saxon operations (see 
Chapter 3 for further discussion). 
This study aims to examine the introduction of alternative work systems across cultures, 
and sees these as a key to global business strategy. Although the diffusion of knowledge- 
driven work systems can be investigated in any empirical context8, the focus in this study 
is on knowledge diffusion on the shop floor and in an engineering project. The basic 
8 After all, as Blackler (1995: 1026) contends, "all individuals and all organisations, not just so-called 
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premise is that knowledge diffusion occurs with equal importance on the shop floor and 
in engineering projects as it does in R&D centres and knowledge-intensive firms such as 
software development and consultancy firms. Hence, the capabilities of `ordinary' 
factories and engineering firms are seen in terms of `knowledge works' (Fruin, 1997) in 
this study. Prusak (1997) notes that as products are increasingly `smart', production 
processes need to process higher levels of information about changing customer 
requirements, and delivery times. Hence, knowledge production and diffusion apply right 
across the board. 
Discussions on the diffusion of work systems within the manufacturing context have 
commonly centred on structural and technical issues such as the cost and quality 
advantages of reduced inventory and efficiency gains from concurrent engineering. 
9 The 
definition adopted here diverges from privileging organisational structures and 
technological systems as the driving forces of work systems diffusion. Rather, it 
emphasises the importance of intangible aspects, in addition to acknowledging the 
tangible. Hence, this study adopts a more processural view on the diffusion of work 
systems. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1998: 10) argue that the diffusion of intangible 
capabilities, much more than the tangible work practices or technical/structural systems, 
represents the key source of competitive advantage. Such diffusion marks the importance 
given to people at all levels of the organisation who must combine "the mastery of some 
highly specialised technical expertise with the ability to work effectively in teams, form 
'knowledge workers' or 'knowledge organisations', are knowledgeable". 
9 The concept of `diffusion of work systems' is used intentionally here to suggest that there is more of 
knowledge sharing within a firm than a transfer based on a functionalist communication model across 
firms. This will be further discussed in Section 2.2.1.4. 
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productive relationships with clients and critically reflect on and then change their own 
organisational practices" (Argyris, 1991: 100). 
The definition of work systems as knowledge-driven reflects a socio-technical 
perspective in which human interaction at all levels of the firm is seen as being as vital as 
technology itself. In addition to acknowledging the technical and structural aspects of 
work systems, this definition pays allegiance to human beings as actively discovering 
problems and creating knowledge to solve them (e. g. Takeuchi, 1998). Hence, work 
systems are envisaged as incorporating the management of people. There is an 
acknowledgement of the importance of structural characteristics, such as company size 
(e. g. Damanpour, 1991) and processes, such as internal communication (e. g. Aiken and 
Hage, 1971) in the diffusion of work systems. Bird et al. (1999) assert that the 
importance of the human factor in the value-added activities of the firm rises as national 
barriers to the flow of capital and technology fall. The importance of an effective 
management of human resources is recognised especially in the context of Japanese 
firms, which are seen as relying more extensively on people-oriented work systems as a 
means of achieving competitive advantage (Abo, 1994). 
2.1.2 Objectified and Context-dependent Views of Work Systems Diffusion 
The traditional view of work systems diffusion reflects the interest in structure and 
technology where tangible characteristics are taken as the primary sources of competitive 
advantage. However, a complex set of meanings attached to work systems urges one to 
investigate the ways in which structure and technology are interwoven in organisational 
21 
practice. At one extreme, that is in part reflected by the Information Technology- and 
Knowledge Management-driven arguments, researchers have argued for technological 
determinism within a contingency framework. In other words, particular kinds of 
technology are proposed to yield certain predictable outcomes (Womack et al., 1990). 
This extreme constitutes the more linear, mechanistic view of diffusion, where work 
systems (with an emphasis on explicit features) are seen as imported from or adopted out 
of a `foreign' context in a unitary fashion. In other words, work systems are `black- 
boxed' as technological artefacts and `transferred'. This stream of research reflects 
Wolfe's (1994) category of `organisational innovativeness' in his review of the 
innovation literature. He argues that there is a tendency to focus on the structural 
variables as the primary determinants of innovation. This static orientation ignores 
"changes in an innovation during the innovation process" (ibid., p. 409). 
Studies have been carried out outside the manufacturing setting on work systems 
diffusion in high-tech firms, such as software development (e. g. Lahti and Beyerlein, 
2000), labelled as `knowledge-intensive fines' (Tampoe, 1993). This is mainly derived 
from the association of knowledge with technology, where technology diffusion is seen 
as synonymous with knowledge diffusion (e. g. Lynskey, 1999). Other researchers have 
challenged the dichotomy between technology and people. They have addressed the 
"sharp decrease in attention to people management and development issues, and step 
increase in attention to information technology (IT), information systems (IS) and 
intellectual capital" (Swan, 1999: 4), seeing technological and structural characteristics of 
work systems as embedded in a social set of norms and beliefs (Thomas, 1994). The 
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importance of their view is reflected in part by the process theory research on 
organisation innovation (Wolfe, 1994). This research investigates "the nature of the 
innovation process, how and why innovations emerge, develop, grow and (perhaps) 
terminate" (ibid., p. 409). In brief, of the two perspectives, one emphasises the technical 
aspects of work systems and regards the diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems as 
objectified, and the other focuses on the social aspects and sees the diffusion of 
knowledge-driven work systems as context-dependent. 
The two perspectives emphasise different aspects of the knowledge creation and diffusion 
process. The perspective that pays heed to the context-dependent nature of knowledge- 
driven work systems diffusion emphasises "culture management and leadership as a 
means for encouraging both socialisation, so that tacit knowledge is shared, and also 
internalisation of explicit knowledge into the values and tacit understandings of 
employees" (Scarbrough et al., 1998: 39). This perspective reflects the sedimented mode 
of knowledge communication "where knowledge is communicated via rules, standards, 
routines and structures" (Scarbrough, 1995: 999). Actors can develop strategies that 
involve the progressive de-limiting and fixing of social relations. The meaning of 
alternative work systems becomes progressively stabilised as users and producers come 
to share common frameworks as to the meaning, critical features and purpose of the 
diffused systems. The context-dependent view of work systems diffusion focuses on 
"knowledge communication through professionalism and an intensively cultivated 
employment relationship which [seeks] to bind individuals tightly to the organisation" 
(ibid., p. 1012). This view acknowledges the stickiness of knowledge-driven work 
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systems and, in turn, the limitations to diffusion across different institutional contexts. 
(This is discussed in further detail in Section 3.1, Chapter 3). In contrast, the objectified 
view of knowledge-driven work systems diffusion implies that practices can easily be 
transplanted in a new institutional setting. The diffusion process is generally analysed 
through broadcasting analogies. Scarbrough (1995) refers to this process as 
communicating knowledge through objectification or universal applicability through 
standardisation. This process requires that technical knowledge be separated from its 
social context by standardisation and segmentation. 
The present research builds on the perspective that takes into account the context- 
sensitive nature of knowledge-driven work systems. It attempts to provide insights into 
the social constitution of work systems, by giving attention to the interrelated aspects of 
technical and structural systems (i. e. largely the tangibles), and people, training, 
discipline, management-worker relations and social networks (i. e. largely the intangibles) 
in a process. Work systems are seen as embedded in a wider social context. For example, 
the quality circle in Japan is embedded in a set of cultural assumptions about hands-on- 
management and employment security, as well as internal labour market structure. 
Interactions of multiple actors shape the diffusion of work systems. In the words of 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1998: 11), the diffusion of work systems is seen as "a highly 
complex, negotiated process put into operation in a diverse range of communities and 
workforces". 
Knowledge-driven work systems, rooted as they are in firms' co-ordination mechanisms 
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and organisational routines, exist in tacit and explicit form (Polanyi, 1966; Senker, 
1995b). They incorporate the cognitive dimension, that is beliefs, perceptions, ideals, 
values, emotions and mental models that are taken for granted (Takeuchi, 1998). 
Particular means of solving problems, carrying out tasks and arriving at decisions become 
institutionalised over time with the influence of past and present actions, beliefs and 
interests (Clark and Mueller, 1994). This has implications for a firm's ability to create 
core organisational capabilities that rest on a combination of, what Araujo (1998: 320) 
calls, migratory `lower-level' skills and `higher-order' (i. e. less diffusible) routines. 
The complementary tacit and explicit forms of work systems are not sharply divided. 
"While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being 
tacitly understood and applied. Hence, "all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit 
knowledge" (Polanyi, 1966: 144). Tacit work systems are taken to reflect organisational 
routines that have been standardised over time to assume a taken-for-granted, 
subconscious nature (Kostova, 1999). In other words, tacit knowledge is taken as 
experiential, practical knowledge that is embedded in habit, skills, routine, practices 
and/or teamwork (Polanyi, 1966). It is believed to be effectively diffused through 
personnel transfers and visits (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Bresman et al., 1999). It is 
operationalised here as the intangible foundation of continuous improvement schemes. 
On the other hand, explicit knowledge is defined independently of a particular individual 
or a group, and is regarded as being transmitted by "book, blueprint or statement to 
everyone on equal terms" (Best, 1990: 127). It is operationalised in this study as the 
tangible foundation of continuous improvement schemes. For example, technology and 
25 
structure as tangibles in a given process are generally abstracted from their contexts to 
reflect explicit forms of knowledge. 
The distinction between tacit and explicit forms may also be observed in the 
classification of scientific and practical knowledge of `time and place' (Hayek, 1945), 
`objective and experiential' knowledge (Penrose, 1959), `migratory and embedded' 
knowledge (Badaracco, 1991), and `idiosyncratic and codified' knowledge (Lanzara and 
Patriotta, 2000). This distinction is reflected in some of the definitions of information, 
which is associated with explicit knowledge, and know-how, which is related to tacit 
knowledge. For example, information is defined by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000: 348, 
brackets added) as "easily codifiable [or explicit] knowledge that can be transmitted 
without loss of integrity once the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are 
known.. . by comparison, know-how [or tacit knowledge] involves knowledge that 
is tacit, 
`sticky', complex, and difficult to codify". Consequently, knowledge ingrained in highly 
tacit work systems can prove to be `sticky' (Szulanski, 1996) to diffuse to `foreign' firms. 
Such knowledge can lack the tacit embedding context of its home country. More often 
than not "what makes sense in one context can change or even lose its meaning when 
communicated to people in a different context" (Takeuchi, 1998: 8). 
The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge has been a focus of debate (e. g. 
Blackler, 1995; Tsoukas, 1996). Critics of this distinction argue that organisations are 
being portrayed as rich depositories of untapped knowledge which can be profitably 
exploited (Marshall and Sapsed, 2000). In line with Polanyi's (1966) argument, Tsoukas 
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(1996) regards tacit and explicit knowledge as mutually constituted, rather than as two 
separate types of knowledge. He (ibid., p 22) contends that "a firm's knowledge is 
distributed in the sense that it is inherently indeterminate". Similarly, Blackler 
(1995: 1032) argues that "knowledge is multifaceted and complex, being both situated and 
abstract, implicit and explicit, distributed and individual, physical and mental, developing 
and static, verbal and decoded". Whilst acknowledging these debates, the present 
research, in line with other work (e. g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), makes a schematic 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge in order to frame and investigate the 
impact of the variation in the emphasis on different types of knowledge on the diffusion 
process. (The variation in emphasis is discussed in the context of Japanese and UK 
business systems in Chapter 3). 
2.1.3 The Empirical Context: Comparative Research Approaches 
As was explained in the introductory chapter, a comparative study of the degree to which 
Japanese work systems are implemented and internalised is carried out to examine the 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics that are likely to have an impact on 
the diffusion process. 
Since the early 1980s, a number of approaches have emerged which allow the patterns 
observed in cross-national diffusion of work systems to be explained. These are, in 
particular the labour process view, which is broadly speaking a political as opposed to a 
technical perspective (Graham, 1993), and the lean production perspective within the 
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`Japanisation' literature, the user-oriented perspective within the innovation processes 
literature and the historical neo-institutional perspective within the neo-institutional 
literature. In the next sections, the key features of these perspectives, including the issues 
they focus on and the conceptual frameworks they offer, are discussed and compared in 
the light of the research aims. In this way, the most appropriate perspective can be 
identified as the basis for the construction of the analytic framework to be used in this 
research. 
2.1.3.1 The Labour Process Perspective within the `Japanisation' Literature 
There is a growing body of literature (Morris, 1988; Oliver & Wilkinson, 1992; Stewart, 
1998) addressing the issue of the diffusion of Japanese management systems through the 
globalisation of Japanese manufacturers. Discussions have focused on issues of work and 
employment relations, labour control and effort intensification by management. Within 
the labour process perspective on the diffusion of Japanese work systems, the focus has 
mainly been on power and dependency implications of the diffusion process (e. g. Briggs, 
1988; Dickens and Savage, 1988; Oliver et al., 1994; Skorstad, 1994; Danford, 1998; 
Delbridge, 1998). Workers are seen as detached from the means of production, and can 
access them only by selling their labour to others (Braverman, 1998). The purpose of 
diffusing foreign work systems becomes "the expansion of a unit of capital belonging to 
the employer, who is thus functioning as a capitalist" (ibid., p. 36). The Japanese work 
systems are seen as enabling management to enforce speedier methods and shortcuts to 
the manufacturing process in an attempt to dissociate the labour process from the skills of 
the workers. In other words, management prerogatives are celebrated to the detriment of 
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the workforce (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). Attention is drawn to the introduction of 
Japanese systems through a selection process conducted according to the criteria and 
templates held by those who enjoy access to it. According to Westney (1999: 404), the 
criterion for diffusing Japanese knowledge-driven work systems in this political view is 
to maintain parental control, or to enhance the power of the dominant coalition. 
Fundamentally, this approach highlights governance and control mechanisms implicit in 
the diffusion of Japanese work systems. For example, Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) argue 
that Japanese management exercises a covert form of social control or `concertive 
control', to use Barker's (1993) words. `Concertive control', as opposed to `bureaucratic 
rational control', is seen as growing out of a "substantial consensus about values, high 
level co-ordination and a degree of self-management by members or workers in an 
organisation" (ibid., p. 408). This is achieved by giving employees the impression that 
they are empowered via quality circles and other team-based activities. Sewell and 
Wilkinson (1992: 271) demonstrate that the "surveillance systems integral to JIT/TQM 
are deliberately designed such that discipline is established in a most efficient manner 
and the exercise of minute control is possible with a minimum of supervisors". In 
Danford's (1997: 2) words, "new management techniques secure for management new 
levers of control over skill deployment, task distribution and overall worker effort rates". 
Furthermore, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) discuss the social and political consequences 
of diffusing Japanese manufacturing methods. Their conceptualisation of `Japanisation' is 
based on Ackroyd et al. 's (1988) definition of the term. Ackroyd et al. (1988) distinguish 
between direct, mediated and permeated or full Japanisation in considering its implication 
for British industry. Direct Japanisation is taken to mean "the penetration of British 
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economy and industry by Japanese firms" (ibid., p. 15). Deliberate or overt copying of 
Japanese policies or practices by British firms is referred to as mediated Japanisation. In 
other words, the impact of the adoption of Japanese practices is not seen as a 
straightforward copying process, given that the effects of the practices are mediated by 
British management (Ackroyd et aL, 1988). 
Oliver and Wilkinson's (1992) arguments give voice to the barriers that the adopter firm 
faces in its efforts to sustain worker-ownership of Japanese manufacturing techniques and 
philosophies. They also illustrate the selective character of any borrowing from Japan, 
where the given company seeks to adopt elements of the `Japanese' model to match its 
circumstances. This results in the adoption of a "hybrid which is neither entirely Japanese 
management as practised in Japan nor typically British" (Wickens, 1987 in Guest, 
1992: 6; see also White and Trevor, 1983). The `selective' importation of organisations 
based on teamwork and devolved responsibility, extensive and intensive communication 
and employee relations systems is seen as designed to safeguard managerial prerogatives. 
The investment in trust-building, openness in communication and visibility in 
management by the Japanese are taken as a means of minimising worker resistance and in 
increasing the acceptance of a new governance system. This indirect form of control is 
seen as associated with a low willingness on the part of the Japanese companies to learn 
from their overseas affiliates, where the Japanese are in strong bargaining position to 
establish ways of working they see as necessary (Smith and Elger, 1998). The Japanese 
firm's selective utilisation of production practices that are identified with the `Japanese 
model' (Taylor et al., 1994: 197) suggests that practices of strategic importance, such as 
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design work, remain in the Japanese headquarters. This ingrains the notion among critics 
that the Japanese managerial strategy in the host company is aimed at stripping labour out 
of production, controlling trade unions and undermining employee autonomy (Williams 
et al., 1992). 
2.1.3.2 The Lean Production Perspective within the `Japanisation' Literature 
The interest in the `Japanisation' debate has also taken the form of a focus on the effect 
of new manufacturing initiatives, such as JIT, on the design of jobs. These represent 
attempts to link the introduction of `new or lean production' methods to competitiveness. 
For example, Buckley and Carter (1999: 80) claim that "gaining value from the intangible 
assets a firm possesses is a key component in achieving the strongest possible 
competitive stance". The diffusion of Japanese work systems is seen as a consequence of 
"deliberate organisational redesign (usually by managers) to accommodate conflicting 
pulls from local and imported patterns, to improve the internal fit within the organisation 
and fit with external environment and to improve organisation's performance" (Westney, 
1999: 402). This has led to debates on convergence of institutional systems that become 
uniform or isomorphic with the `globalisation' of managerial structures and strategies. 
For example, US/UK firms in some industrial sectors are seen as converging towards the 
Japanese employment system (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1985). The evolution in the 
internal organisation of firms towards what is claimed to be `welfare corporatism' is 
assumed to over-ride `market individualism' (ibid. ). The changes made in business 
enterprises and regulatory institutions are said to be in the direction of restructuring of 
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mass production industry by adopting new technologies and new practices (Womack et 
al., 1990). The focus in such arguments is on business and craft production as well as 
engineering, industrial relations and production restructuring-in brief flexible 
manufacturing systems-to meet the Japanese challenge. 
During the 1960s, it was widely held that the diffusion of manufacturing technologies and 
divisions of labour at the societal level would eventually lead to convergence in 
institutional arrangements and economic performance (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). 
However, despite economic integration of manufacturing markets, the harmonisation of 
the institutional variation across nations has not occurred (Sorge, 1991). It is commonly 
believed among advocates of the `lean production' perspective (e. g. Kenney and Florida, 
1993; MacDuffie, 1995) that there is an optimal solution for organising labour, raw 
materials and capital in the manufacture and distribution of goods, and for adopting 
organisational practices in the cross-national diffusion of work systems. There is an 
attempt to establish the optimum balance between cost reduction, retention of control and 
devolution of responsibility to the supply chain (e. g. Alford et al., 2000). 
Within this perspective, the focus has been primarily on the contingencies necessary for 
the successful diffusion of work systems. These contingencies are taken as `best 
practices' in a module form that can be disassembled and transplanted to another context 
(Womack et al., 1990; Bohn, 1994). Knowledge ingrained in portable `best practices' is 
taken as a commodity that can be moved from one context to another. This view of 
knowledge is reflected by much of the research driven by rational-choice neo- 
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institutionalist ideas (which will be discussed in Section 2.1.3.4.1) whereby work systems 
are conceptualised as bearing structural characteristics (e. g. Littler, 1982) and/or 
technological characteristics (e. g. Marton, 1986; Jeremy, 1992) that serve as "actionable 
consulting packages and `how to' books" (Lillrank, 1995: 976). It is far too common to 
look simply for pieces of the work systems that one can benchmark and adopt. Although 
it is argued that "lean production proponents argue that this system successfully combines 
social and technical aspects of efficient manufacturing" (Delbridge, 1998: 6), there is 
greater focus on diffusible explicit components of the system that provides a `universal 
model of best practice' than on tacit components. 
At the firm level, it is argued that "the greater the dependence of an organisation on 
another organisation, the more similar it will become to that organisation in structure, 
climate and behavioural focus" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 74). The advocates of the 
lean production perspective are less sympathetic to the notion that capitalist systems are 
diverse. It is assumed that work systems can be abstracted from the wider institutional 
context in which they are embedded (e. g. Womack et al., 1990). 10 According to Kenney 
and Florida (1993), the most successful firms use teams, quality control activities, 
rotation and egalitarian management styles. The `one-best-solution' to organising 
resources in an attempt to access technology, know-how, managerial expertise, capital 
and international markets (Child and Faulkner, 1998) is based on the assumption that 
Japanese methods are universal and can be effectively applied to other contexts. This 
thinking is especially reflected in the early instances of adoption, characterised by the 
'o Hence, the lean production perspective is also labelled as the technological/rational perspective by some 
(e. g. Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). 
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diffusion of one or two particular management techniques, in isolation from the broader 
strategy and philosophy by UK management (Beale, 1994). 
The `universalistic models' in the `Japanisation' literature emphasise on the `transfer' of 
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work systems that can be communicated between the sender (or the broadcaster) and the 
receiver in a form abstracted from the wider social networks. Although patterns of 
knowledge flow are examined across industries and countries within the universalistic 
accounts, the complex ensembles of routines that can mould what is being 
`communicated' are ignored. Knowledge ingrained in work systems is, rather, understood 
as an object that can be created, packaged and diffused, more or less unchanged, from 
one context to another. Attention is given to immediate contingencies of a given 
transaction away from the scope for social action in shaping such a transaction 
(Scarbrough, 1995). The theoretical assumption is that key variables, such as structure 
and technology move without friction and in a linear fashion (Clark, 1987). However, 
such variables in reality are shaped by organisational culture and value systems, hence, 
are sensitive to contexts. The assumption that the variables move in a linear fashion 
implies that learning in this context occurs in a mimetic or a coercive way, and that `best 
practice' is diffused through imitation. 
2.1.3.3 The User-oriented Perspective within the Innovation Processes Literature 
Research on innovation processes is also relevant for understanding the diffusion of work 
systems. This tends to adopt either a supply focused approach (see Rogers' 1983 work on 
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diffusion of innovations), or a user-oriented perspective (e. g. Clark et al., 1992). The 
supply-focused model focuses on the ways in which suppliers may communicate new 
ideas to users in order to encourage adoption. As the focus in this model is on adoption, 
implementation problems tend to be ignored (Clark, 1987). There is an assumption here 
that work systems remain unmodified in their move through different sectors, units or 
nations. On the other hand, the user-oriented perspective considers plurality of actors, the 
role of social structures, unintended outcomes of power struggles and the problems with 
appropriating new work practices alongside existing practice and context. The user- 
oriented perspective thus assumes that innovations are "heterogeneous complexes rather 
than homogeneous entities" (Clark, 1987: 60), hence their diffusion can be non-linear. 
This section focuses on the latter view as applied to work systems diffusion, given its 
closer fit with the aims of the present study. l l Innovation in the user-oriented perspective 
is regarded as dependent on contextual features that are shaped by the societal context, 
leading to differences in implementation across contexts, including nations (Swan et al., 
1999). This view assumes that "potential users [of the diffused knowledge or innovation] 
are embedded in complex ensembles of routines which may inhibit or enable their ability 
to use an innovation" (Clark and Newell, 1993: 70, brackets added). Hence, the limits to 
implementation, given the embeddedness of diffused knowledge, are addressed. 
Furthermore, cognitive and political dimensions of the process of knowledge diffusion 
are acknowledged. It is assumed that innovations are firm-specific and socially- 
constructed artefacts, hence can be shaped by the interests of suppliers and powerful 
users. This perspective acknowledges different forms of knowledge and patterns of 
11 Although this research does not focus on an innovation, arguments drawn from the studies on innovation 
processes can be enlightening from the point of view of work systems diffusion. 
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"knowing as a dynamic activity involving the continuous creation, reproduction, 
modification and destruction of streams of meaning" (Marshall and Sapsed, 2000: 2). In 
other words, there is a stronger focus on agency. In contrast to the focus on structural and 
technical concerns of the orthodox view, there is a focus on active process involving "the 
formation, redesign and implementation of new ideas" in the process-based account 
(Hislop et al., 1998: 429). The intangible questions of culture, commitment, motivation, 
involvement and trust are seen just as important as technology and structure in the 
diffusion of knowledge in the user-oriented perspective (Scarbrough et al., 1998). In spite 
of the strength of this perspective in explaining the process of work systems diffusion, 
there are limitations that the current study attempts to address. Some of the limitations are 
as follows: 
(i) There is limited attention to macro diffusion processes at an industry or a national 
level, with the exception of a handful of examples, such as Jeremy's (1981 in 
Clark, 1987: 162) work on the "transfer of British textile technology, technique 
and knowledge into the USA between 1790 and 1830". 
(ii) The attention given to institutional characteristics, such as employment systems, 
organisational structures (Hedlund, 1994), and sector-specific labour markets 
(Lam, 2000) is scant. 
An investigation of the diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems in the manufacturing 
sector can benefit from the arguments presented in the field of innovation related 
research. It can highlight the role of the adopter or user in the internalisation of `new' 
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work systems. 
2.1.3.4 The Neo-institutional Literature 
A multiplicity and diversity of neo-institutional arguments have had in common the 
questioning of conventional organisational theories. Conventional organisational theories 
rely on understanding organisations as essentially closed systems, working to a logic of 
efficiency, context-free rational agency and/or `one-best-way' in organisational 
structuring and operating (Djelic, 1999). In contrast, the neo-institutional arguments 
emphasise on the "varied ways in which social groups [are] constituted inside and outside 
organisations and their continuous competition for control of resources" (Whitley, 
1999c: 12). There is a belief that the rules of the competitive game are socially constituted 
by different state structures and policies and institutionalised patterns of behaviour, and 
so differ significantly between institutional contexts. Emphasis is laid on "the shaping of 
recursive patterns of corporate or inter-firm behaviour by national institutions both in 
functionally significant areas of business such as education and training, finance etc. as 
well as upon underlying familial patterns of socialisation" (Loveridge and Mueller, 
2000: 221). 
The diversity of neo-institutional arguments stems from different traditions, namely from 
economics, sociology and political science. Differences between these arguments mean 
that the definition of the term institutions adopted in each case also differs. Within the 
neo-institutional theory, there have been two broad schools of thought in comparative 
research-those who argue for isomorphism or convergence of social systems of 
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production (e. g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), and those who examine contextualities in 
industrial organisation and explain for the persistence or divergence of particular 
structural and cultural legacies across national boundaries (e. g. Loveridge, 1996; Streeck, 
1996; Djelic, 1998). Those who examine the contextualities in industrial organisation 
address the gap in research where there is less developed body of research that examines 
the process of work systems diffusion in manufacturing settings beyond the technical 
and/or structural aspects of work systems as solutions to manufacturing settings' 
competitiveness. For instance, organisational theorists and strategists (e. g. Richter and 
Vettel, 1995; Appleyard, 1996) have acknowledged the strategic importance of the 
diffusion of organisational practices, but have given less importance to the institutional 
limits to such diffusions in terms of conflicting structural and cultural legacies and 
embeddedness of work systems in these legacies. "There is evidence to suggest that these 
transfers are not always smooth and successful" (Kostova, 1999: 308). For example, there 
is much research that reports on the local adoption of `Japanese' work systems. The 
resulting picture is far from a replica of a discrete set of these systems (e. g. Reitsperger, 
1986; Elger and Smith, 1994; Mair, 1998b). As was discussed in Section 2.1.3.2, 
proponents of the lean production perspective fail to address the limits to adoption of 
alternative work systems. Although the present study does not disregard the positive 
implications of the diffusion of work systems such as, combination of technical skills for 
innovation, physical resources for economies-of-scale and efficiency and building of 
market capabilities for flexibility (e. g. Aiken and Hage, 1968; Bergquist et al., 1995; 
Sierra, 1995; Child and Faulkner, 1998), it focuses on the limitations to diffusion as these 
have received limited attention. 
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The next section discusses two different typologies of neo-institutional outlook on work 
systems diffusion: rational-choice neo-institutionalism and historical neo-institutionalism. 
The barriers to the diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems are discussed within the 
second typology, that is historical neo-institutionalism. 
2.1.3.4.1 Two Different Outlooks on Neo-institutionalism 
The multiplicity of neo-institutional arguments can be broadly merged under the rational- 
choice and historical neo-institutional typologies. 
Rational-choice neo-institutionalism 
According to Djelic (1999), the rational-choice neo-institutionalism, or institutional 
economics, emerged as an anti-thesis of classical and behavioural theory in economics 
and political science. Within this perspective, the firm is seen as addressing the process of 
creating value and enhancing competitiveness through its `optimal' combination of 
resources (e. g. Schumpeter, 1942; Richardson, 1960). There is a focus on the conditions 
facing firms in general, rather than the internal activities that contribute to the success of 
individual firms. Firms are seen as reactors to the environment. "The internal decision- 
making process is irrelevant, and the firm is treated as if it is a single entity, a single 
brain" (Rowlinson, 1997: 14). In other words, the deterministic outlook on a firm's nature 
and functioning does not take into account a firm's ability to enact its environment. 
However, "gigantic multinational corporations can exercise an economic stranglehold 
backed by the political force of the country and the local capitalistic classes" (Worsley, 
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1982: 13). 
The rational-choice neo-institutionalism highlights the "plurality of governance and 
organisational structures [as being] reconciled with assumptions of rationality and 
efficiency" (Djelic, 1999: 5). Different industries or specific market environments are 
seen as bearing different structural arrangements that are most efficient in a given 
context. Williamson's (1985) assumptions of bounded rationality and logic of efficiency, 
as applied to institutionalism, drive the process of transformation in different contexts 
towards a particular equilibrium solution. There is an emphasis on statistics of 
equilibrium states rather than dynamics (Granovetter, 1985). In other words, there is an 
undersocialised conception of human action and the impact of social structure and social 
relations on production, distribution or consumption. However, institutions can be 
constrained by ongoing social relations. Loveridge (1996: 2) contends that "institutional 
evolution is seen as an ongoing process, subject to prevailing demands of the evolving 
needs of the actors, rather than as the end point of an apparently linear trajectory". As 
Granovetter (1985: 504) argues, "most behaviour is closely embedded in networks of 
interpersonal relations". Behaviour may be aimed not only at economic goals but also at 
sociability, approval, status and power. Such arguments contrast with the conventional 
efficiency arguments within the Rational Choice model in Economics, for rational-choice 
neo-institutionalists do not argue for a superior, universal model. Rather, they adopt a 
contingency approach to transaction cost economics in association with organisational 
structures (or contextual rationality). Actors, in this framework, are defined as bounded- 
rational with decontextualised goals. Granovetter (1985: 481) notes that "much of the 
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utilitarian tradition, including classical and neo-classical economics, assumes rational, 
self-interested behaviour affected minimally by social relations, thus invoking an 
idealised state". Hence, there is limited appreciation of the role of strategic choice, beliefs 
and power. Behavioural characteristics, such as stakeholder relations and personnel 
motivations, are not emphasised, for the assumptions of perfect information and 
atomisation of actors do not necessitate strategy formulation incorporating stakeholder 
relationships and innovative capabilities with reference to institutional constraints on 
choices. Although social institutions matter in the rational-choice neo-institutional 
perspective, they are only seen as parameters in social actors' calculative decision. There 
is the assumption that decision-making is based on "solipsistically acting rational 
individuals" (Lane and Bachmann, 1997: 231; Coleman, 1990), or, in Marini's (1992: 21) 
terms, on purposive actors who "act in ways that tend to produce beneficial results" or 
maximise net return. The rational-choice neo-institutionalism is characterised by its 
"reconciliation of convergence with a plurality of solutions or models, each one of those 
being better fitted, or more efficient type of context or environment" (Djelic, 1999: 4). 
This perspective is in alignment with the neo-contingency arguments whereby a range of 
factors or environmental characteristics are linked to rates of adoption and outcomes of 
implementing innovation processes. For example, (Porter, 1990) stresses the importance 
of nations that are "characterised by their peculiar capabilities within particular sectors in 
which they have developed a regional comparative advantage" (Loveridge, 1996: 4). In 
contrast, historical neo-institutionalism (which is detailed in the following section) 
acknowledges goals, preferences of actors, their problem identification process and the 
historical contexts in which they are embedded. Managerial preferences, normative 
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patterns and political contingencies can affect patterns of growth (Penrose, 1959). 
Furthermore, decision-making can be influenced by the divergent interests of individuals 
within and outside the organisation (Brunsson, 1989). Historical neo-institutionalism 
rejects the very idea of convergence and argues for a multiplicity of models. It is assumed 
that organisational solutions are defined through a historical process where both path 
dependencies and unanticipated developments play a part (Djelic, 1999). 
In the context of work systems diffusion, the rational-choice neo-institutionalist 
arguments tend to centre on the perception that actors can copy the practices of a 
particular institutional environment easily to another context (see discussion in Section 
2.1.3.2). 
Historical neo-institutionalism 
The historical neo-institutional perspective enriches the classical approach to cross- 
national diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems, providing a sense of the 
mechanisms and limits to diffusion. It allows one to discuss the barriers to diffusion, a 
matter rarely treated in the literature. In contrast to conventional efficiency accounts, 
"historical variants of neo-institutionalism have generally set out to account for the 
peculiarities of a given national system of industrial production and for persistent 
structural differences across national boundaries" (Djelic, 1999: 7). 12 Historical neo- 
institutionalism reflects the `societal effects' (Sorge, 1991) approach to work systems 
12 Once institutionalised, governing rules tend to persist "because they become integrated with wider 
economic institutions and ways of thinking" (Dobbin, 1995: 280). 
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diffusion, in that, nationally embedded differences across business systems are 
acknowledged in the process of diffusing alternative work systems. Within this 
perspective, national structural and cultural legacies are traced as a means of determining 
what makes a national system. Institutions are seen as comprising `constitutive and 
regulative rules or normative expectations' that are, to a degree, taken for granted or 
internalised by a group of actors (Abell, 1995). They constitute "copying or mimetic 
action and learning by adaptation" (ibid., p. 11). In other words, institutions are 
transmitted mimetically in groups, resonating an evolutionary epistemology. Although 
advocates of this theory broadly agree that economic activity is embedded within a 
particular set of national institutional constraints, they differ in their focus on the 
constraining legacies. Some researchers (e. g. Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; March and 
Olsen, 1984; Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Fligstein, 1990) emphasise on the structural 
aspects of institutions, investigating mainly the regulative carriers of institutions. Others 
have adopted a more sociological or cultural view, focusing on cognitive and normative 
carriers of institutions, that is values, expectations and belief systems (e. g. Whitley, 
1992). In such a view, cultural mechanisms are taken to increase stability of the work 
environment and to facilitate the equitable mediation of transactions between parties 
under conditions that severely limit the capacity for rational control. 13 
Historical neo-institutionalism acknowledges the peculiarities of each national 
13 Radical change is not incorporated into historical neo-institutionalism. Rather, this perspective 
acknowledges the possibility that historical accidents or unanticipated developments may occur with heavy 
reliance on path-dependent behaviour (Djelic, 1999). By the same token, Powell (1991: 193) argues that 
"path-dependent models suggest that institutional arrangements are not likely to be flexible; they cannot 
change rapidly in response to perturbations in the environment". Hence, the rational-choice neo- 
institutional assumption of reacting to, rather than enacting, the environment prevails to a degree in 
historical neo-institutionalism. 
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institutional context. Hence it rejects the assumption that institutional contexts are 
homogeneous. Social relationships and the impact that collective norms have on these 
relationships are examined in conjunction with the historical underpinnings and structural 
embeddedness of the given ties (Djelic, 1999). As opposed to a static framework 
provided by rational-choice neo-institutionalism in the analysis of the effects of co- 
operation, historical neo-institutionalism offers a more articulated view of the 
characteristics of technology, role of knowledge, nature of the firm and dynamics of 
competition, considering the cognitive dimension of the innovation process (Colombo, 
1998). For instance, although market opportunities lead to innovations in organisational 
design, these innovations are not necessarily the outcomes of rational lines of thinking 
about the most efficient way to organise. Organisational practices, rather, represent 
legitimated structures and cultural understandings (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988). The 
sensitivity to the historical context of work systems or path-dependencies do not allow 
for `best practices' of a particular institutional environment to be uniformly imitated by 
the adopters embedded in a different institutional setting. For example, Patel and Pavitt's 
(1997) study on 400 of the world's largest firms shows that their technological 
competencies are influenced by the firms' principal products and the conditions in their 
home country. It is claimed that managers are heavily constrained in the directions of 
their technological search given the "complexity and path dependency in the 
accumulation of firm-specific technological competencies" (ibid., p. 141). Historical neo- 
institutionalism is sensitive to national contexts, or what Clark (2000) calls the `zones of 
manoeuvre' (which will be defined in Section 2.2). In other words, path dependencies, or 
pre-existing capabilities inherent in contexts and firms, can enable or limit strategic 
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choice intended to contribute to a firm's performance (ibid. ). This perspective recognises 
the potential value of creatively modifying and refining, or in the words of Clark (1987) 
`appropriating', work systems so that the user develops the new practices on a continually 
incremental basis. 
The basic premise of historical neo-institutionalism is that specific organisational and 
behavioural tendencies are shaped by certain features of a given institutional setting that 
is constructed in an evolutionary manner (e. g. Nelson and Winter, 1982). This yields 
what Boyer (1997) calls `capitalist diversity'. In other words, institutionalisation of 
market relations is the result of synchronisation and legitimisation of reactions to crises 
that have developed in a previous system, and reflect `the social and political conflict 
particular to each country' (ibid. ). The institutional framework of a nation is taken as an 
ideal form, specific to a social pattern, based on the following argument: 
Where key institutions structuring the nature of property rights and their 
enforcement, of economic actors, and of the norms governing their 
interaction are more strongly established at the regional or supranational 
levels, then we would expect distinctive patterns of economic organisation 
to become more established within those boundaries. 
(Whitley, 1999a: 118) 
For example, Britain and the USA are seen as characterised by market-oriented 
capitalism, and founded on the institutional characteristics of decentralisation, external 
mobility, role of the market and low level of mediation with trade unions. On the other 
hand, Japan is seen as characterised by high market regulation, institutional co-operation, 
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credit-based financial system and paternalist authority relations. (Further discussion can 
be found in Section 2.1.3.4.2). The institutional characteristics of Britain and USA 
provide for `rapid response to recession' and `adjustment to structural changes' (Boyer, 
1997: 90). Similarly, Whitley (1999c) has documented the character of divergent 
capitalist systems, or in his words multiple `national business systems' (NBSs), as 
distinct. The multiplicity of cultural and structural legacies suggests the co-existence of 
national patterns of organising rather than their reconciliation. This derives from the 
assumption of historical neo-institutionalism that each national institutional background 
is unique and persistent, explaining significant differences in organisational structuring 
and operating across national boundaries (Djelic, 1999). Consequently, the diffusion of 
work systems from one institutional context to another can be constrained by `persistent 
differences' in patterns of organising. In simple terms, "choices [have] been made long 
ago and [are] deeply entrenched in an established `culture' that [is] at least in the short 
term, beyond the reach of contemporary actors" (Crouch and Streeck, 1997: 1). In contrast 
to the environmentally deterministic nature of change within rational-choice neo- 
institutionalism, it is the change in institutional features that initiates organisational 
change within historical neo-institutionalism. Organisational change-in the present 
study, the internalisation of new work systems-is seen as more than a process of 
adaptation driven by rational actors along lines of efficiency. There is, rather, editing of 
knowledge-driven work systems, given the constraints and path dependencies on 
diffusion. Historical neo-institutionalism highlights the stickiness of pre-existing 
institutional legacies, generally defined at the national level and with an impact on 
actions at the firm level. 
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The present study adopts the historical neo-institutionalist, as opposed to the rational- 
choice neo-institutionalist, perspective in an attempt to address the limits to diffusion of 
context-dependent knowledge-driven work systems. The focus is on examining the 
interplay between the context and process of diffusion. (Further justification for the 
adoption of this perspective can be found in Section 2.1.3.5). This study draws a 
distinction between institutional characteristics at the macro national level (such as the 
financial system, state, legal system, public training system and union strength) and those 
at the meso local level (such as the location of the company, skills base in the region, and 
level of industrial dispute, discussed in Section 2.2.1). Given this analytic line of 
demarcation, the perspective adopted in this study differs from others that do not separate 
the national institutional characteristics from the local institutional characteristics (e. g. 
Karnoe, 1995; Erramilli, 1996). It should also be emphasised that there is a focus here on 
dominant institutional characteristics that govern resources, such as labour and finances. 
In practice, few countries are expected to develop all the institutional characteristics "for 
any single coherent way of organising economic activities to be institutionalised as the 
dominant one" (Whitley, 2000b: 858). 
The differences in the institutional and societal infrastructures and networking 
arrangements can lead to variations in internalisation of work systems (Swan et al., 
1999). This suggests a neo-institutional rather than a neo-contingency interpretation. The 
aim here is not to highlight the need to achieve compatibility between work systems and 
the task environment, or to identify systems that are seen as. the most efficient at 
particular points in time, as do scholars such as Miles and Snow (1978). Rather, there is 
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an attempt to consider the contextual influences and the role of actors in work systems 
diffusion involving the interaction of technology, organisation and society (Slappendel, 
1996). It should be noted that the historical neo-institutional approach adopted here 
cannot be subsumed under the neo-contingency framework, but a basic contingency 
argument is inevitable. As Sorge (1991: 186) argues "whenever a correspondence 
between markets, strategies, organisation and human resources is postulated or 
recognised, the argument which makes this explicit is potentially or even necessarily of a 
neo-contingency one". It is desirable to have a fit between institutional regimes and the 
diffusion process to extend the explanatory power of the analytic framework used in this 
study. Loveridge (1998: 1049) contends that "much of the characterisation of national 
systems in the institutionalist literature has been based on the broadest of generalisations 
that sometimes appear to have gained credibility through repeated mutual citation". There 
is an attempt in this study to fine-tune such generalisations through an empirical evidence 
of actors' influence at the firm level on the diffusion process. 
2.1.3.4.2 Divergent Capitalisms 
Various studies conducted within neo-institutionalism argue for the variation in actors' 
ability to act legitimately across institutional settings, for example, the following: 
Maurice et aL (1986) and Sorge (1991) on the `societal effects' on work systems; 
Whitley (1992-2000) on `national business systems'; Dobbin (1995) on the 
embeddedness of economic rationality in institutional norms and conventions; 
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) on `social systems of production'; Herrigal (1996) on 
`industrial orders' in Germany and the USA; and Hamilton and Biggart (1988), Orrü et 
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al., (1991) on post-war East Asian capitalisms. Each institutional context is believed to 
have developed "in contrasting ways as a result of pre-industrial legacies, patterns of 
industrialisation and twentieth-century state structures and policies" (Whitley, 1999b: 16). 
Among the historical neo-institutional arguments listed, those on divergent capitalisms 
are the most appropriate in explaining for the different forms of economic organisation in 
different national contexts. Given the aim of this research, namely to provide a detailed, 
systematic and rigorous comparison of the extent to which work systems are internalised 
in a `foreign' institutional environment, a framework that is sensitive to contextualities 
and pays systematic attention to the influence of social institutions is essential in 
providing answers to the central research question. 
The research focuses on Whitley's (1992-2000) work on divergent capitalisms. This work 
is concerned with "describing and explaining variations in economic organisation 
regardless of whether they become established in geographical regions, states or 
continents" (Whitley, 1999a: 117). It addresses the development of each institutional 
context in contrasting ways as a result of pre-industrial legacies. The central motive of 
the divergent capitalisms view is to account for the existence and persistence of 
nationally distinct forms of economic organisation. Although this view encompasses 
research into the social constitution of the underlying processes, it does not adopt a 
processural perspective to cross-national comparisons. The key element in the framework 
is the firm, which is conceptualised as the dominant unit of governance, differing across 
national systems. Examples include the `chaebol' in South Korea and the `keiretsu' in 
Japan. The divergent capitalisms view highlights key macro-level institutions that are 
seen as shaping different forms of business systems. Whitley (1996,2000a) identifies the 
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governance principles of each market economy or business system as the state, financial 
system, public training system, legal system, authority relations and union strength. The 
degree of standardisation of co-ordination and forms of economic organisation are 
commonly observed in these principles or systems. The key institutional features 
combine to form six types of business systems: fragmented, co-ordinated industrial 
district, compartmentalised, state organised, collaborative and highly co-ordinated (see 
Table 2.1). Each of these systems is seen as reflecting the principles of domination of 
their institutional environments (e. g. Whitley, 1999b). 
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Variations in institutional features arise from the fact that institutionalised rules are 
enacted in a non-uniform way. Given the embeddedness of organisations in larger social 
relations (Granovetter, 1985), principles of governance would be expected to differ 
across business systems. In other words, the way in which managerial co-ordination and 
work organisation of the firm are brought together reflects the institutional context in 
which the organisation is embedded. When organisations extend their operations into new 
institutional contexts, they are highly likely to adapt their existing structures and cultures. 
Institutional constraints can affect the degree to which work systems are diffused to the 
host country (Morgan et al., 2000b). 
The work on divergent capitalisms has been extended to include firm-level organisational 
characteristics. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, these include, among others, task 
fragmentation, worker discretion and involvement, managerial control of work 
organisation, separation of managers from workers and employer commitment to 
employment security (Whitley, 1999b). 14 
This research, as further discussed in Chapter 3, focuses on the structural and cultural 
legacies of two of the six business environments: `highly co-ordinated' and 
`compartmentalised' systems, as the empirical investigation is undertaken in Anglo- 
Japanese settings alone. Japan exemplifies the `highly co-ordinated' business system, 
whereas the US/UK context typifies the `compartmentalised' system (Whitley, 1999b). It 
is recognised here that there is a wide variation among firms within Japan. Nevertheless, 
as a whole, the Japanese MNCs tend to exhibit commonality in their Japan-based systems 
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with regard to work organisation, labour relations and employee development. Hence the 
underlying philosophies, such as team-based work, ambiguous job descriptions, a 
seniority-based reward system, staffing from within and training through job rotation, 
remain the same. 
Highly Co-ordinated Business Systems 
According to Sako (1997), the organisational integration of economic activities is 
associated with the national system of industrial relations. High levels of integration are 
observed in environments characterised by high levels of state risk-sharing, strong 
intermediaries and high market regulations, coupled with some union strength, limited 
public training system and high trust in formal institutions (Whitley, 1999b). Such 
environments encourage collaboration between actors, and develop highly co-ordinated 
systems where risks can easily be shared and the state plays a highly co-ordinating role. 
'5 
For example, studies in Japanese business systems (e. g. Orrü, 1997) show that 
institutional co-operation is a key feature of the overarching organisational logic of 
highly co-ordinated business systems. In the context of cross-national diffusion of work 
systems, firms operating in highly co-ordinated business systems are not likely to be 
involved in diffusing central activities that are closely linked to domestic partners and 
agencies. "They [highly co-ordinating systems] find it difficult to shift key activities and 
significant resources to foreign locations, and moreover are unlikely to see the need for 
14 These characteristics are discussed in Section 3.1.2, Chapter 3. 
15 Research on Japanese overseas plants (e. g. Kenney and Florida, 1993) demonstrates that highly co- 
ordinated systems "encourage domestic partners to establish subsidiaries in the same locations so that they 
can share risks with them and rely on established relationships to reduce uncertainty in the new 
environment" (Whitley, 1999c: 18). 
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such investment as long as their domestic location and commitments are viewed as 
providing major advantages" (Whitley, 1999c: 12). Given their strong embeddedness in a 
network of mutual obligations and commitment (Gerlach, 1992; Sako, 1992; McMillan, 
1996), firms in these systems tend to implement incremental, continuous and 
interdependent change. This means such firms are more likely to constrain their radical 
diversification into related fields. A credit-based financial system also has a role to play 
in this, as banks (which have strong links with their clients) become reluctant to invest in 
unrelated industries. Hence, there is less of an opportunity for an entrepreneurial 
function. However, this does not imply that firms in highly co-ordinated systems have 
limited firm-specific competences. As is suggested by Whitley (2000b: 878, brackets 
added), "skills are more firm dependent and specific [in highly co-ordinated business 
systems, such as Japan] than in economies with strong public training systems organised 
around existing industries [as that in Germany]". As will be shown in Chapters 3, there is 
greater emphasis on tacit work systems and, hence, greater work-system specificity in 
highly co-ordinated NBSs. There is a lock-in to growth goals with credit-based financial 
system and long-term employer-employee relations. Such relations based on mutual 
obligations limit opportunistic behaviour and allow for considerable trust between actors, 
as well as major knowledge and risk sharing. This institutional characteristic may not 
prevail in other business systems, and its absence may facilitate the diffusion of work 
systems to other contexts. However, the strong connection also means that actors may 
find it difficult to exit the network when prevailing conditions change (e. g. Zysman, 
1983). Furthermore, the institutional arrangements of highly co-ordinated systems, such 
as reciprocal paternalist authority relations, encourage investment in skills development. 
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These skills are typically firm-specific due to long-term commitments and an 
`experience' model of education (Hibino, 1997), encompassing in-house training and job 
rotation (Dore and Sako, 1997). 
The `structure and flow' aspects (Sorge, 1996: 73) of highly co-ordinated institutions form 
distinct national patterns, in which firms and inter-firm relations are governed within a 
tightly-knit network. Sorge (1996) conceptualises the structural aspects as the properties 
that characterise the composition of a group of people or of a system, such as different 
types of labour based on age, experience, specialism and learning. The flow aspects refer 
to "additions and subtractions which occur with regard to a dimension over a certain 
period of time", such as labour market mobility between firms (ibid., p. 73). 
Embeddedness in a tightly-knit network can have negative implications for the 
diffusibility of work systems from strongly institutionalised environments that limit 
opportunistic behaviour and depend on considerable trust between social partners to 
contexts exhibiting low extent of alliance integration (Whitley, 2000a). In other words, 
highly localised, context-dependent work systems can be `sticky' to diffuse to other 
institutional contexts. Allied hierarchies, commonly observed in highly co-ordinated 
business systems, tend to allow for limited diffusibility of firm-specific competitive 
advantages to foreign subsidiaries and limited subsidiary development of distinct 
organisational capabilities, given their highly embedded nature (Whitley, 1999b). Such 
hierarchies are seen as internationalising more slowly and incrementally than firms in, for 
example, compartmentalised business systems. "A more common pattern of 
internationalisation for firms in highly co-ordinated environments is to rely initially on 
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exports because of their dependence on business partners and employees for competitive 
advantage" (ibid., p. 21). Societal patterns may not be reproduced in different contexts 
even where an oncoming innovation is basically similar, for "changes are not the same in 
every society, even when we are dealing with technical challenges" (Sorge, 1996: 81). 
The discussion of the institutional characteristics of highly co-ordinated business systems 
allows one to claim that the knowledge-driven work systems of firms in highly co- 
ordinated business systems are likely to be less diffusible to other institutional 
environments. The variation in labour market institutions, state structures and policies 
and financial systems in different societies can discourage the diffusibility of knowledge- 
driven work systems to other firms. (This will be further explained in Section 3.1, 
Chapter 3). 
Compartmentalised Business Systems 
The compartmentalised business system, in which UK organisational practices are 
embedded, differs greatly from the highly co-ordinated system in its institutionalised 
procedures regulating business practice and the norms governing market boundaries. In 
less integrated or embedded contexts of economic relations with relatively easy market 
entry and exit, such as those of the US and the UK, the dominant institutions discourage 
co-operation and collaboration between business partners, including employers and 
employees. Work systems or organisational practices of firms in compartmentalised 
business systems are not strongly embedded in social networks of close co-operation and 
high interdependency. This is illustrated by the member firms' low capacity for collective 
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problem solving (Lane and Bachmann, 1997). Relations between actors are defined as 
`arm's length' and typically adversarial. 16 Firms are relatively isolated from each other. 
Consequently, the influence of employee interests and business partners on decision- 
making is low, as is frequently reported in studies of Japanese operations in the UK (e. g. 
Murata and Harrison, 1991). This has negative implications for continuous innovation 
and the development of long-term growth strategies. There is, rather, a reliance on a 
strongly institutionalised formal system of rules and procedures that facilitates delegation 
and trust in formal institutions. Trust is governed `contractually' rather than through 
`obligational contracting' (Sako, 1992). For example, Kester (1996: 108) suggests Anglo- 
American corporate governance emphasises "the reduction of agency costs associated 
with the separation of ownership from control, relying more heavily on formal, legalistic 
mechanisms to order commercial relationships among transacting parties". The co- 
ordinating role of the state is limited. The state acts more as a regulator, where "finance 
flows through competitive capital markets rather than banks, and training is more a 
matter for individual investment than for co-ordinated collaboration between state 
agencies, employers and unions", creating a predictable environment in which rationality 
of decision-making can be highlighted to a greater extent (Whitley, 1999c: 8). This has 
the implication that organisational practices of compartmentalised business systems are 
more diffusible to other institutional environments. The limited collaboration, short- 
termism, weak control systems and fragmented training systems in compartmentalised 
institutional environments generate work systems that are easier to diffuse than those of 
highly co-ordinated environments. 
16 Formal institutions in compartmentalised business environments "tend to be organised into discrete 
spheres of influence with little co-ordination between them" (Whitley, 2000a: 8). 
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Individualism and limited conventions governing roles in compartmentalised business 
systems (e. g. Lewchuck's (1992) discussion of the diffusion of Fordist technology in 
Britain) may foster entrepreneurialism in firms. However, this may not necessarily reflect 
firms' capability to develop a firm-specific or idiosyncratic knowledge base. As Lane 
(1996: 276) argues "lack of support for favourable access to capital, skill and R&D [in 
compartmentalised business systems] ... 
has reinforced the risk-aversion and short- 
termism fostered by the [capital market-based] financial system", which can discourage 
the development of firm-specific knowledge base. 
Compartmentalised business systems are also linked to fragmented training systems. In 
other words, skills training and control systems are identified as weak. Limited 
collaboration between employers, unions and other groups discourages co-operation in 
the management of training systems (Whitley, 1999b). It is argued that "while 
collaboration between functions has improved, the level of dismantlement of these 
internal vertical specialisations is only slowly taking effect in Western firms" (Mueller 
and Loveridge, 1997: 146). As commitment and mutual dependence are limited, employee 
contribution to knowledge creation is constrained. Adaptation to environmental changes 
is through organisational structuring rather than in-house learning and employee 
adaptability. The implications of these institutional features for diffusibility of work 
systems need to be considered. Isolated hierarchies, commonly observed in these 
systems, do not offer the same advantages in terms of sharing idiosyncratic knowledge 
with employees and business partners as allied hierarchies in highly co-ordinated 
systems. Competences are not `constrained' by obligational ties to partners. Hence they 
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are more mobile across borders. This deems work practices in compartmentalised 
business systems more diffusible to other institutional environments (Whitley, 1999b). In 
order to manage risk and uncertainty, firms in compartmentalised systems are more likely 
to move assets across sectors and gain experience of managing diverse activities. They 
are also more likely to delegate autonomy to subsidiaries, and encourage the adoption of 
polycentric rather than ethnocentric strategies. '? As Whitley (1996c: 20) contends, firms 
in compartmentalised business systems "are likely to assume that their firm specific 
competitive advantages can be equally successful abroad as at home... since 
[organisational competences are] not closely tied to particular links with local business 
partners and institutions". 
2.1.3.5 Comparing Perspectives within Japanisation, Innovation Processes and Neo- 
institutional Literatures 
As is shown in Table 2.2, the four major perspectives as applied to knowledge-driven 
work systems diffusion differ from each other in some important aspects. It should be 
noted that the distinction drawn in this table is not based on a comprehensive list of 
mutually exclusive features of the four major perspectives. The table is a schematic 
presentation of the dominant characteristics of each perspective in comparison to the 
other. Marked differences in the table concern the focus (processes versus technical 
and/or structural properties of firms), the level of investigation (intra-firm versus inter- 
firm), the nature of the framework (universal versus embedded) and the view of work 
systems diffusion (objectified versus context-dependent or sedimented). The attention 
17 Polycentric strategy refers to the adoption of a system that conforms to local practices (Rosenzweig and 
Nohria, 1994). 
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paid to the nature and historical roots of social institutions also differs among the 
different perspectives. 
With reference to the research aim, it is essential to select a perspective that provides a 
systematic and rigorous comparison of the levels of implementation and internalisation of 
Japanese work systems in `foreign' institutional environments. The labour process view 
within the Japanisation literature presents a universalistic approach to the control-related 
aim of introducing Japanese work practices. Although this view focuses more on 
processes than technical and structural properties of firms (which is in line with the aim 
of the current research), it predominantly investigates intra-firm characteristics, such as 
the impact of Japanese work systems on employee empowerment, rather than inter-firm 
organisation of resources. The nature of work systems diffusion (whether it is objectified 
or context-dependent) is not of concern in this view. There is a focus on governance and 
control mechanisms implicit in the diffusion of work systems. The impact of path 
dependencies and institutional constraints on the internalisation of such systems is not 
acknowledged. The universalistic understanding of the control-related nature of work 
systems in the labour process view within the Japanisation literature is not in accordance 
with the purpose of the present research. 
Nor is the `lean production' perspective considered as suitable for forming the basis of 
the analytic framework. Although the level of investigation of work systems diffusion is 
inter-firm, this perspective ignores the contextualities in the diffusion process. It 
emphasises on the objectified nature of work systems diffusion with a focus on the 
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diffusion of work structures and technicalities. There is a universalistic view of work 
systems as best practices that can be diffused with ease to other contexts. Constraints on 
the diffusion process are not considered. 
At a first glance, the user-oriented perspective within the innovation processes literature 
seems well suited as a basis for the analytic framework in this study. This perspective 
focuses on processes and acknowledges the social embeddedness of work systems and 
the context-dependent nature work systems diffusion. It bears similarities with the 
historical neo-institutional perspective with regard to the sensitivity it shows to 
contextual features that can lead to differences in the internalisation of alternative work 
systems. However, studies on innovation processes adopting the user-oriented 
perspective only recently have aimed at investigating inter-organisational arrangements 
across countries (e. g. Swan et al., 1999). Majority of the studies adopting this perspective 
do not link inter-firm level investigations to the influence of institutional characteristics at 
a national level (Clark (1987) is an exception to this). If a link is made, this is not 
performed in a systematic manner. The diffusion of organisational practices themselves is 
not considered as a key learning activity. Rather, internal processes and strategic 
decisions about innovation-design of user organisations are analysed. 
In contrast to the user-oriented perspective within the innovation processes literature, the 
historical neo-institutional perspective offers a framework that links characteristics of 
work systems to path dependencies within particular institutional settings in a systematic 
manner (e. g. Djelic, 1998). A systematic comparison of the context-dependent nature of 
61 
work systems diffusion provides a rigorous analysis of the diffusion process. The focus is 
not on the process of technology development but on that of diffusing organisational 
structures and processes, including HRM activities (e. g. Sorge, 1991). The impact of key 
characteristics of distinct social institutions on the firm is acknowledged. This historical 
neo-institutional approach is different from Porter's (1990) work on the competitive 
advantage of nations. It is more specific, restricted to fewer countries, related to the 
organisation and human resources literature in greater detail and informed by systematic 
comparisons of cases. Regarding these merits, the historical neo-institutional perspective 
is considered as the appropriate basis for constructing the analytic framework in the 
present study. As the analyses using the historical neo-institutional perspective generally 
reside at the macro national level (e. g. Herrigal, 1996), arguments are drawn from the 
user-oriented perspective in the innovation processes literature to formulate propositions 
on the diffusion process at the micro firm level. 
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In the following section, a number of shortcomings are listed with regard to observations 
in the literature on the historical neo-institutional perspective. The limitations of the 
perspective are addressed in order to develop more process-sensitive framework that can 
guide and structure the present study. In other words, Whitley's work on divergent 
capitalisms, which addresses structure rather than agency, is furthered by linking 
structures to micro-level social action in which they are implicated. "Contexts of meaning 
within which individuals define themselves, interpret their roles and act accordingly" are 
acknowledged without losing sight of the structural aspects (Karnoe and Nygaard, 
1999: 85). 
2.2 The Historical Neo-institutional Perspective: Critique and Refinements 
The historical neo-institutional perspective adopted here provides an evolutionary, path- 
dependent view of transformation. It delineates more a linear, sequential process of 
change than a cyclical one. It does not account for instances of radical change (Djelic, 
1999), and runs the risk of overlooking the possibility that organisations can be 
sufficiently powerful to enact their environments. In contrast to the evolutionary theory 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), the historical neo-institutional perspective is concerned with 
the peculiarities of each institutional context that explain for persistent differences in 
organisational structuring and operating. The historical neo-institutional perspective does 
not assume path-determined (as opposed to path-dependent) firm behaviour patterns and 
market outcomes in an attempt to determine the profitability of each firm. Although the 
process of change is seen as highly situation-specific and decisions are perceived as being 
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influenced by various environmental factors, organisational solutions within historical 
neo-institutionalism are regarded as being defined within specific historical contexts via 
unanticipated developments. This draws the criticism that the historical neo-institutional 
perspective is static in nature. Although the historical variant of neo-institutional theory 
rejects the idea of convergence in organisational structuring and operating, it represents a 
new constraint, in that, institutional contexts are seen as narrowing firms' choices with 
respect to strategies and solutions and as shaping goals and preferences (Hollingsworth 
and Boyer, 1997). The emphasis on regularity and stability (or incremental change) 
within this perspective rarely builds in the role of the collective or individual actor. 
Rather, actions are seen as predetermined by institutional conditions. However, a firm's 
knowledge can be "continually re(constituted) through the activities undertaken within a 
firm" (Tsoukas, 1996: 22). "Whitley offers no amplification on how [institutional] forces 
interact with the actors' social responses, seen to have become institutionalised within the 
structures he delineates" (Loveridge, 1996: 5, brackets added). Hence, it is proposed in the 
present research that the role of actors in shaping work systems is important. Attention is 
paid not only to structural and cultural developments in the past to arrive at explanations 
about present diffusion processes, but also to the role of management and the 
interpretation of alternative work systems by employees. The internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems can be "blocked or facilitated by the nature of the 
cultural infrastructure and the role of human agencies" (Loveridge, 1987: 193). The 
crucial factor in the internalisation of such systems is the interaction between the context 
and the process of diffusion. There is an interest here in investigating this interplay. The 
historical neo-institutional perspective is refined to incorporate the process dimension of 
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the diffusion of work systems in this study. Empirical evidence is provided to integrate 
actors into action and to combine action with constraints by highlighting the limitations 
to the diffusion process. As suggested by the arguments in the innovation processes 
literature (e. g. Hislop et al., 1998), the internalisation of work systems is an active 
process involving actors' decisions to adopt new ideas, where the links between 
implementation and internalisation processes are important in determining the outcome of 
the diffused system. Furthermore, implementation is a necessary condition for 
internalisation of a work system, for a work system cannot be infused with value unless it 
is used in the organisation (Kostova, 1999). Hence, context-dependent knowledge is 
subjected to actors' interpretation upon its diffusion to a new setting. In other words, its 
"utilisation or development during the innovation process requires the active involvement 
of those workers who possess it" (Hislop et al., 1998: 438). Actors have the potential to 
creatively interpret their past experiences. "Acquisition of knowledge is not a simple 
matter of taking in knowledge; rather things assumed to be natural categories, such as 
`bodies of knowledge', `learners', and `cultural transmission' require reconceptualisation 
as cultural, social products" (Lave, 1993: 8). In other words, knowledge undergoes 
construction and transformation when put to use (Blackler, 1995). 
There is a dynamic interaction among episodes of external acquisition of knowledge, its 
use by firms and the commitment by firms to the extent that the acquired knowledge 
assumes a taken-for-granted or institutionalised nature. Knowledge-driven work systems 
are institutionalised when "the employees at the recipient unit attach to the practice a 
symbolic meaning and value, as have the employees from the home country" (Kostova, 
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1999: 311). Actors are a vital component of work systems that are diffused by translations 
to their international affiliates. The refinement suggested here is displayed in Figure 2.1 
(which will be explained in detail in Section 2.2.1.4). This figure constitutes one of the 
building blocks of the analytic framework. It indicates that, triggered by operational 
and/or strategic motivations, work systems are acquired and put to use by management. 
The role of management is observed in the implementation of work systems. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of alternative work systems within the firm points to the 
translation of existing work systems by employees that results in appropriated work 
systems or the blending of `new' work systems with the existing ones. The adopter view 
of diffusion is addressed here with an emphasis on the investigation of the degree of 
internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems. The implementation and 
internalisation processes are viewed as ongoing processes. 
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Figure 2.1 The Implementation and Internalisation of Knowledge-driven Work 
Systems with a Process Dimension 
Degree of implementation of work systems 
1 
Degree of internalisation of work systems 
Existing 
Translation/ Appropriated 
work lip 
editing of work systems 
work 
systems systems 
Source: See text 
Although the historical neo-institutional perspective acknowledges the process of editing 
work systems, it views this process as driven by pre-existing legacies. However, actors 
may not be fully constrained or determined in their values and interests. For example, 
they can amplify their decisions through their memberships in networks. Clark (2000) 
contends that contexts imply `zones of manoeuvre'. In other words, firms do not act alone 
nor do they "reconfigure [their] repertoire of capabilities as a design rule except within 
certain degrees of freedom" (ibid., p. 304). There is co-evolution, in the sense, contexts 
contain constraints as well as enablers and, hence, pre-existing processes in a transitional 
period may lead to a new configuration. This is illustrated by Blundel and Clark's (2001) 
study on two cheesemakers, categorised as artisanal or craft-based firms, in the UK. Their 
tale of the cheesemakers shows that networks in which the firms are embedded are 
dynamic, idiosyncratic and living phenomena. They argue that `inherited' factors within 
the specific social structures of the two cheesemakers shape learning and, hence, the 
growth trajectory of firms. 
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The level of analysis in neo-institutional research is commonly at the macro level. "There 
is a pronounced need for cross-cultural scholars to conduct more micro-level research 
that documents what happens when managers from different cultures work together" 
(Brannen and Salk, 1999: 334). There is only a mention rather than a detailed empirical 
study of the impact of the national level on that of the firm. The national level is 
generally considered as the appropriate level of analysis for social institutions (Whitley, 
1992). However, social patterns shaping the diffusion process at the firm level also need 
to be considered. Key characteristics of the institutional environment in which a firm 
operates are insufficient for a detailed analysis of the implementation and internalisation 
of work systems at the firm level. Once again, an attempt is made to refine the historical 
neo-institutional perspective by complementing the national level with the firm level. 
This will be detailed in Section 2.2.1. Although Whitley (1999c) defines key work 
systems characteristics at the firm level in his later work, it is not clear how these systems 
are affected in a context of cross-national diffusion across conflicting national business 
systems. 
The historical neo-institutional perspective also has the shortcoming of disregarding local 
institutional characteristics in its analysis. Mueller and Loveridge (1997: 154) propose 
that "what is perhaps required is that the interaction between the MNC and the key 
institutions isolated by NBS/NIS theorists should be studied in greater depth in its local 
context and across a range of sectors as well as a number of levels of corporate activity". 
Key contextual characteristics can be both industry-specific and site-specific. The 
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historical neo-institutional perspective examines dominant patterns of institutional 
arrangement, and hence is not sensitive to different levels of implementation and 
internalisation of work systems across different localities, such as location sites. As is 
discussed in the next section, it is useful here to analyse the nature of the local (in 
addition to the national) contexts of firms, given that the research focuses on a 
comparative analysis of the diffusion of work systems. The present study addresses these 
shortcomings by aiming to investigate the interaction between the context and the 
process. 
2.2.1 Constructing the Analytic Framework 
In line with the historical neo-institutional perspective adopted here, the diffusion of 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems is seen as being channelled and constrained by 
national social institutions. In other words, a "firm's knowledge is derived from the 
broader industrial and societal context within which a firm is embedded" (Tsoukas, 
1996: 22). Key social institutions that are likely to influence the degree to which work 
systems are internalised were listed in Section 2.1.3.4.2. The following sections, from 
2.2.1.1 to 2.2.1.3, detail the nature of the influence of national institutional, local 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics on the diffusion of work systems. 
Similar to Figure 2.1, each of the figures presented in the three sections constitutes the 
building blocks of the analytic framework. This is followed by a discussion of the 
attributes of work systems diffusion in Section 2.2.1.4. 
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2.2.1.1 The Influence of Key Institutional Characteristics 
National Institutional Level 
Governance structures and capabilities developed in home countries can affect the nature 
of the investments made, where and when they are made, and how they are managed in 
internationalisation efforts. It is suggested that weakly institutionalised contexts of 
economic activity will be less conducive to developing stable and wide ranging 
partnerships and long-term commitments across boundaries (Whitley, 1999c). For 
example, particularistic environments, such as China, are notable for their weak state 
combined with weak norms of governing economic transactions. In contrast to weakly 
institutionalised settings, highly co-ordinated business systems, such as Japan, present 
strongly institutionalised systems of normative rules that lock key actors into long-term 
commitments, and encourage co-operative behaviour by restricting exit from business 
networks. Hence, highly co-ordinated business systems would be expected to be 
favourable to the internalisation of work systems. 18 However, the ability of firms in such 
systems to diffuse their work systems to other institutional contexts is questionable. 
Firms in these systems are likely to "limit the size and centrality of their initial FDI" 
(Whitley, 1999c: 13). (This was discussed in detail in Section 2.1.3.4.2, under Highly Co- 
ordinated Business Systems). Given the embeddedness of practices in home economies, 
commitments to new partnerships are expected, in general, to be limited. There is likely 
to be an integration of foreign subsidiaries into the parent company's operations, and 
18 The analytic distinction between highly co-ordinated and compartmentalised business systems in its link 
to the degree to which work systems are internalised will aid in the formulation of propositions in Chapter 
3. 
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linkages developing incrementally. Nevertheless, it is likely that firms in highly co- 
ordinated systems will allow their subsidiaries to learn and adopt new ways of doing 
things, as long as there is control over key or strategic resources. 19 
Firms operating in highly co-ordinated systems are highly likely to adopt complex and 
risky innovation strategies that require considerable amount of both tacit and explicit 
knowledge to develop and implement such innovations. This in turn can enhance and 
develop organisational capabilities (Whitley, 2000b). Skills in these institutions are 
"more firm-dependent and specific than in economies with strong public training systems 
organised around existing industries" (ibid., p. 878). Work systems are developed in- 
house and regarded as highly tacit and difficult to access by outsiders. 
Whereas, given the weak public training systems, the role of the state as a regulator, flow 
of finance through capital markets and reliance on formalised rules and procedures (see 
Section 2.1.3.4.2 for a detailed discussion), compartmentalised business systems, such as 
the UK, constitute a weakly institutionalised environment. Such business systems are 
likely to be unfavourable to the internalisation of work systems, for firms in these 
systems are characterised by `arm's length' relationships, and entry and exit 
arrangements for actors are more flexible. Firms are not constrained by obligational ties 
to stakeholders, including employees. Their competitive advantages are not dependent on 
other actors in a business network, and are more willing to invest major resources abroad 
(Whitley, 1999c). As business partners cannot be relied upon to manage risks, firms in 
19 The separation of control and local adaptation activities is difficult where the knowledge diffused is 
highly tacit (Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
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compartmentalised systems "control more widely varied and unconnected activities and 
resources than co-operative ones" (ibid., p. 14). Consequently, they gain a broader range 
of experience in managing the activities of different kinds of industries. Transplants of 
such firms are more likely to be delegated autonomy by the parent company in 
developing strategies to adapt to the local context. Knowledge of such firms tends to be 
highly mobile given their inclination to standardise work procedures. Hence, they are 
likely to assume that their organisational capabilities can produce successful results 
abroad as at home. 
Firms operating in compartmentalised systems are highly likely to adopt innovation 
strategies that are often dependent on new, codified knowledge as a key to organisational 
competence (Whitley, 2000b). Their formalised systems are likely to be easier to diffuse 
than tacit knowledge. Low skills and limited employee involvement in such business 
systems can hinder the learning necessary to adapt to changing environmental conditions. 
Moreover, organisational flexibility is likely to be inhibited by standardisation of 
knowledge and the limited accumulation of tacit knowledge (Lazonick, 1998). 
The results of the above discussion are summarised in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 The Impact of National Institutional Characteristics on Work Systems 
Diffusion 
Characteristics of work Highly co-ordinated Compartmentalised 
systems 
Willingness to diffuse Limited Considerable 
Diffusibility of firm- Limited High 
specific competitive 
advantages to foreign 
subsidiaries 
Central control of Considerable Variable 
subsidiaries and integration 
with parent companies 
Subsidiary development of Limited Considerable 
distinct organisational 
capabilities 
Extent to which competitive High Low 
competences are firm- 
specific (with reference to 
tacitness of work systems) 
Source: Adapted from Whitley (1999c) 
Local Institutional Level 
In addition to the impact of institutional variation at the national level, local institutional 
characteristics can have an effect on the implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems. The salient characteristics that are considered in the 
present research are the location area and site of companies' level of industrial dispute 
and the skills base in a given region. 
A number of researches carried out in the area of `Japanisation' have examined the 
impact of local labour supply and industrial relations of transplants on work organisation 
(e. g. Elger and Smith, 1994; Sharpe, 1999). For example, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) 
identify low trade union strength (i. e. low labour dispute) as facilitating the diffusion of 
new work systems in Japanese subsidiaries in the UK. Furthermore, Sharpe (1999) points 
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to the ability of firms to be highly selective with regard to their workforce (whereby skills 
can be developed in-house) on a greenfield site with high Japanese inward investment. It 
is suggested that high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) familiarise workers in a 
region with the practices to be introduced. Moreover, there is a strong network to support 
the adoption of `new' systems (ibid. ). The brownfield site in Sharpe's research presents 
an unsupportive context, characterised by a traditional declining manufacturing region 
(i. e. a centre for manufacturing), a low inward investment, a high level of industrial 
dispute and a heterogeneous workforce in terms of previous work experience, for the 
internalisation of `new' work practices. There is resistance to new methods of work and 
shop floor practices. Similarly, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992: 55) show that "trade unions 
increase the scope for demarcation disputes, greatly hindering acceptance of change and 
flexible labour deployment within the company". 
Consequently, one can expect the degree of internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven 
work systems to be high where there is a favourable local institutional context, 
characterised by a non-unionised labour market, and location on a greenfield site in an 
area with a strong service sector (where labour can be expected to be relatively free of 
preconceived ideas in manufacturing, and more easily indoctrinated in new ways of 
operating). Similarly, one would expect a large supply of unskilled workers in a given 
area to be conducive to the internalisation of alternative work systems as workers would 
not be embedded in a tradition of manufacturing that can prove to be difficult to change. 
For example, Sharpe (1997: 186) notes that "the possibility of starting with a new 
workforce, with comparatively less experience of factory work including middle-aged 
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women and young workers recently out of school, with fewer preconceptions, [can allow] 
the introduction of initiatives with comparatively less resistance and fear by the workers". 
In contrast, where there is an unfavourable local institutional context, characterised by a 
unionised labour market, a small supply of unskilled workforce and location on a 
brownfield site in a centre for manufacturing, one can expect the degree of internalisation 
of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems to be low (see Figure 2.2 for a pictorial 
representation of the key local institutional characteristics that can have an impact on 
work systems diffusion). 
Figure 2.2 Key Local Institutional Characteristics that are Likely to Have an 
Impact on the Diffusion of Work Systems 
Location 
Level of 
industrial 
site dispute 
Skills base I Location 
of labour area 
Source: See text 
2.2.1.2 The Influence of Key Organisational Characteristics 
The nature of organisational characteristics, such as the size and age of the company, are 
likely to affect the diffusion of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems (c. f. Lincoln 
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and Kalleberg, 1990). 20 For instance, large organisations can offer more benefits than 
smaller enterprises, and this can explain the high level of implementation of new 
practices. Similarly, the longer the affiliate company has been in operation, the more 
familiar are the employees likely to become with the new work systems. 
The nature of work systems can be an important factor in the degree to which systems are 
diffused. The nature of work systems is conceptualised in this study as structural, 
cultural, control-related and technological. The four types of work systems are selected in 
such a way that a comprehensive account of the phenomenon under investigation is 
provided. The diffusion of organisational structures is defined here as a shift to team 
structure, that is, to a structural environment created for employees to participate through 
teams. Organisational structures are seen as having an effect on the work attitudes of 
individual employees (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). 
Cultural work systems are defined in this study as the values and norms (Dacin et al., 
1999) that constitute the philosophies which underlie the technical and structural 
elements of continuous improvement schemes, such as attention to detail and efforts 
committed to training. Chatman and Jehn (1994) specify respect for people, detail and 
team orientation as some of the values composing organisational culture. Cultural 
practices include internal training and small group activities and the underlying principles 
of valuing the details of work, stressing quality, formalising work stages and demanding 
high levels of task-related discipline, generally associated with Japanese management, 
20 The age of a company is not necessarily related to its location on a brownfield or a greenfield site. For 
example, a company on a brownfield site may be younger than that on a greenfield site. 
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and "observed in many overseas subsidiaries of Japanese multinational corporations" 
(Dedoussis, 1995: 735). For example, training can be the core element of Japanese 
employees' high levels of commitment to continuous improvement activities (e. g. 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1998). It is proposed here that the degree of implementation 
and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems can be affected by the 
cultural nature of the diffused practices. 
The control-related system is defined here as the degree of Japanese involvement in 
strategic decisions and operations as well as hands-on management in the host or adopter 
company. This definition is based on Doz and Prahalad's (1984) argument that a 
partner's influence on joint venture's strategy formulation and implementation is a better 
measure of control in circumstances where local firms depend highly on foreign partner's 
technology and marketing methods. Such involvement has implications for the adopter 
firm's perception of a power exercise by the source company. The role of management or 
management intervention is crucial in shaping that perception. Managers can act as a 
medium for acquiring and encoding timely information. Their strategic and operational 
aims and the way those aims are met (hands-on or hands-off) can have an impact on the 
extent to which work systems are diffused. For example, a high level of direct 
involvement in the development of employment skills in Japan is claimed to influence the 
involvement of workers in innovative strategies positively (Whitley, 2000b). 
Furthermore, studies on innovation processes show that specialised personnel such as 
`technological gatekeepers' have a significant effect on the diffusion of knowledge 
between organisations (e. g. Inkpen and Dinur, 1998). Consequently, it is proposed here 
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that the degree to which Japanese work systems are put to use and accepted is likely to be 
influenced by the control-related systems that are diffused. 
It should be noted that high levels of control could result in a widespread implementation 
of source company's work systems but not necessarily lead to a high level of 
internalisation. As Kostova (1999: 319) argues, 
when the single motive for the transfer of a practice is to achieve 
legitimacy with, and approval by, the parent company, the employees at 
the recipient unit will go on to develop positive attitudes toward the 
practice. Thus, dependence will have effect on implementation but not on 
internalisation. 
Ideas or know-how about practices can be diffused only when such practices are actually 
perceived and realised by local employees (Abo, 1992). 
A number of researches (e. g. Taylor et al., 1994; Delbridge, 1998) within the 
`Japanisation' literature point to worker resistance in response to the power exercised by 
Japanese expatriate management in the diffusion of work systems. For example, workers 
can `survive' the system (i. e. attempt to distance themselves from management, such as 
by not wearing the uniform and avoiding overtime), `moderate' the system (i. e. attempt to 
secure some control over work such as the speed), and `beat' the system (i. e. secure 
significant counter-control in relation to the management system and actively to 
challenge managerial prerogatives) (Delbridge, 1998: 194). The worker response to a 
power exercise can partly reflect the degree to which workers have internalised `new' 
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work systems. (This will be further detailed in Section 2.2.1.3). 
Here, technological practices refer to advanced production systems technology that is 
needed for the efficient running of assembly lines and technical systems. Lack of such 
technology can be an impediment to delivering efficiency improvements (e. g. Boyer, 
1998). Technology diffusion is seen as essential for the design and development of new 
models (e. g. Chung, 1998). For instance, Hyundai relied on technology diffusion and 
styling concepts from Mitsubishi in order to reduce its lead-time on model development 
(ibid., p. 171). The adoption of CAD/CAM at Hyundai reduced expenditures on new 
model development by around 20 per cent by cutting work in progress. Recently, PSA 
Peugeot Citroen of France has joined forces with Vivendi, the French communications 
group, to develop the technology necessary for defining the role of telematics in the car 
of tomorrow (FT. com, 2000). A high implementation of Japanese work systems is likely 
where there is a skilful blend of people, business processes and technology. This is based 
on the assumption that the diffusion process is related to group responsiveness, 
organisational characteristics and institutional characteristics, such as employment 
systems, labour markets and organisational structure (Hedlund, 1994). Consequently, it is 
proposed here that technological practices can also have an effect on the diffusion of 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. 
In the present study, cultural and control-related systems21 are taken as largely intangible, 
tacit systems, whilst structural and technological systems are seen as representing largely 
21 Control-related systems are also seen as intangible given the reliance of the Japanese on networks of 
interdependence rather than formal sets of rules for surveillance (e. g. Fucini and Fucini, 1990). 
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tangible, explicit systems (see Section 2.1.2 for a conceptualisation of tacit and explicit 
systems). This is in line with the distinction drawn by Brannen et al. (1999: 124) between 
the "`hard side' [or the hardware] of the production system-the equipment, technical 
process flow (such as heat treat and machining), automation and flexible assembly" and 
the `soft side', or the software, of the production system, such as a system of quality 
assurance, a clean and orderly workplace and a well maintained equipment wherever 
possible. The software of the production system, in this context, refers to processes that 
are heavily people-dependent: that is of high system embeddedness. For example, "in 
Japanese car plants people are still playing key roles at many levels" (Abo, 1992: 171). 
The plant level people are expected to have the ability to understand the linked processes 
before and after their own jobs and to be involved in attending the machines as well as 
the products handled by them. In other words, processes that are more or less tightly 
integrated with other technical and social systems are seen as being highly contextualised 
or of high tacitness. Tacit work systems in this study are operationalised as the intangible 
foundation of continuous improvement schemes, such as discipline, trust, team spirit and 
participation. In contrast, processes that can easily be detached from their context of 
formation are characterised in this study as highly objectified, to the extent that they are 
low in system embeddedness and reflect a large explicit knowledge base. Explicit work 
practices in the present study are operationalised as the tangible foundation of continuous 
improvement schemes, such as team-based organisational structure and technology. 
It is proposed in the present study (in support of the propositions that are to be formulated 
in Chapter 3) that an emphasis on the cultural and control-related work systems, as 
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defined here, can be favourable to the internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems, 
as it would aid in diffusing the original meaning of the source company's work systems. 
The association of an exercise of control with the intemalisation of work systems is based 
on the argument that the Japanese tend to exercise implicit forms of control (i. e. social 
investment that extends well beyond hierarchical principles) that may be less resisted by 
employees than explicit forms of control such as direct supervision (e. g. McMillan, 
1996). Furthermore, "deliberate efforts to build trust, promote behavioural norms and 
information networks that lead to co-operation, consensus and a sense of collective vision 
in the Japanese corporation" (ibid., p. 214) can result in high level of internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems. In contrast, an emphasis on the structural and 
technological work systems, as defined here, can be unfavourable to the internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems. The focus on the tangible features of the alternative 
work systems can undercut people's motivation to commit themselves to such work 
systems (e. g. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1998). 
2.2.1.3 The Influence of Key Group Characteristics 
The degree of compatibility between values of the source firm and those of the adopter 
firm can be expected to have a positive impact on the diffusion process. Focusing on the 
adopter, it is suggested here that since the diffusion of work systems is typically 
associated with learning, change and innovation, cultural orientation of the adopter 
towards learning, innovation and change are likely to result in a more positive attitude 
towards the diffusion process (Kostova, 1999). 
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The willingness of employees to accept alternative work systems is seen as a key group 
characteristic that can have an impact on the diffusion process (Mathieu and Zajac, 
1990). This is labeled here as the attitude of teams towards the work systems of the 
source firm. Specifically, it is the commitment, or the sense of ownership, which various 
groups within the adopter firm display towards quality improvement schemes. An 
investigation at the group level is added to that at the organisational level in recognition 
of employees' role in the internalisation of `new' work systems at the adopter's end. For 
example, Takeuchi (1981) argues that the contribution of lower levels in the 
organisational hierarchy in the improvement of overall product quality has been very 
important in the overall strength of Japanese business activity. Furthermore, Casper 
(2000: 903) argues that medium levels of employee motivation, or a `hold-up' problem, 
are highly likely in extremely competitive, demanding and time-intensive work 
environments, such as therapeutics. The situation is claimed to be even worse in firms 
that emphasise long-term relational contracts and engage in technological progress in a 
cumulative manner to generate firm-specific knowledge (ibid. ). It is proposed in the 
present study that high levels of commitment displayed by employees are likely to be 
favourable to the internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems. In contrast, where 
the willingness of employees to accept alternative work systems is low, the 
internalisation of these systems would be expected to be low. 
As a whole, the knowledge-driven work systems in this study can be influenced by (i) the 
differences in national institutional context (i. e. the degree of compatibility of structural 
and cultural legacies) between the source and the adopter company, (ii) the labour market 
83 
and inward investment patterns within the local institutional context, (iii) the 
organisational characteristics of the adopter firm and the nature of the diffused work 
systems and (iv) the adopting teams' perceived value of and commitment to the work 
systems. 
2.2.1.4 The Attributes of Work Systems Diffusion 
Having discussed the likely influence of multilevel characteristics on the diffusion of 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems, this section provides a conceptualisation of 
the work systems diffusion process. The work systems diffusion process is seen here as 
composed of two stages: (i) implementation and (ii) internalisation. As this study adopts a 
context-dependent definition of knowledge and emphasises the adopter or user side, as 
opposed to the supply side of knowledge-driven work systems diffusion, it is proposed 
here that a theoretical distinction is needed between the implementation and 
internalisation process. This is to acknowledge the role of actors in appropriating work 
systems (Clark, 1987). The "blending and redesign of technical systems alongside 
changes in organisational practices and local context" is referred to here as the 
appropriation of work systems (Swan et al., 1999: 906; Swan and Clark, 1992). It is seen 
as the process of unpacking and reblending new ideas within existing contexts in order to 
develop firm-specific solutions (Clark and Staunton, 1989). The transformation process is 
"affected by such processes, whereby external knowledge/artefacts/methods are `fused' 
with internal knowledge/procedures/systems" (Hislop et al., 1998: 430). It should be 
noted that supply-oriented models "presume that the only problems worth considering are 
inside the user firm at the stage of implementation" (Clark et al., 1992: 7 1). However, this 
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study attempts to investigate the diffusibility of meaning, value attached to work systems 
in addition to structural and technical elements. Where the original meaning of the source 
company's practices are difficult to diffuse, the existing work practices are likely to be 
redefined and restructured until eventually they become routine. 
The concept of `knowledge-driven work systems diffusion' is used intentionally in this 
study. It is distinguished from the concept of `knowledge-driven work systems transfer' 
which refers to a communications model that emphasises the flow of technical skills or 
technological capabilities from source to affiliate firms (e. g. Mowery et al., 1996). In a 
communications model, knowledge is treated as an object that is created, packaged and 
moved in an unchanged form from one unit to another (Hislop et al., 1998). However, in 
the present study, knowledge is seen as context-dependent. Its diffusion points to sharing 
of knowledge across company lines. The concept of `diffusion' explains "how new ideas 
are communicated and why some ideas are chosen (or rejected)", or why so many ideas 
fail during implementation or generate unanticipated consequences (ibid., p. 429). It is 
well-suited to explaining the locally situated sense-making process of technical and 
organisational knowledge acquisition. 
The introduction of `new' work systems by management at the adopter firm is labelled 
theoretically and empirically in this study as the implementation process, whilst the 
routinisation or institutionalisation of work systems by workers is analytically understood 
as the internalisation process. More specifically, the internalisation process refers to the 
acceptance and approval by employees of a practice that is infused with value (Kostova, 
85 
1999). For example, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993: 492) argue that "with increases 
in the number of organisations making independent problem-solving decisions to adopt 
an innovation, the innovation becomes increasingly `infused with value beyond the 
technical requirements of the task at hand' (Selznick, 1957: 17)". In other words, many 
organisations adopt an innovation, based not on individual organisation's assessment of 
this innovation's efficiency or returns, but on what is considered legitimate for 
organisations to use this innovation. In an empirical sense, internalisation is understood 
as the acceptance by workers of the tacit principles of continuous improvement schemes. 
It is expected that higher levels of implementation of a particular work system will be 
associated with higher levels of internalisation of that work system. The concept of 
appropriation itself reflects this cumulative and progressive transformation of work 
systems. Where the alternative work system is incompatible with the existing practices, 
one would expect problems in internalisation (Swan and Clark, 1992). It is also possible 
that although a work system is formally implemented, employees may not infuse it with 
value by developing positive attitudes towards it. On the whole, a focus on the degree of 
internalisation of work systems can provide important insights into the problems of 
diffusing alternative work systems (see Figure 2.1 on page 68 for a pictorial 
representation of the implementation and internalisation process). 
2.3 Summary of the Analytic Framework 
In the previous sections of this chapter, key attributes of work systems diffusion and the 
relevant key national and local institutional, organisational and group characteristics 
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(which were presented as the building blocks of the analytic framework) that are likely to 
influence the diffusion process have been identified and discussed. These building blocks 
are integrated below into a single analytic framework (see Figure 2.3). This framework, 
in turn, is used to formulate five propositions in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 2.3 Analytic Framework 
National Institutional Level (I) Organisational Level (III) Group Level (IV) 
Type of 
capitalist 
system 
Nature of 
diffused work 
systems 
Local Institutional Level (II) 
Level of Location industrial 
site dispute 
Skills base 
of labour 
I 
Location 
area 
Degree of implementation of work systems 
1 
Degree of internalisation of work systems 
Attitudes of 
teams towards 
the work 
systems of the 
source firm 
Existing Translation/ Appropriated 
work editing of work systems 
systems work 
systems 
Source: See text 
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Figure 2.3 shows the impact of the key national institutional, local institutional, 
organisational and group characteristics on the degree of implementation and 
internalisation of work systems. The structural elements, such as the type of capitalist 
system, location site, nature of diffused work systems and attitudes of teams towards the 
work systems of the source firm, are complemented with a process element, that is the 
process of internalising work systems. It is proposed in this figure that the institutional 
variation at the national and regional levels can have an impact on the implementation 
and internalisation of work systems. Similarly, at the firm level, the nature of work 
systems that are diffused and the group level attitudes of members towards the work 
systems of the source firm can positively or negatively influence the process whereby 
work systems are implemented and internalised. 
The nature and the likely influence of key institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics have been addressed separately in this chapter, but it should be 
emphasised that it is their combined impact that needs to be taken into account if an 
analysis is to be made on the diffusion of work systems. Moreover, the likely influence of 
the suggested characteristics should not be taken as a straightjacket for the analysis. 
Rather, the figure serves as a schema for data analysis. 
The application of the framework in a comparative analysis implies the following steps. 
First, data are gathered on the structural and cultural legacies of different countries (the 
UK and Japan). Then, the characteristics of each local institution are determined. Next, 
attributes of work systems, including nature of practices in each firm, are identified. This 
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is followed by the identification of group characteristics. Finally, the elements in the 
framework are analysed in connection with each other, and the key (national and local) 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics are compared and contrasted to gain 
insights into the link between these characteristics and the extents of implementation and 
internalisation. The application of the framework is discussed in the following chapter. 
In sum, the historical neo-institutional perspective has been refined in the following 
manner. First, the processes that underlie the implementation and internalisation of work 
systems, acknowledging the role of actors, are made explicit. Second, detailed 
specifications of the implementation and internalisation processes at the firm level have 
been called for in support of an analysis at the national level. Third, local institutional 
characteristics have been taken into account in the operationalisation of institutional 
variation across firms. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the concept of `work systems' has been defined and discussed. Work 
systems are understood as driven by people's knowledge, ideas and suggestions and 
founded on harnessing knowledge at the point where products are made and services are 
delivered. Both the structural and processural aspects of work systems are addressed. 
On the basis of a review of comparative research approaches, specifically the labour 
process and lean production perspectives within the `Japanisation' literature, the user- 
oriented perspective within the innovation processes literature and the historical neo- 
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institutional perspective within the neo-institutional literature, it has been indicated in this 
chapter that the diffusion of work systems is influenced by host country's legitimated 
structures and cultural understandings. Research concerning the institutional 
embeddedness of work systems has been discussed with particular reference to Whitley's 
divergent capitalisms view within the historical neo-institutionalist outlook on diffusion 
of work systems. From the six types of ideal business systems (fragmented, co-ordinated 
industrial district, compartmentalised, state organised, collaborative and highly co- 
ordinated), the present study focuses on the `highly co-ordinated' and 
`compartmentalised' business environments, which reflect the Japanese and UK contexts 
respectively. It is argued in this chapter that nationally distinct societal environments of 
highly co-ordinated business systems allow for limited diffusibility of work systems to 
other institutional environments. In contrast, competences of compartmentalised business 
systems are seen as more mobile across borders due to the absence of obligational ties to 
other actors in such systems. The impact of key national and local institutional, 
organisational and group characteristics on the diffusion process is discussed in an effort 
to construct an analytic framework that can guide the present study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
APPLICATION OF THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, the application of the analytic framework, constructed in Chapter 2, is 
discussed. The process of work systems diffusion is examined within Anglo-Japanese 
collaborations. The Japanese and UK contexts are discussed as nationally distinct social 
settings with specific organisational structural and cultural legacies. For this purpose, 
detailed descriptions are provided for each country relating to the nature of HRM systems 
or employment practices, such as the following: reward systems and employee 
governance, workplace relations and task organisation and control or structural forms. 
The variation in the structural and cultural legacies between the two countries is shown to 
hinder the diffusion of `new' work systems. A discussion of the institutional limits to the 
diffusion of work systems at the national level is followed by an outline of the difference 
in emphasis placed on tacit and explicit knowledge in Japan and the UK. The resulting 
insights on work systems diffusion are related to the analytic framework to formulate a 
set of propositions with regard to the influence of institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics on the implementation and internalisation of knowledge-driven work 
systems. 
3.1 Limits to Diffusion of Work Systems 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the diffusion of work systems can be influenced by the 
variation in the institutional settings of the source and adopter firms. This section 
discusses the difficulty in the diffusion of work systems, specifically from the Japanese 
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context to that of the UK. The present study conceptualises two levels of embeddedness22 
in explaining the difficulty in the diffusion of work systems: one at the macro level and 
the other at the micro level. Macro-level embeddedness addresses the nationally distinct 
characteristics of social institutions, such as the legitimacy of Japanese and UK business 
systems, including structural characteristics of organisations and HRM systems. Micro- 
level embeddedness addresses the emphasis on the tacit nature of the diffused work 
systems. These are considered next. 
3.1.1 Embeddedness at the National Level: Structural Legacies of Organisations 
Organisational Structural Legacies of Japan 
Dominant practices in relation to specific areas, such as reward systems and employee 
governance in Japan, combine to form distinctive configurations. The presumed 
commitment and motivation advantage enjoyed by Japanese manufacturers over their 
Anglo-Saxon counterparts is said to emerge from a distinctive set of organisational 
structures and employment systems that characterise the Japanese workplace (Lincoln 
and Kalleberg, 1990). Bureaucracy and paternalism are synthesised (Nakane, 1970 in 
Kubo et al., 2001; Clark, 1979; Hill, 1981) and welfare corporatism is advocated (Dore, 
1973). This is also viewed as a combination of `learning bureaucracy' and `democratic 
Taylorism' (Adler, 1992). The internal labour-market developments in Japan are seen as 
allowing for greater informal participation in decisions, compared with Anglo-Saxon 
plants. The collectivist values and tightly-knit networks of Japanese society (Yoshimura 
22 The definition of embeddedness is provided in Chapter 2. 
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and Anderson, 1997)23 are believed to encourage low strike activity, absenteeism and 
turnover, as was discussed in Section 2.1.3.4.2, under Highly Co-ordinated Business 
Systems in Chapter 2 (see Oliver and Wilkinson (1992: 53) for a historical analysis). 
According to Morgan et al. (2000a: 11), "Japanese firms in general tend to be the least 
diversified; they concentrate on a particular range of skills and competences around 
specific technologies and markets". Their subsidiaries are highly integrated into the 
Japanese headquarters. Unlike Anglo-Saxon firms' preference for `flat' organisational 
structures and greater diversification, Japanese organisations are seen as having thickly 
populated vertical hierarchies and proliferating work units, which break up occupational 
and class loyalties while encouraging the formation of organisation-wide cohesive bonds 
(Besser, 1996; Liker et al., 1999). 
A key feature of Japanese firms is believed to be their commitment to small-group 
activities (Cole, 1979). It is believed that their history of nationalism led them to design 
organisations in which the core values of Japanese culture, such as group orientation, 
harmony, loyalty, respect for age and authority, were protected. Team-level sharing, as in 
quality circles and new model changeover teams, is said to strengthen factory knowledge- 
creation capabilities (c. f. Fruin's 1997 study of knowledge works at Toshiba). It is argued 
that these activities enhance knowledge sharing through `socialisation' (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995)24, and create a "sense of belonging, involvement and participation" 
23 These characteristics do not necessarily resonate an emotional bond. Rather, there is dependence on 
others with the expectation that they will behave in accordance with the given code of conduct. 24 This is illustrated by Matsushita's Home Bakery team. "At Matsushita, team members apprenticed 
themselves to the head baker at Osaka International Hotel to capture the essence of kneading skill through 
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(Liker et al., 1999: 11). However, it should be noted that this participation is more 
operational than strategic (e. g. Turnbull and Delbridge, 1994; Delbridge, 1995). Such 
involvement takes place within a context of high vertical hierarchy, formalisation and 
standardisation in production systems (Yoshino, 1968). However, this type of hierarchy 
differs from that found in British firms. Liker et al. (1999) argue that there is relatively 
limited coercive rationale that produces efficiency at the expense of worker commitment, 
flexibility and improvement momentum in the Japanese hierarchy. 25 
Overall, as was explained in Chapter 2, the Japanese business system is classified as 
`highly co-ordinated', with a considerably reliable legal system, co-ordinating and 
developing state, bank (credit)-based financial system, limited public training system, 
highly paternalist authority and limited union strength (Whitley, 1999b; 2000a). 
Organisational Structural Legacies of the UK 
In contrast to a synthesis of bureaucracy and paternalism commonly observed in Japan, 
there are "fewer supervisory contacts, less worker control, and a poorer quality of 
supervisory and co-worker relations in the West" (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990: 233). It is 
argued that the structural differentiation or pronounced differences among managers, 
bodily experience" (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 85). 
25 In spite of the arguments for the distinctive architectural features of Japanese firms, it should be noted 
that Japanese organisations are fundamentally not different in their multidivisional structural features from 
their European counterparts. Historically, similar to European firms, they displayed a clear, top-down 
structure organised around functions. With the "presence of successful U. S. multinationals, largely 
organised around the multidivisional structure" in Europe and the role of consulting firms, there was a 
spread in the multidivisional form in Britain (McMillan, 1996: 217). The shift to this structure was much 
slower in Japan. According to Suzuki (1980), only 56 per cent of top 100 Japanese firms had adopted the 
divisional structure, as compared with the 72 per cent in Britain, by the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, 
`similarities' in macro-organisational features in Japan and the UK are exposed to the influence of different 
traditions and interpersonal relations or meso-level organisational features. Hence, the way in which 
multidivisional structures operate in the two countries differ. 
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supervisors and workers do not encourage teamwork. The form of bureaucracy found in 
traditional UK fines is seen as different from that of Japanese firms, in that it is designed 
for the purpose of control. According to Liker et al. (1999), its features, such as 
procedures and standards, serve to control performance standards. The organisational 
structures in the UK business system are claimed to be marked by `flatter and fatter' 
hierarchies, due in part to the fact that promotion and pay are based on merit (Besser, 
1996)26 The business behaviour, based on individualism in the UK (Casson et al., 1996), 
is likely to lead to adverse competitive behaviour among firms. Strike activity, 
absenteeism and turnover have traditionally been expected occurrences (Lane, 1996). 27 
Management's desire for control over many key operating decisions, and the many 
symbolic differences between workers and managers, have reinforced an adversarial 
workplace, whereby management-employee relations are said to be restrained (McMillan, 
1996). 
Overall, as was explained in Chapter 2, the UK business system is identified as 
`compartmentalised', with a reliable legal system, regulative state, financial system based 
on a capital market, weak public training system, low paternalistic authority and low 
union strength (Whitley (1999b: 61), see Table 3.1 for a comparison of the types of 
business environments in Japan and the UK). 
26 On the other hand, as detailed in Section 3.1.2, the Japanese management system is seen as upholding a 
seniority-based pay system as a means of developing core employees (Sako and Sato, 1997). 27 For example, the development and retention of Anglo-Saxon managers in Japanese transplants overseas 
is seen as a serious problem (e. g. Kenney and Florida, 1993). 
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Table 3.1 The National Institutional Features Associated with Types of Business 
Systems in Japan and the UK 
Types of Business 
System/ Key Features 
Highly co-ordinated 
(such as Japan) 
Compartmentalised 
(such as the U 
Authority Relations Highly patemalist Contractual 
State Co-ordinating and 
developing 
Regulative 
Legal system Considerably reliable Reliable 
Financial system Bank (Credit)-based Capital market 
Public training system" stem Limited Weak 
Union strength Limited Low 
Source: Adapted from Whitley (2000a and 1999b: 60) 
3.1.2 Embeddedness at the National Level: Cultural Legacies of Organisations 
Organisational Cultural Legacies of Japan 
Some of the work processes which differentiate East Asian work systems from many 
continental European ones are task specialisation, degree of worker discretion, degree of 
managerial control, degree of separation and segmentation between managers and 
workers, and degree of employer commitment to employment security (Whitley, 
1999b). 28 
It is argued that the Japanese management system allows considerable independence to 
individuals or work groups as to how work is conducted, and tasks are usually more 
broadly defined (Pascale and Athos, 1986; Fukuda, 1987; Kenney and Florida, 1995). 
There is an effort to secure "enhanced leverage over effort and worker compliance to 
boot" (Danford, 1998: 41). It is also claimed that the regular Japanese employee identifies 
with the firm (Aoki, 1988). The characteristic of `groupism' (Wilms et al., 1994) is 
28 Please note that the discussion on organisational legacies of Japan and the UK is structured along these 
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widely seen as conducive to the effective running of Kaizen systems (Tolich et aL, 1999). 
The education system in Japan is said to provide "little or no tradition of independent 
craft or skill, so companies take on employees and train them up, in-house, entirely 
according to their own needs" (George and Levie, 1984: 26). It is not only the leaders and 
facilitators of the quality control (QC) process who are trained. In Japan, years rather than 
hours are spent on the training of the QC members (ibid. ). 
Although Japanese workers in large organisations may have some discretion over 
performance, they "have very little say in what tasks they do or the conditions under 
which they do them" (Whitley, 1999b: 90). Unlike the Taylorised system observed in the 
UK (Lane, 1996), the `paternalistic delegated responsibility' system in Japan offers low 
reward differentials and segmentation between managers and workers. The world image 
of the Japanese in the 80s rested on, and to a large degree still rests on, "commitment, 
identification, and loyalty Japanese employees exhibit toward their firms, low rates of 
industrial conflict, absenteeism and turnover combined with higher worker productivity 
and production quality" (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990: 738). These characteristics may 
prove difficult to replicate in the UK context, which is characterised by adversarial 
relations between management and workers. 
It is a known practice for "Japanese employers to set out to build organisational cultures, 
involving high levels of worker commitment, and flexibility" (Warner, 1994: 510). This 
model is based on three pillars: seniority wages (nenko), lifetime employment (shunshi 
five dimensions, which are labelled by Whitley (1999b) as `characteristics of work systems'. 
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koyo)29 and enterprise unionism (kigyobetsu rodo kumiai) (Morris and Wilkinson, 1995). 
Japanese management principles that typically emphasise the key objectives of quality 
and flexibility, long-term growth (Sullivan et al., 1981), market share, employment 
security and close, trust-based relations to suppliers, customers and financers (Lillrank, 
1995: 978) stand on these pillars. 
In summary, the traditional Japanese system of corporate management is seen as 
characterised by 
standardised training to ensure that everyone is of average competence, 
seniority-based rewards, aversion to competition and emphasis on 
harmony, group responsibility, and organisation at once authoritative and 
democratically participative. (Odaka, 1986: 51) 
These practices are claimed to create employment stability, flexible personnel policies 
and strong employee identification with the company (Odaka, 1986). According to 
Whitley (1999b: 92), the Japanese work systems can be dominantly identified as 
`paternalist', commonly observed in highly co-ordinated business systems. The Japanese 
institutional context is seen as combining low levels of job fragmentation, high employer 
commitment to employment security, considerable worker involvement and managerial 
control of work organisation, and relatively low separation of manager from workers 
(ibid. ). Although such employment practices are currently in a state of change, triggered 
by the Asian financial crisis of the early 1990s, they are still seen as having positive 
29 Lifetime employment is seen as having positive implications for skills development and labour turnover 
(Dickens and Savage, 1988). 
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implications for participative, hands-on management; commitment to continuous 
improvement activities; team work and on-the-job training; and technical advancement30 
(McMillan, 1996). Although Casson et al. (1996: 40) claim that "just as the Post-modem 
firms have striven to assimilate Japanese methods to an individualistic environment, so in 
the post-war period leading Japanese firms have been assimilating US business methods 
to a much more organic environment", there are few indicators that speak of any `radical 
transformation' in the Japanese workplace at this point (Dirks et al., 2000). Proposals to 
rejuvenate Japanese firms by introducing individual initiative, clarity in job descriptions, 
multitrack personnel systems with distinct hiring, remuneration, welfare, training and 
promotion schemes serve as symbols and metaphors, rather than blueprints, that create 
tension or conflict between what is and what would or should be (ibid. ). Similarly, Porter 
et al. (2000: 17) contend that "there have been some calls for restructuring especially in 
the financial sector but no consensus on what the restructuring should look like". For 
example, in a survey of large and medium-sized firms, conducted in 1993, less than 10 
per cent of Japanese firms had loosened formal office presence rules for R&D workers, 
limiting the use of the number of working hours or input efforts in their evaluation, or 
had introduced performance oriented, in contrast to seniority oriented, compensation 
systems (KSKKK, 1994 in Dirks et al., 2000: 550). Moreover, "it should be noted that the 
practices ascribed to Japanese management are seen in a variety of non-Japanese 
organisations, but are more normatively accepted in Japan" (Besser, 1996: 11). 
30 Worker and technology are not viewed as being in conflict or threat to job security in the Japanese 
context (McMillan, 1996). 
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Organisational Cultural Legacies of the UK 
In comparison with the human resource practices observed in Japan, the UK system of 
HRM is less homogeneous across industries and sectors. Nonetheless, two general 
features of the system can be outlined when making comparisons with other countries: 
first, industrial relations in the UK have been adversarial31 (as was discussed in Section 
3.1.1) and second, employment security is low (McMillan, 1996). Unions in Britain have 
traditionally had only marginal influence over hiring and firing practices (Lane, 1996). 
Lower employment security in Britain (Whitley, 1999b) is connected to lower investment 
in skills development by UK firms (Sako, 1992) and the lack of a lifetime relationship 
with employees (Ho, 1993; Scarbrough and Terry, 1998). "The training system is more 
weakly institutionalised and standardised across industrial sectors" (Whitley, 1997: 256). 
In other words, skills training and control systems are weakly developed (Whitley, 
1999b). British deficiencies in skills training have negative implications for technical co- 
operation and trust. Given British managers' low level of formal education in comparison 
to those in strongly institutionalised contexts, such as that of Germany (Lane, 1996), 
there are frequent transfers for promotion between firms, as well as changing far more 
between functional specialisms within firms. In addition, the education level of workers 
has been such that the expectations of workers have been largely economic rather than 
social (McMillan, 1996). High managerial control and low worker discretion or 
involvement are seen as creating `them and us attitude problems' (Oliver and Wilkinson, 
1992: 186). In other words, with the availability of low skill workers, management 
hierarchy has been enhanced and the ideological framework of `them and us' has been 
31 This is associated with the confrontational nature of management-worker relationships in the UK (e. g. 
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reinforced. Such an ideological framework can limit the extent to which commitment 
among the UK workers can be attained. 
According to Whitley (1999b), the UK work system can be dominantly identified as a 
`Taylorist' one, commonly found in compartmentalised business systems. In summary, it 
can be argued that the UK system "combines high levels of job fragmentation, 
managerial control over task performance and work organisation, strong manager-worker 
separation, and low employer commitment to employment security" (ibid., p. 92, see 
Table 3.2 for a comparison of the types of work systems in Japan and the UK). 
Table 3.2 Types of Work Systems in Japan and the UK 
Characteristics Paternalist Taylorist 
(such as Japan) (such as the UK) 
Task fragmentation Low High 
Worker discretion and Considerable Low 
involvement 
Managerial control of Considerable High 
work organisation 
Separation of manager Variable High 
from workers 
Employer commitment to High Low 
employment security for 
core workforce 
Source: Adapted from Whitley (1999b: 92) 
As with the categorisation of business systems characteristics (in Table 3.1), only 
dominant characteristics of work systems are highlighted in Table 3.2. Although the 
operationalisation of the `paternalist' and `Taylorist' typologies is static, it is useful in 
Maurice et al., 1980). 
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providing a general picture, in relative terms, of the dominant forms of work systems in 
different national contexts. 
3.1.3 Embeddedness at the Firm Level 
It is argued that there is a difference in the emphasis placed on explicit and tacit 
knowledge in Japan and the UK. Work practices can be considered as highly tacit in 
Japan, whilst they can be regarded as of lower tacitness in the UK (Inkpen and Dinur, 
1998). The basis for this claim rests on Hedlund and Nonaka's (1993) argument that 
"Western firms lose much of their potential for knowledge creation by overemphasising 
explicit knowledge and the development of complex managerial hierarchies, systems and 
standardisation" (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998: 457). Emphasis on tacit knowledge in the UK 
is overshadowed by the importance given to relatively more easily diffusible explicit 
knowledge (Takeuchi, 1998). This is partly evidenced by the Anglo-Saxon firms' 
propensity to jump on fashion bandwagons (e. g. Abrahamson, 1996). 
Emphasis on Tacit Knowledge in Japan 
Japan is perceived as emphasising tacit knowledge and the process of creating new 
knowledge with the involvement of everyone (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Takeuchi, 
1998). In this context, communication is seen as an integral part of the knowledge 
diffusion process. It is argued that Japanese firms focus on the `soft' dimension of 
management that is skills, staff, style and superordinate goals, rather than strategy, 
structure and systems (Pascale and Athos, 1986). Similarly, Nonaka and Johansson 
(1985) argue that it is `natural' for Japanese firms to demonstrate an environment of 
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organisational learning, given Japanese management's consensus decision-making 
process that facilitates knowledge sharing and on-the-job and continuous education (as 
discussed in Section 3.1.2). Many of the knowledge diffusion issues "come down to 
finding effective ways to let people talk and listen to one another" (Davenport and 
Prusak, 1998), and this is said to be provided by the Japanese context (e. g. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995). The organisation in the Japanese context is perceived as a `living 
organism' (c. f. Morgan, 1986 for a definition) pursuing continuous innovation. 32 
According to Takeuchi (1998), Japanese emphasis rests on the importance it places on the 
`whole personality', rather than the mind alone. There is no dualism between the knower 
and the known. 33 Hence, there is an attempt to keep the human element of knowledge 
production alive. 34 There is an organisational, rather than a market, orientation to skills 
development in Japan. There are rules and hierarchies governing employer-employee 
relations within a plant or corporation (McMillan, 1996). Consequently, skills profiles are 
developed internally through corporate training policies. "A high degree of homogeneity 
of markets and skills, together with distinctive employment practices, traditionally have 
linked together to facilitate high commiment to the enterprise as a whole" (Sharpe, 
2001: 197). Internally developed incentives for training, commitment and turnover render 
work systems in Japan highly tacit. 
Iwata (1982: iii) argues that given the high level of institutionalisation of the Japanese 
32 This is contrasted, by Munakata (1998), with the mechanistic organisations in the US. 
33 The different forms of knowledge in Japan and the 'West' are claimed to be dictated by the intellectual 
traditions of Zen Buddhism and Cartesian dualism (Takeuchi, 1998). The former is based on the principle 
of "the oneness of the body and mind", whilst the latter is founded on the argument that "true knowledge 
can be obtained only by the mind, not the body" (ibid., p. 7; also see discussion of East-West managerial 
mindsets in Chia, 2000). 
34 This avoids the degeneration of knowledge production into a fad (c. f. case studies in Scarbrough and 
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practices, "it is rather doubtful whether Japanese-style management can be transplanted 
as it is to other countries". Hybrid solutions are common where Japanese belief systems, 
which are not readily compatible with those in compartmentalised business systems, are 
diffused to Anglo-Saxon contexts (c. f. Taylor et al., 1994; Mair, 1998b). For instance, 
QCs, JIT delivery, teams and suggestion programmes, which are interdependent within 
an entire system of a strongly institutionalised context, as that of Japan, can produce 
vastly different results when taken out of context. 
Emphasis on Explicit Knowledge in the UK 
In comparison with the Japanese, UK managers tend to focus more on explicit knowledge 
that can be measured and managed by a selected few who carry out knowledge initiatives 
(Takeuchi, 1998). According to Takeuchi (1998: 6), "there is a long philosophical 
tradition in the West of valuing precise, conceptual knowledge and systematic sciences, 
which can be traced back to Descartes". This is the type of knowledge that can be 
processed by a computer, transmitted electronically and stored in databases and, hence, is 
equated with information technology in the `West' (Spender, 1996). Its diffusion can be 
characterised as objectified mode of knowledge communication (Scarbrough, 1995). The 
focus on this mode of communication in the UK is in contrast with Japan's emphasis on 
informal, 'on-the-job' knowledge35, stored in people's brains, found in networks of social 
relations (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), and communicated in a sedimented mode 
Swan, 1999). 
35 The `gradualist' ideas derived from factory experiences exemplify this point well (e. g. Hull et at, 1985). 
The use of the word `gradualist' serves to distinguish between the `incremental' innovation approach, 
adopted by, for instance, Japanese companies and the 'radical' or great-leap' innovation approach upheld 
generally by Anglo-Saxon companies (Imai, 1986: 23). 
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(Scarbrough, 1995). The emphasis of the UK firms on explicit knowledge (Hedlund and 
Nonaka, 1993; Boisot, 1995) reflects the bias towards the easier of the two kinds of 
knowledge to measure, control and process, as such knowledge is not categorised as 
highly subjective, personal and cognitive that requires interaction through the actions of 
individuals. It is argued that, unlike the case in Japan, knowledge in the UK is not created 
by the "interaction of frontline employees, middle managers and top management with 
middle managers in line positions playing the key synthesising role" (Takeuchi, 1998: 9). 
Knowledge is, rather, managed by a few key players in staff positions, including 
information processing or internal consultancy. This, in line with the Cartesian separation 
between mind and body, reflects the goal of economising on "immediate truth-seeking, 
identity-location and affirmation .... universalism, unambiguity, logical precision, 
rightness, method and principles as the guiding axioms of good managerial practice" 
(Chia, 2000: 7). It is argued that such an approach cannot capture "the dynamic and 
richly-textured nuances of social exchanges in Eastern settings" (ibid. ). Firms under 
highly competitive external labour markets tend not to invest in general training due to 
the risk that workers can leave. Rather, they pay trained individuals market wages in a 
competitive labour market (McMillan, 1996). Consequently, markets that are governed 
by supply/demand conditions in the economy at large encourage selection and screening 
policies that do not have to be too sophisticated (ibid. ). A worker can be laid off or may 
transfer if the economic contract turns out to be unfavourable. The external labour market 
approach to skills development render work systems in the UK highly explicit. 
The emphasis on explicit or objectified mode of knowledge in the UK business system 
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falls in alignment with the work systems characteristics of Taylorist organisations. 
Explicit knowledge "tends to generate a unified and predictable pattern of behaviour and 
output in organisations" (Lam, 1998: 10) that encourages high levels of managerial 
control and low levels of worker involvement in decisions. (This corresponds to the third 
characteristic in Table 3.2). The codification of knowledge, or its abstraction from social 
networks, tends to reduce investment in personal interaction or sharing of tacit 
knowledge. This implies a `high' separation of managers from workers in Taylorist 
organisations (see the fourth characteristic in Table 3.2). In line with the principles of 
Taylorism, complex social or team relationships tend to be given limited attention in the 
codification of workers' experiences, or formalisation of work roles and procedures by 
the UK firms. This relates to the UK business system's low institutional embeddedness, 
or weak institutional context, in comparison to that of Japan. 
The impact of the embeddedness of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems at the 
national institutional and the firm levels on their diffusibility can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
This figure highlights the contrasting nature of the two levels of embeddedness in Japan 
and the UK. 
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It is assumed here that the nationally distinct nature of the institutional environment in 
which automotive manufacture firms in Japan are embedded has facilitated the 
development of a highly co-ordinated structure and a paternalist culture. The facilitating 
nature of considerably reliable legal system, paternalistic authority relations, co- 
ordinating and developing state, credit-based financial system, limited public training 
system and limited union strength in addition to low task fragmentation, considerable 
managerial control of work organisation and high employer commitment to employment 
security (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) that apply to Japan's institutional environment form a 
cohesive system of mutually reinforcing influences. This institutional environment also 
encourages emphasis on tacit knowledge. The `strong institutional context' in Figure 3.1 
represents the highly co-ordinated business system characterised by a network of mutual 
obligations and commitment. Within such a context, predominant economic relationships 
are paternalist and the sectors cohere strongly. 
In contrast with the national institutional features of Japan, the UK context is 
characterised by a compartmentalised structure and a Taylorist culture. Nationally 
distinct key influences include a reliable legal system, contractual authority relations, 
regulative state, capital market-based financial system, limited public training system and 
low worker involvement, high separation of managers from workers, high managerial 
control and low employer commitment to employment security (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). 
This institutional context encourages emphasis on explicit knowledge. The `weak 
institutional context' in Figure 3.1 represents the compartmentalised business system 
characterised by work systems that are not strongly embedded in social networks of close 
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co-operation and high interdependency. Predominant economic relationships are 
Taylorist. Such a system does not bear the institutional support necessary for a long-term 
orientation to developing competencies. 
Figure 3.1 shows the diffusibility of work systems from a strong institutional context, 
such as that of Japan, to a relatively weak one, such as that of the UK. The figure implies 
that work systems become less diffusible as they are moved from highly co-ordinated 
structural legacies and paternalist cultural legacies at the macro leve136, and high 
knowledge tacitness at the firm level in Japan to a context characterised by 
compartmentalised structural legacies and Taylorist cultural legacies at the macro level, 
and low knowledge tacitness (or high knowledge explicitness) at the micro level in the 
UK. 
3.2 Propositions 
The analytic framework constructed in Chapter 2, complemented with the discussion in 
the above sections, forms the basis of the propositions on the influence of key 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics on the implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. 
36 Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) claim that the greater the socio-cultural difference between MNCs (i. e. 
the cultural distance between the parent company and the host country), the more likely it is for the local 
adaptation of, for instance, HRM practices to local interests and diversity. The authors argue that the 
method of founding, presence of expatriates, extent of communication with the parent company can limit 
the adoption of parent companies' work systems. 
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As was pointed out earlier (in Sections 2.2.1.1 to 2.2.1.3, Chapter 2), favourable key 
characteristics are likely to have a positive impact on the degree of implementation and 
internalisation. In contrast, if a firm is embedded in an environment with unfavourable 
key characteristics, a low degree of implementation and internalisation of knowledge- 
driven work systems is expected to be observed. In Section 2.2.1, favourable and 
unfavourable key characteristics were discussed separately in their link to the degree of 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems under 
the following headings: the influence of key institutional characteristics, the influence of 
key organisational characteristics, and the influence of key group characteristics. This 
discussion is summarised here in the form two institutional settings that can be identified 
as contrasting in nature. In an attempt to formulate propositions, these institutional 
settings are taken to represent two extreme points of a scale, ranging from `favourable' to 
`unfavourable' (see Table 3.3). It should be noted that `intermediate' settings can also 
prevail in between the two extremes. 
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On the basis of the scale in Table 3.3 that reflects the expected degree of implementation 
and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems in connection with a set 
of favourable and unfavourable key institutional, organisational and group characteristics, 
five propositions can be formulated. The first two propositions are formulated on the 
basis of the two extreme points of the scale, reflecting the impact of the favourable and 
unfavourable institutional settings on the implementation and internalisation of work 
systems. The three remaining propositions reflect the institutional settings and degrees of 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems that are 
likely to be found in between the two extremes. 
Proposition 1 
Affiliates of firms in highly-institutionalised environments that are operating in 
unfavourable institutional settings (as those delineated in Table 3.3) are likely to 
exhibit a low degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work 
systems. 
Similarly, a second proposition can be made to reflect the opposite argument. 
Proposition 2 
Affiliates of firms in highly-institutionalised environments that are operating in 
favourable institutional settings (as those delineated in Table 3.3) are likely to 
exhibit a high degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work 
systems. 
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Propositions can also be made to take into account the less tightly-knit institutional 
settings that may have an impact on the degree of implementation and internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems. 
Proposition 3 
Affiliates of firms in highly institutionalised environments that are operating in 
settings in which unfavourable key institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics are more dominant than the favourable ones are likely to exhibit a 
low degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems. 
The counter-argument is as follows; 
Proposition 4 
Affiliates of firms in highly-institutionalised environments that are operating in 
settings in which favourable key institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics are more dominant than the unfavourable ones are likely to exhibit 
a high degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems. 
There is also the possibility that a high or low degree of implementation and 
internalisation of work systems is attained in settings that lack the dominating effect of 
the favourable or unfavourable key institutional characteristics. 
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Proposition 5 
Incoherent pattern of high and low degree of implementation and internalisation is 
likely to develop in settings which lack key institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics that are favourable or unfavourable. 
These five propositions further clarify the aim of the field study described in Chapter 5. 
The research findings are fed back to the propositions formulated here in Chapter 6. 
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, limits to diffusion of work systems are discussed in terms of their 
embeddedness at the macro national and micro firm levels. The variation in the 
organisational structural and cultural legacies of Japan and the UK are shown to affect the 
diffusibility of work systems. Similarly, the difference in emphasis placed on tacit and 
explicit knowledge in Japan and the UK has an impact on the extent to which work 
systems can be diffused. It is argued that work systems become less diffusible as they are 
moved from highly co-ordinated structural legacies and paternalist cultural legacies at the 
macro level, and high knowledge tacitness at the firm level in Japan to a context 
characterised by compartmentalised structural legacies and Taylorist cultural legacies at 
the macro level, and high knowledge explicitness at the micro level in the UK. Five 
propositions are formulated on the basis of a scale ranging from favourable to 
unfavourable institutional settings and their impact on the degree of implementation and 
internalisation of work systems. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter concerns the methodological aspects of this study: that is, where and how 
the research project was carried out, so as to arrive at answers to the central research 
question. The criteria used to select firms for the case studies are addressed. Moreover, 
attention is paid to the data collection and analysis process involved in the comparison of 
three Anglo-Japanese cases in the automotive sector. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of research quality issues, specifically the reliability and validity of the 
outcomes, which are seen as applicable to both qualitative and quantitative research. 
4.1 The Research Process 
A comparative study of three affiliate firms of Japanese MNCs operating in the UK (i. e. 
two subsidiary firms and a technical collaboration) was conducted in order to gain 
insights into the influence of nationally distinct social institutions on the implementation 
and internalisation of alternative work systems. The cases involve detailed descriptions of 
the characteristics of the work-systems diffusion process at the local firm level. They 
consider key institutional, organisational and group characteristics that are likely to have 
an impact on the diffusibility of work systems across nations. 
As was addressed in Chapter 1, the automotive manufacture sector forms the setting for 
this empirical research. The data collection and analysis processes that allowed for a 
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comparison of the cases are outlined in Table 4.1. It should be noted that the process 
presented in the table is by no means a clear-cut, linear one. It is rather a value-laden, 
iterative process that reflects the constant shift between theory and practice. Theory 
informs practice or the way the empirical work is carried out, and the research results are 
fed back into theory to further develop it. 
Table 4.1 Outline of the Research Process 
List of activities 
Theory Practice/Em irical work 
Exploration of arguments in the 
innovation processes and neo-institutional 
literatures 
Construction of an initial conceptual Exploration of research sites, negotiation 
framework of access 
Development of an interview protocol Data collection at one of the subsidiary 
firms 
Revision of the conceptual framework Data collection at the technical 
collaboration site 
Exploration of arguments in the Data collection at the second subsidiary 
Japanisation literature firm 
Case write-up Factory work in the two subsidiary firms 
Revised case descriptions; Further data collection through a visit to 
Further readings on neo-institutionalism Japan 
Data processing/ comparative analysis of Feedback from the respondents on the 
the cases anal sis38 
Final revision 
Source: See text 
The research process comprised sixteen major stages. It began with a review of the 
literature on neo-institutional theory and innovation processes literature (stage 1). In the 
meantime, research sites were explored (stage 3). This consisted of interviews with five 
38 The respondents were contacted throughout the data collection process for feedback on preliminary 
research results. This was an ongoing process, and is partly reflected in the duration of the data collection 
process that has spread over a period of two years, from August 1998 to April 2000. 
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MDs, a company secretary and a general project manager at five Anglo-Japanese joint 
ventures and two UK subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs, see Appendix I for an overview of 
the organisations involved in the explorative stage of the research). These preliminary 
interviews were useful in identifying the practitioner-perceived key concerns in managing 
cross-national collaborations, especially the cultural differences as a barrier to 
implementing source company's practices. This explorative stage also enabled the 
researcher to formulate interview questions and provided access into one of the affiliate 
firms (a subsidiary firm coded as Teniki UK in this research). However, on the whole, 
gaining access to organisations proved to be longer than expected (8 months). (This is 
detailed in section 4.2.2). An interview protocol was developed for data collection (stage 
4), and a qualitative in-depth case study in a subsidiary firm was conducted (stage 5). In 
this way, detailed knowledge was gained about the following aspects: structure, culture 
and past and recent developments of the firm; its key actors, interests, worker 
perceptions; and institutional characteristics that helped to create a clear view of the 
patterns of interaction, specific artefacts and actual practices in the firm and its wider 
social context. Interviews with directors and senior managers across various functions, as 
well as with plant personnel, were conducted. These confirmed the relevance of the initial 
concepts and frameworks that had been developed in stage 2 for the purpose of the study. 
This was followed by a case study conducted in a technical collaboration (stage 7). Data 
in the third company (i. e. the second subsidiary firm) were collected as the data collection 
in the other two sampled firms were in progress (stage 9). The interview data from the 
three cases were complemented with participant observation through factory work (stage 
11) and a visit to parent/partner firms in Japan (stage 13). Preliminary findings from the 
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cases served to refine the initial conceptual framework (stage 6). Insights from the cases 
allowed revisions to be made to the literature review section (stages 8 and 12). Further 
readings on `Japanisation' and neo-institutionalism better informed recursive data 
processing and analysis (stages 10,12,14 and 16). These stages are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
4.2 Data Collection 
4.2.1 The Selection of Firms 
Data were collected relating to the degree to which Japanese knowledge-driven work 
systems were put to practice and accepted at two UK subsidiary firms in the automotive 
manufacture sector and a UK-based Anglo-Japanese technical collaboration between two 
major car manufacturers. The two subsidiary firms (Teniki UK and Nissera UK) were 
selected to include a brownfield and a greenfield site, for the purposes of comparative 
study. The technical collaboration (Rover-Honda) was included in the sample to test for 
the effect of the form of ownership on the degree to which alternative work systems were 
accepted. 39 There was an interest in observing influences other than control exercised by 
the parent company, which seems to be commonly observed in fully-owned subsidiaries 
(e. g. Skorstad, 1994; Danford, 1998; Delbridge, 1998), on the degree of internalisation of 
work systems. Rover provided a good example of work systems diffusion whereby its 
claimed successful collaboration with Honda till 1995 (e. g. Faulkner, 1995) created 
`centres of excellence', or central specialism in the form of project teams that benefited 
39 The selection of a technical collaboration site also provided an opportunity to see how an existing UK 
firm adopted lessons from Japan and how its relations with a Japanese partner were implicated in this 
process. Hence, there was an effort to look beyond solely how Japanese firms operated in the UK. 
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from each other's experience (Ohtani et al., 1997). Nissera UK, the greenfield site, was 
claimed to be a good example of a UK subsidiary firm that had successfully implemented 
Japanese work systems. Teniki UK, the brownfield site, aimed to be more market 
oriented and quality-conscious by adopting Japanese work systems. All of the three firms 
were examples of firms adopting Japanese work systems to make them work in the UK. 
They had adopted continuous improvement schemes from the Japanese to attain 
economic efficiency. 
Firms involved in this study were selected according to specific criteria including the 
form of ownership, nature of diffused work systems, site and sector. Sites were selected 
to achieve variety in terms of aspects such as firm location and form of ownership. It 
should be noted that whilst demographic information on the cases is important for 
drawing conclusions, one must look beyond structural classifications to recognise each 
firm as representing a "unique community of people who go about their business in a 
distinctive setting" (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1998: 20). The selection of the technical 
collaboration case-the Rover-Honda collaboration-was mainly based on Rover's long- 
standing relationship with a major Japanese car manufacturer, Honda. Honda carried the 
image of the most innovative Japanese manufacturer in the mid-1980s. It also had the 
characteristic of a Japanese Total Quality Control (TQC) attitude to manufacturing. The 
collaboration lent itself to research as there were intensive efforts to diffuse the TQC 
system to Rover. This research specifically focused on a project carried out between 1985 
and 1989, which constituted `side-by-side' work rather than an `arm's length' 
relationship with Honda. It was seen as the most successful project by both engineers and 
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managers at Rover. Similarly, the two subsidiary firms were espoused to continuous 
improvement in quality and reliability through a programme of total quality 
improvement, serving their customers' needs through a Just-In-Time delivery. 
The two subsidiary firms were active in a single stage of the supply chain-assembly of 
car components-whereas the technical collaboration was involved in a separate stage- 
design, engineering, and manufacture of automobiles. Nevertheless, they had a core 
business, which involved the activity that they had performed since their establishment. 
All of the three firms were located in the automotive manufacture sector. As was 
discussed in Chapter 1, this sector lent itself to investigating the limits to diffusing 
`Japanese best practices', for the UK automotive manufacture sector had been heavily 
influenced by Japanese investment, particularly in the 1980s. 
Table 4.2 lists the firms that have been involved in this study. It includes information 
about their date of establishment, location site, core business, size, form of ownership, 
nature of diffused work systems and sector. There was an attempt to standardise 
parameters across firms for a comparison along sector and nature of diffused practices. It 
is recognised in this study that variation in structural characteristics across the three 
cases, such as company size, can influence the degree to which work systems are 
implemented and internalised (see Section 6.1.2.1, Chapter 6). However, an attempt is 
made here at highlighting the interaction between organisational members and the 
process of attaching meaning to alternative work systems. 
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Both of the subsidiary firms were roughly medium-sized (170 and 300 employees 
respectively40). However, the third firm differed in terms of its number of employees, 
being a large-sized firm. Similarly, the time span from the year of initial investment to 
data collection, labelled here as company age, differed across the sites (either being three 
or 11 years). The literature suggests that different types of firms within the same industry 
behave in a dissimilar fashion (e. g. Chesbrough (1998), c. f. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. 
(1994) in relation to the internalisation of team-based work systems). Hence, the likely 
impact that the differences in company size and age could have on the diffusion of 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems was taken into account. 
Nissera UK was similar to Teniki UK in terms of the form of ownership, company size, 
nature of diffused work systems and sector. However, in terms of company age (from 
investment to data collection), it was similar to the Rover-Honda collaboration 4' 
Although the Rover-Honda Collaboration was larger than the two subsidiary firms in size 
and operated under a different form of ownership, it was similar to Teniki UK and 
Nissera UK in terms of the nature of diffused work systems and sector. The Rover case 
had a local institutional context that was similar to that of Teniki UK, particularly in 
terms of site location. Rover's similarity with Nissera UK was more in terms of both 
companies espousing to be successful models of diffused Japanese work systems. The 
selected companies were not closely matched for it seemed more attractive to design a 
research that reflected the spread in actors' interpretation of alternative work systems. For 
40 In general, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 1995b) in the UK defines a small firm as one 
with fewer than 200 employees and a medium-sized firm as one with 200-500 employees. Teniki UK, with 
170 employees, is not defined in this research as a small-sized firm, as its historical trend (see Appendix V) 
does not suggest maintenance of a small size. 
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example, on the topic of closely matching cases, Sorge (1991: 173) shows that where case 
studies are selected to match in pairs as closely as possible and product strategies are 
`controlled for', there may be "tendencies in the evolution of competence requirements 
[to appear] to be similar in the two countries [UK and Germany]". 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, multiple levels are addressed in this study to gain an 
integrated understanding into work systems diffusion. If the national context alone was 
addressed, then one would expect similar outcomes in the levels of internalisation in each 
of the three cases. This would be to ignore any possible variation in the degree to which 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems are internalised across firms located in the 
same sector within a single country. 
4.2.2 The Negotiation ofAccess 
The process of establishing contacts with companies began in mid-1997 with the dispatch 
of letters to 30 Japanese manufacturing companies in the UK. The list, which was 
compiled by the Department of Trade and Industry's `Invest in Britain' Bureau (IBB, 
1995), consisted of UK subsidiaries and joint ventures classified according to region and 
product category. These initial letters, accompanied by a research proposal, bore requests 
for company documents with the aim of making the researcher more familiar with the 
company's operations, in turn, creating an opportunity to follow up the letters with 
requests for company visits and interviews. The response rate was 50 per cent. The letters 
41 In the case of the Rover-Honda collaboration, this period covers 1978 to 1989, that is the year of 
establishment to the end of the Rover 200/ Honda Concerto (R8/YY) project. 
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were directed to Managing Directors (MDs), rather than HR/Personnel Departments, for 
it was felt that the latter group's high level of formalisation and relatively lower level of 
authority could slow the process of entry into the organisations 42 
The second round of letters was sent within a month to the MDs who had responded 
positively to the first round of letters. Eight companies, which are listed in Appendix I, 
extended invitations for interviews, and served as participants of a pilot study. Three of 
the company heads-Unipart Yachiyo Technology Ltd., Unipart Yutaka Systems Ltd., 
and R-Tek Ltd. -were Japanese, allowing the researcher to gain Japanese perspectives on 
the nature of knowledge and the facilitators and inhibitors of the process of diffusing 
knowledge-driven work systems. These preliminary interviews demonstrated that there 
were indeed cultural differences between Japan and the UK, for example in the way 
learning was exercised, or in the techniques used for diffusing knowledge. 43 These 
interviews allowed the researcher to further refine and structure her questions. 
Given their distant geographical locations, it was not possible to research two of the joint 
ventures, namely Ikeda Hoover and R-Tek Ltd., in detail. Moreover, the two Unipart 
collaborations were recent developments, having been in operation for two months at the 
time of establishing contact. Hence, they were in the initial stages of diffusing Japanese 
work systems. They also had problems with inventory control, supplies and working 
relations, and had to reap the benefit of their initial investment before they could commit 
42 This proved to be justified over the course of the research, especially in the case of large, relatively more 
bureaucratic firms. 
43 For example, the interview with the MD of Unipart Yachiyo Technology Ltd. showed that the emphasis 
placed on employees' past experience (80 per cent, as opposed to 20 per cent placed on talent-terms used 
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themselves to any research. 
The contact with ERA Technology (which was the UK parent company of Telecom 
Modus-a joint venture between ERA Technology in the UK and NEC in Japan) was 
maintained over a period of eight months. Meetings were scheduled with the Japanese 
Director of Strategy and Finance, the British Technical Director, the British Company 
Accountant and the British Human Resources Manager at Telecom Modus. Similarly, the 
MD of the sixth company in the pilot study, Hoya Lens UK Ltd., provided interviews 
with six managers and a process engineer that allowed the researcher to refine her 
research tools. Further access to Hoya Lens UK Ltd. was denied on the grounds that 
information critical of the company's operations was released by the process engineer. 
A preliminary interview at the last company, Teniki UK Ltd., allowed further access to 
it 44Access was negotiated on the basis of monthly visits to the company over a period of 
six months 45 However, a further request was made to work as an operator on the shop 
floor during the company's slump period of April to July 1999. This was looked upon as 
favourable. The same request was also directed to the second subsidiary firm, Nissera UK 
Ltd., when the gatekeeper expressed curiosity over the reasons for low level of 
motivation on the shop floor. Work experience on the shop floor was granted for a week 
before the shutdown period in August 1999 at Nissera UK Ltd.. 
by the MD himself) was greater in Japan than it was in the `West'. The `West' was seen as placing more 
emphasis on talent and performance. 
as This seemed to be premised on the grounds of a managerial interest in the evaluation of a change 
programme that was underway in the organisation at the time of contact. The change programme was 
initiated in 1996 by the Japanese management via replacement of local management with a `more market- 
oriented, quality-conscious team'. 
43 An earlier request for fortnightly visits per month had to be changed as it was found to be too time- 
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The key issues arising during negotiation of access were as follows: the benefit which 
could be afforded to the organisation (in this context, the feedback on the research 
findings), the amount of organisational time the research was likely to take, and the 
extent to which the research findings would become public through publications. 
Eventual publications were agreed to on the basis that the identity of the organisation was 
disguised and the anonymity of individuals preserved. 
The use of British business contacts helped in setting up meetings with the Japanese 
counterparts (c. f. Glidewell, 1959 in Gill and Johnson, 1991). However, on the whole, 
negotiation of access proved to be time-consuming and often difficult, with the researcher 
lacking powerful support. 
4.2.3 Justification of a Comparative Study 
The cases were selected with the intention of including affiliate firms of Japanese MNCs 
in different local institutional sites in a comparative study. A comparative analysis was 
carried out in order to develop robust explanations for the internalisation of knowledge- 
driven work systems. A number of studies on knowledge diffusion are characterised by 
generalisations which are assumed to be universal but are in fact conditioned by the 
circumstances of time and place (e. g. Rogers, 1983). For example, Rogers' (1983) work 
is seen as a somewhat prescriptive supply-side model that draws a linear relationship 
between the supplier and the user of knowledge to be `transferred'. Knowledge in this 
consuming for the company. 
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context is objectified and manipulated for rapid 'transfer'. 46 His model, which is further 
developed by Clark and Staunton (1989), is criticised for ignoring the embeddedness of 
knowledge-driven work systems in complex ensembles of routines which may inhibit or 
enable the firms' ability to use diffused systems (Clark and Newell, 1993). It is argued 
that the diffusion process is more complex, involving political processes of the suppliers 
and the active involvement of the users (ibid. ). The context-bound nature of diffusion 
necessitates the acknowledgement of the institutional context that shapes the 
internalisation of a practice in a new national system (Clark, 1987). One can discover 
whether one's explanatory arguments are context-bound by investigating experience in 
other environments. If the experience applies in a diversity of times and places, one may 
assume that one has identified a robust generalisation. Otherwise, one needs to explore 
the situational characteristics that may explain for the differences in outcomes that tend to 
persist, resisting pressures to converge (Hyman, 1998). This essentially serves as a means 
of teasing out macro institutional influences from the micro organisational effects. 
Comparative research also has a potential role in identifying `lessons'. For example, the 
appropriation of production and inventory control systems in the British context was 
modelled on the American vision, templates and artefacts and "diffused through a strong 
presence of American suppliers (e. g. IBM) and major American consultancies (e. g. 
Arthur Anderson)" (Clark and Newell, 1993: 77). The key player in the diffusion of the 
system-the British Production and Inventory Control Society (BPICS)-was in fact a 
licensee of the American Society, APICS. A comparative study of the British and the US 
46 'Knowledge transfer' is used intentionally here to reflect the linearity assumed in the diffusion of 
knowledge. 
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production and inventory control systems provided an opportunity to explain for 
persistent differences. It also allowed for the acknowledgement of peculiarities of each 
national institutional context. Such an analysis falls in alignment with the neo- 
institutionalist arguments, which argue for the specificities of national institutional 
frameworks. A comparative study is also useful for saturating categories of incidents, for 
it provides the opportunity to maximise differences among groups. "[Theoretical] 
saturation can never be attained by studying one incident in one group" (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 63). Multiple groups need to be studied. 
The current research focuses on an inter-firm comparison in a single national system, 
with references drawn from the national context that serves as the supplier of alternative 
work systems. The comparative study seeks to establish and account for similarities and 
differences in the cases investigated. It is not a cross-national comparison, as the 
companies under study in Japan and the UK are not paired. Those in Japan constitute the 
parent or partner firms of the affiliate firms in the UK. Inevitably, parent and subsidiary 
firms could not be matched on age, size and technological advancement. 
From a methodological standpoint, the comparative approach also aims to achieve the 
objective of testing and exploring the pervasiveness of uniqueness. "Paradoxically, 
uniqueness can only be demonstrated through systematic comparison that differentiates a 
country from all others as a deviant case in a given universe" (Rose, 1991 in Hyman, 
1998: 6). In other words, exceptionalism needs to be integrated through comparative 
analysis. Such an analysis also allows one to identify explanatory propositions in a 
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systematic manner. 
Within this study, there is a focus on comparison of a process as well as institutional 
structures. One implication of this comparison is that elements of the given process, such 
as worker response to alternative work systems, may be the same across countries despite 
institutional differences. Hyman (1998: 10) argues that "national institutions of interest 
representation are not appropriate units for comparative analysis, for they are differently 
constituted, differently experienced and differently set in motion according to specific 
national context". Hence, the aim here is to highlight macro institutional and micro 
organisational influences on the internalisation process across sites in a specific national 
context. 
4.2.3.1 Doing a Qualitative Case Study Encompassing Interviews and Participant 
Observation 
The research is based on a qualitative case study of the process of internalising work 
systems at the firm level, drawing both on interviews and participant observation. The 
emphasis on knowledge-driven work systems diffusion research is on understanding the 
contextual characteristics that influence organisations' decisions to adopt new ideas (e. g. 
Hislop et al., 1998). Qualitative case studies enable one to carry out investigations where 
other methods such as experiments do not lend themselves to viewing the case from the 
perspective of those involved (Gillham, 2000). The interest in the present study is to carry 
out research into the processes leading to results rather than into the `significance' of the 
results themselves. It has been argued in Chapter 2 that actors translate or interpret new 
ideas and use them alongside existing systems and processes (e. g. Scarbrough and 
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Corbett, 1992). Such sense-making processes can be more thoroughly investigated by 
immersing oneself in the daily activities of the research participants, made possible by 
participant observation. This allows one to be sensitive to the context-dependent, specific 
and tacit nature of the diffused knowledge-driven work systems. The richness of the 
context, or in Yin's (1994: 3) words "the complex interaction between the phenomenon 
and its (temporal) context' 'warrants the use of a qualitative case study. 
Three qualitative case studies were conducted to attain a rigorous comparison of the 
diffusion process. It was felt that a comparison of two subsidiary firms alone would not 
have provided diversity in the investigation of the likely influences on the internalisation 
of alternative work systems. Three cases could yield more data than two cases where 
flow and configuration of events and reactions influencing a particular degree of 
internalisation of work systems would become clear. A `replication study' (Yin, 1994) 
was necessary whereby "successive cases [could be] examined to see whether the new 
pattern matche[d] the one found earlier [in the first case study]" (Huberman and Miles, 
1998: 195). At the same time, investigating more than three multilevel, in-depth case 
studies would become unmanageable from a practical point of view. The aim was to 
strike a balance between collecting data that allowed for a rigorous analysis and avoiding 
data overload in the field, "leading to the analysts thus missing important information, 
overweighing some findings, skewing the analysis" (ibid., p. 198). 
The present study drew upon both interviews and participant observation. Context- 
dependent knowledge, which is action-oriented and based on organisational routines 
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(Hislop et al., 1998), could not be discerned entirely through interviews. The nature of 
such knowledge required participation in the highly dynamic interplay of archetypes and 
the negotiated patterns of interaction between different groups of social actors. Under 
these circumstances, interviews would provide only an incomplete account of those 
relations and processes, and would not enable an in-depth understanding of the diffusion 
process and its relation to institutional contexts. This research is not only concerned with 
discrete taxonomies, such as structural elements, of work systems diffusion. It also aims 
to examine the social relations and processes in which activities are embodied (Clark and 
Newell, 1993). 
The research focuses on participants' perceptions of continuous improvement activities 
and related changes in work practices and structures. The challenge here is to understand 
and interpret complex forms of social activity, which are defined by the actors themselves 
in terms of their own subjective meanings. The internal logic of participants' meaning 
cannot be addressed by positivist methods borrowed from the natural sciences. In order to 
explore the experience of the workers under the `Japanese' model, one needs to live, act 
and think the specific meaning and relevance structure of the social agents (Delbridge, 
1998). However, in the given research, this is not carried to the extreme of being fully 
immersed in the activities of a given firm and, hence, the researcher could stand back and 
relate the variables under observation. A weeklong participant observation, which 
complemented interview data, provided the opportunity to elicit adopters' perspective 
and examine practice (e. g. Altheide and Johnson, 1998). 
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The situation of the workplace relations, in this context, is of key significance. The task is 
to explain and understand subjects' underlying motives and meaning systems. Douglas 
(1976 in Gill and Johnson, 1991: 109) argues that "participant observation can enable the 
researcher to penetrate various complex form of `misinformation, fronts, evasions and 
lies' that are considered endemic in most social settings". In other words, the researcher 
surrenders to everyday experience but does not go native. S/he needs to come back to 
reflect and report upon the experience. 
The nature of this study partly reflects a `world' of social constructions in which the 
researcher cannot control the characteristics involved in a situation that occurs in a 
natural setting (Merriam, 1988). The study aims to explain through developing 
understanding, rather than through predictive testing. As it focuses on the actions and 
taken-for-granted meanings of research participants, the researcher comes closer to, 
rather than removed from, the data. In line with Delbridge's (1998: 17) argument, the aim 
of this study is to seek in part "detailed description of the reality of workplace relations 
and to relate these findings to contemporary theory and other studies of `empirical 
tendencies"'. Furthermore, there is an attempt to formulate a systematic comparison of 
the observed peculiarities across cases. 
4.2.3.2 The Interview Type and Protocol 
In the present research, data were mainly gathered through interviews. Although 
interviews as a data collection tool can provide an answer to how context-dependent 
knowledge can diffuse across nations, they are not immune to respondent bias. The 
research responds to this bias by triangulating data through participant observation and 
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document analysis. This, as will be outlined in Section 4.4, is a means of establishing 
validity in the context of reflective accounting. Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 278) refer to 
this process as `analytic realism'. In Hammersley's (1992: 69) terms, analytic realism 
aims to "represent accurately those features of the phenomena that it is intended to 
describe, explain or theorise". 
The relevant data were gathered from multiple sources including company reports, 
journal articles, participant observation and interviews. In the case of the two UK 
subsidiary firms, part of the information drew on participant observation over one week 
in June and July 1999. Further information came from interviews with Japanese advisors, 
directors, UK team leaders, operators and managers across personnel and training, sales 
and marketing, product engineering, design and quality, and finance between August 
1998 and January 2000. In addition, information was obtained through interviews with 
the Japanese managers in product development, general affairs, quality assurance, 
corporate finance, engineering and corporate planning and control departments at the 
parent companies and factory tours in Japan in April 2000 (see Appendix II for a list of 
interviewees at both subsidiary firms). The research questions addressed the nature of the 
relationship, and the division of responsibility between the Japanese MNC and the 
subsidiary. They also considered the means of diffusion, characteristics that facilitated 
and inhibited the diffusion process, perceived cultural and managerial differences 
between the two companies, technology diffusion and learning opportunities available to 
the parent and subsidiary companies. Interviews from multiple functions were drawn for 
a representative account of the ways in which knowledge-driven work systems were 
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sustained in the firms. The aim of the inquiry was to reveal the different truths and 
realities held by different individuals across sections within a firm as well as groups 
across nations (Stringer, 1996). Participant observation in these two companies was 
limited to a week, given the change in employees' work schedule47. Hence, interviews 
with factory personnel and managers were necessary to attain a complete picture of the 
social patterns in the factory. Interviews were also necessary for background information 
on the factory structure and work relations at the time of the company's foundation, for 
these patterns, given their occurrence in the past, could not be experienced in person. 
In the case of the technical collaboration, the perceptions of research participants on the 
past collaborative project were gathered through interviews and document analysis. 
Interviews at Rover were conducted between January 1999 and September 1999 with 23 
employees, including senior managers across design, purchasing, and manufacturing. 
Discussions focused on how the R8/YY (Rover 200/Honda Concerto) project that 
commenced in 1985 (with a model launch in 1989), was carried out by the electrical 
engineers in a framework of diffused Japanese quality improvement philosophies and 
techniques. There was a focus on electrical engineers, as their working relations with 
Honda members were seen as better than those in other departments at Rover, hence 
favourable characteristics that were likely to influence the internalisation of Japanese 
work systems could be more easily identified. Interviews focused on the views of 18 
engineers based at Rover since the time of the collaboration, who were involved at some 
stage in the R8/YY project. Nine of the engineers constituted the core team of the 30 
47 The number of working days was reduced from five to four days due to a drop in the sales volumes of 
major customers. This was a measure taken to avoid lay-offs. 
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electrical engineers who visited Japan and served liaison roles for a period of six to 12 
months. The nature of the research questions addressed to the subsidiary firms applied to 
the Rover-Honda collaboration as well. In addition, specific Honda practices that were 
diffused to Rover and implemented at the time of the R8/YY project were explored, as 
well as mechanisms for sharing ideas and the role of technology on the effectiveness of 
the collaboration. In brief, the questions focused on the knowledge-sharing dimension 
within the engineering project and diffusion across the two companies. The same 
questions were also directed to 10 Honda members. Four of these were principal 
engineers on the R8/YY project based in Japan. One of the Honda members was the 
project manager on the R8/YY and another occupied a managerial position on the XX 
project. The remaining four were senior managers. One of the senior managers was based 
at Honda R&D UK, the second at Honda of the UK Manufacturing Ltd., and the 
remaining two at the Rover Liaison Office of Honda Motor Europe Ltd. (see Appendix II 
for a list of interviewees at Rover and Honda). Some of the engineers on the team (four at 
Rover and five at Honda) could not be interviewed, as they were no longer affiliated with 
the company (mainly in the case of Rover) and the electrical engineering department (in 
the case of Honda). In addition, there were resource constraints with regard to the three- 
week visit to Japan. Rover members were approached via snowball sampling involving 
direct letters and fax messages. A similar approach to Honda-that is sending letters that 
expressed the purpose of the research and requests for meetings-proved futile as there 
was no familiarity on the part of the Honda members with the researcher. 48 Rather, 
contacts at Rover were resorted to in approaching specific names in senior managerial 
48 The researcher had to be `recommended' to a Honda member by a trustworthy British counterpart at 
Rover. 
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positions at Honda. Honda R&D in Utsunomiya and Honda Headquarters in Aoyama, 
Japan, were visited for interviews during March and April 2000. The engineers provided 
specific information relating to the concerned project, whilst senior managers provided 
the history of the collaboration, including its industrial and economic background. In 
addition to formal interviews, there were informal conversations with Rover engineers 
that allowed interpretations following interviews to be clarified and confirmed. 
In sum, Rover and Honda employees seemed to be co-operative and relatively open about 
their experiences during the R8/YY joint work. It was a project carried out in the past and 
the commercial sensitivity of the information provided was no longer an issue. As the 
research was a retrospective study of the diffusion of Honda practices to the UK partner, 
Rover members could more rationally reflect upon their joint work by presenting both 
their negative and positive experiences. During discussions, participants were engaged in 
the process of reflecting on their experiences, rather than living them. This enabled them 
to better articulate their experiences and perceptions. A retrospective study could reduce 
the likely occurrence of an attribution bias, where a negative occurrence is attributed to 
an external cause, rather than an internal interpretation (that is something within the 
personal control of the respondent) (McKenna, 1994). Respondents at Rover could hold 
their group members or company responsible for mistakes or managerial deficiencies 
over the course of their collaboration with Honda. 49 The researcher was sensitive to the 
possibility that members could over-rationalise their experiences. Effort was made to 
49 The same did not necessarily apply to Honda members. This might have been due to the strong 
implications that the norm of losing face has in the Japanese culture. At the same time, interviews with 
Honda engineers were held in the presence of two senior Honda members, one of whom had recently 
retired. The retired member acted as a translator, at times, during the interviews. 
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minimise such drawbacks through methods of validation (see Section 4.4.2). 
Interviews in the sampled firms were open-ended and semi-structured, and addressed the 
incorporation of Japanese production and managerial philosophies and techniques into 
two subsidiaries and a collaborating firm in the UK. Multiple modes of evidence were 
built into ongoing data collection for testing or confirming conclusions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). A combination of multiple methods allowed rigour, breadth and depth 
to be added to the investigation (Flick, 1992). Interview questions pertained to "meaning 
and general knowledge information", rather than information used to count phenomena 
through surveys and compilations of official data (Besser, 1996: 30). The type of 
information sought was concerned with the meaning for individuals of events, 
relationships, social structures, roles and norms (Kamata, 1982; Hamper, 1991). 
The list of interview questions for the three companies (see Appendix III) were 
complemented with preliminary data on the firms. Protocols (Yin, 1994) incorporating 
schedules of company visits and members to be interviewed were developed. The 
majority of the interviews were taped and transcribed. 50 Wherever possible, confirmation 
of the contents of the transcriptions was sought. The resulting data were processed into 
50 Seven Rover, one Nissera UK and four Teniki UK interviews with British respondents were not taped, as 
the conditions under which the interviews were conducted were not suitable for recording. There were very 
few instances where the researcher felt that the tape recorder led to withholding of data by the participants. 
The train journey rides provided an excellent opportunity for turning rough notes into readable reports as 
soon as the data were collected. As Delbridge (1998: 21) contends "despite the difficulties, it is important to 
try and record the events of the day as soon as possible since there is a greater likelihood of ethnocentric 
bias creeping into the data the longer the records are left". Notes were taken in the case of interviews with 
Japanese participants. Given the language difficulty and the specific trust-building mechanism in the 
Japanese society (where heavy emphasis is placed on goodwill trust that forms over time), note-taking 
rather than tape-recording was necessary. Moreover, note-taking allowed Japanese respondents to 
demonstrate the issue at hand by sketching it on paper. 
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reports and sent to gatekeepers in each company for feedback. 
The data collection at Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda Collaboration is 
summarised in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Data Collection at Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda 
Collaboration 
Teniki (UK) Nissera (UK) Rover-Honda 
Document Company reports, Company reports, DTI reports, journal 
analysis local development local development and newspaper 
agency reports agency reports articles, books, 
internal reports 
Interviews in the 18 (August 1998- 14 (April - 25 (January - 
UK January 2000) September 1999) September 1999) 
Interviews in 2 (April 2000) 6 (April 2000) 8 (March - April 
Japan 2000) 
Total number of 20 20 33 
interviews 
Participant 1 week's work 1 week's work Not applicable 
observation (in experience as an experience as an (given that the 
the UK) operator in air operator in cluster project was 
element, air cleaner assembly and PCB developed between 
and carbon canister manufacture (June 1985 and 1989) 
assembly (July 1999) 
1999) 
Factory tours in Saitama plant; air Liquid Crystal [Tour of Rover's 
Japan cleaner assembly, Display production, Longbridge plant 
injection and blow case assembly, (June 1999)] 
moulding and press Research & 
shops (April 2000) Development 
Centre (April 2000 
Source: Data collected between 1998 and 2000 
The questions were translated into Japanese and presented to each participant interviewed 
in Japan together with the English version for a clearer understanding of the concepts 
presented to the participants. The Japanese version of the questions was sent to the 
139 
participants based in Japan in advance of the researcher's visit to the Japanese parent and 
partner firms. Both the English and the Japanese versions of the interview questions were 
developed on the basis of the levels and concepts presented in the analytic framework 
(see Chapter 2), and deduced from the research questions (see Chapter 1). The list of 
interview questions was divided into three sections. The first section aimed to capture the 
institutional elements that could have an impact on the implementation and 
internalisation of work systems at the adopter frms. sl In Section II, there was a focus on 
organisational characteristics, such as structural and cultural elements, that could 
influence the diffusion process. The questions in this section were preceded by a 
historical discussion of the establishment of the organisation (when and by whom, that is, 
which key actors were involved in the process of establishment). The range of products 
manufactured, customers served and the size (in terms of the number of employees) of 
the company, provided by the gatekeepers in each firm, were also considered. In Section 
III, questions were asked about group characteristics that could influence the 
internalisation of alternative work systems at the factory and the engineering project 
level. Participants were asked for their perceptions on the method of diffusion, the 
performance implications of, and the worker response to the alternative systems. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The analysis of empirical data (see Chapter 6 for the results) reflects Djelic's (1998) two- 
51 Platt (1988) notes that one would use case studies when one deliberately wants to cover contextual 
conditions. Why and how questions are asked about a contemporary set of events over which the researcher 
has little or no control (Yin, 1994). This allows for socially acquired and shared knowledge to become 
available to the researcher. 
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step comparative historical analysis. It combines detailed case studies with systematic 
comparison. This is similar to Westbrook's (1995) specifications in action research for 
initially achieving contextual understanding, then carrying out a comparison for 
generalisation. In Djelic's (1998: 14) words, detailed case studies ensure that "historical 
and contextual singularities are not being disregarded", and systematic comparison 
"allows for a significant theoretical leverage and represents a powerful tool, thus making 
generalisation possible". As a first step, in-depth case studies were conducted to gain 
insights into the historical context of the selected cases. This provided the main 
conditions for a given outcome, that is the degree of internalisation of Japanese work 
systems within each of the cases. Interview transcriptions and observation notes were 
scanned to identify all the relevant data about the attributes of work systems diffusion. 
This generated a list of tentative sub-themes under the main themes identified in the 
literature review (see Section 2.2.1, Chapter 2). Iterative loops of adding and amending 
sub-themes led to those that were identified as the most important in explaining the 
diffusion process. The internalisation or the acceptance of work systems was seen as 
influenced by, for example, participation through teams, emphasis on training, approach 
to discipline and the level of trust and communication. (Chapter 5 will explore these 
issues in detail). Sub-themes that were not comparable across the three companies or 
were only mentioned by a single respondent were not included in the analysis. For 
example, the production manager at Nissera UK (30 July 1999) indicated a lack of 
interest in suggestion schemes on the part of the workers: "we have launched it [the 
suggestion scheme twice]. People are just not motivated". This particular component of 
continuous improvement scheme was not diffused to Teniki UK, hence was excluded 
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from the findings reported in Chapter 6 on the basis of its lack of comparability. The 
same applies to the sick pay scheme that was detailed as "we have a sick pay scheme 
where if you have a good year and have seven out of 240 days absenteeism, you will be 
granted for next year a 100 per cent pay for sickness" by the production manager at 
Nissera UK (30 July 1999). No information on the sick pay scheme was reported by 
Teniki UK and Rover respondents. Furthermore, data that were not relevant to the levels 
of analysis and research aims addressed here were excluded. For instance, worker 
"complaints" were perceived by two of the administrative staff at Nissera UK as follows: 
"you will always hear complaints. Perhaps they have not got much work to do. We 
changed the bins in the ladies' room and got complaints that they were not hygienic 
enough". Similarly, the lack of trust between some of the operators at Teniki UK was not 
included in the discussions in Chapter 6, for this constituted an individual level of 
analysis that differed from what the study aimed to analyse: "you cannot trust all. They 
may look pleasant but will tell the supervisor behind your back. They may try to get you 
into trouble. They will not tell you things you should not do" (assembler at Teniki UK). 
The answers provided to more pertinent questions, such as barriers to diffusion of work 
systems, focused on a communication barrier between the Japanese and the British. For 
example, British (Indian by origin) Electrical Engineer E at Rover (7 May 1999) argued: 
It may be because I have myself been living in a different culture so 
personally maybe when I bumped into them I saw myself in them, where I 
was when I first came to this country [the UK]. I sort of knew what 
problems they might come across. I guess I was more open to that type of 
issue. But with other people, they had not experienced those issues 
themselves so they thought no one else has those issues. I think maybe in 
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Britain the tendency is that everybody else can learn English. And I do not 
want to learn any other language. When you first come across people, 
when you have been in a similar situation yourself, you can relate to them. 
The more you relate to them, the less these barriers. 
As other respondents acknowledged a communication barrier, theoretical saturation was 
reached on this issue and the `level of communication' was included as one of the sub- 
themes in the analysis. There was also theoretical saturation on the differences in 
company philosophies between Rover and Honda that were seen as a barrier to diffusion. 
The biggest learning curve was that they [the Japanese] stick to their 
processes. Culturally or the way they are brought up, they follow the steps. 
Whereas in the way Europeans think, it is `we got to get from there to 
there. Oh we can take a shortcut', which brings you to the earlier point, 
because psychologically we do not follow the steps, that is if the process is 
right or wrong. If you always take shortcuts, you never know if the process 
is right. Even if you think the process is wrong, you should follow the 
process and then take out what is wrong or modify the bits that are wrong. 
(British Electrical Engineer F at Rover, 21 June 1999) 
Perceived differences in company philosophies were included in the discussion on the 
degree to which workers understood and accepted the philosophies or the underlying tacit 
principles of continuous improvement under `organisational culture'. 
The second step in data analysis consisted of a systematic comparison, which was carried 
out to determine not only necessary conditions, but also a possible multiplicity of paths 
towards the same outcome. A `method of difference' (Djelic, 1998: 15) was adopted in 
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making comparisons of cases with different degrees of internalisation of alternative work 
systems. In this way, conditions that might be responsible for the variation in outcomes 
could be identified. (These comparisons will be discussed in Chapter 6). 
4.4 Reliability and Validity Concerns 
Qualitative case studies, including participant observation that involves the immersion of 
the researcher into the social setting under study, can be regarded by those with a 
positivist approach to methodology as highly subjective (e. g. Schatzman and Strauss, 
1973). For example, the researcher may be seen as impacting on the social setting, or 
forced to rely on his/her own perceptions. Under the circumstance, representations need 
to be given credence or legitimated through cross-checking. This research employs 
multiple data collection as a means of minimising inaccurate interpretations. Multiple 
cases, multiple informants within each case and across nations (i. e. interviews with both 
British and Japanese members), and more than one data gathering method are used to 
strengthen the study's usefulness for other settings (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). 
This study counter-challenges what the traditional canons perceive as a weakness-low 
external validity-in qualitative research by explicating the theoretical parameters of the 
study. It presents how data collection and analysis were guided by concepts (see Chapter 
2). Effort was taken to participate in the factory activities of workers, taking into account 
the opinions and actions of the people with whom the researcher interacted. Nonetheless, 
as the researcher was part of the social world that was being studied and had intrinsic 
values and beliefs from which she could not wholly detach herself, absolute neutrality or 
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true objectivity was impossible to achieve. As Delbridge (1998: 18) contends, "from 
conception through implementation to analysis and final interpretation, an individual's 
personal values and experiences will affect the research process". Under the 
circumstance, the challenge for the researcher was to be conscious of any factors that 
could render the study "unintelligible, unrepresentative, or irrelevant" (ibid. ). In the given 
study, the impact of the researcher's presence on the findings was minimised by forming 
relationships with the members in social settings. 
The qualitative case studies conducted in the three firms were subject to adequacy or 
validity, and reliability problems, as would be a quantitative study. 52 There was still a 
need to organise and interpret observations in qualitative research in a systematic way. 
Measures were taken to ensure that quality aspects, including reliability, construct 
validity, internal validity and external validity were incorporated into the study. 
4.4.1 Reliability 
The reliability of the research results was enhanced by making explicit the procedures 
that had been followed for data collection. These procedures included matters of 
interview protocol, tape-recordings of interviews and the feedback on transcriptions from 
the participants, as well as building and sustaining relationships in the field. 53 Also of 
52 Although the terms 'validity' and 'reliability' are borrowed from positivist natural sciences to test for the 
coherence of the study (especially given the fact that a systematic comparison is performed), they do not 
imply a simple causality between the phenomena under investigation. There is an attempt to capture the 
complexity of understanding, in addition to providing an explanation of why things are how they are. In 
other words, the research adopts `theoretical realism' rather than a truly naturalistic perspective. Social 
action, in this context, is seen as `occurring within relatively enduring social-structural conditions which do 
not determine those actions but do constitute a form of `objective reality' within which those actions take 
place" (Godard, 1993 in Delbridge, 1998: 16). 
3 This helped in attaining considerable degree of internal coherence and plausibility (Atkinson, 1990). 
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importance was the collecting of secondary information, 54 such as journal and newspaper 
articles, Department of Trade and Industry publications, books devoted to the Rover- 
Honda collaboration and company reports. 
4 . 4.2 Construct Validity 
Due to the nature of the kind of information sought, concerned as it was with the meaning 
for individuals of events, relationships, social structures, roles and norms, there was no 
easy means of checking validity (Besser, 1996: 29). If true meaning is what the credible 
members say it is, it is necessary to decide how many participants one should interview in 
order to have a clear picture of the social patterns in a given organisation. A valid picture 
of the researched phenomenon is attained here through theoretical saturation. This is 
defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as an instance when a researcher interviews 
members of a specific group about the meaning of some aspect of reality and the same 
responses, themes, concerns and feelings come up again and again. When "no additional 
data [can be] found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category", 
theoretical saturation has been reached on this issue for this group (ibid., p. 61). In 
addition, this study adopts a multilevel approach. It investigates knowledge-driven work 
systems diffusion at the institutional, organisational and group levels, and this is useful in 
saturating categories of incidents. It is argued that a multilevel approach is necessary to 
provide a representative account of a complex organisational phenomenon as that of 
cross-national diffusion of work systems (Kostova, 1999). 
54 According to Eisenhardt (1989), prior research and literature about a subject can provide a valuable 
source for comparative analysis and validating theory. 
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Initial concepts and frameworks were tested through preliminary interviews, while 
research sites were being explored. This testing was carried out at an early stage in the 
research process. Questions were semi-structured, so as to provide for consistency across 
the cases in the message conveyed to the participants. The semi-structured questioning 
also provided the opportunity to probe issues deeper to obtain an in-depth understanding 
of the key characteristics that were likely to shape the process of internalising Japanese 
work systems. This questioning provided the researcher with the flexibility to track key 
issues as they emerged. In addition, participant observation made it possible to capture, 
understand and analyse social relations and processes. It allowed the researcher to 
examine the main activities of the working day and in particular how participants "[took] 
recourse to context-linked typifications in order to make sense of their activities" 
(Hassard, 1993: 98). In the given case, it was necessary to learn the informal rules that 
were being followed and the way these were interpreted. 
The research addressed the matter of respondent bias by triangulating data. Multiple 
sources of confirmation were necessary to clarify meaning and to verify the repeatability 
of an interpretation (Raymond, 1996). Data were drawn from interviews, participant 
observation and document analysis. Moreover, within the case companies, interview data 
with a particular work group were checked against responses from another group. For 
example, factory workers' accounts in two of the cases were triangulated with the team 
leaders' and the managers' accounts. Similarly, British and Japanese participants' 
accounts were cross-checked against each other. This helped minimise possible 
translation errors. 
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Individual case findings were presented in various conferences for cross-checking the use 
of research concepts. This was also a check for coherence of arguments. In other words, 
there was a check to ascertain whether the conclusions followed from the premises, and 
correspondence. Interpretations had to be written or staged as a presentation which 
required direct response from an audience (see Appendix IV for a list of papers presented 
at conferences). 
Interview data were also cross-checked with research participants. Company reports 
circulated for feedback served to validate research results. There were several employees 
with whom the researcher interacted regularly and to whom she was able to go back to 
whenever there was a need for elaboration and clarification. 
4.4.3 Internal Validity 
To arrive at insights into the relationship between institutional variation and work 
systems diffusion, Yin's (1994) principle of pattern-matching was employed. The case 
studies revealed how and why a particular degree of internalisation of Japanese work 
systems had occurred. There was an intensive search for patterns in key characteristics 
that explained a given level of internalisation. After analysing the historical constituents 
of each case, events of each company were compared and contrasted to reveal similarities 
and differences. These results were then compared with the research questions about the 
influence of institutional, organisational and group elements on the internalisation of 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. The two-step comparative historical analysis 
(discussed in Section 4.3) promoted the internal validity of the research by minimising 
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the possibility of misinterpretations caused by the researcher's selective perception. 
4.4.4 External Validity 
The domain to which findings could be generalised was the historical neo-institutional 
framework in an analytic rather than statistical form (Yin, 1994). As the research aim was 
to explain the complexity of social exchange in a factory setting and on a collaborative 
project to highlight the key concepts constituting the diffusion process, the statistical 
generalisability of findings to other settings was not of concern in this study. However, it 
was possible to arrive at empirical pointers for the future. A future step would be to 
investigate conceptually similar but apparently contrasting situations (Bechhofer and 
Paterson, 2000). 
This research focused on the cognitive systems and normative patterns that outlined the 
expected mode of social relationships in the factory and the joint project settings. Other 
research strategies, such as surveys and archival analysis, were considered as constrained 
in their potential to tap into the "mental models in which human beings create working 
models of the world by making and manipulating analogies in their minds" (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995: 60). In this context, it becomes more meaningful to rephrase the question 
of whether case studies are generalisable to a form that reads as follows: `in what sense is 
a case study representative? '. Reflecting upon the matter, one could draw patterns of 
behaviour in a particular group of organisations. For example, firms located on greenfield 
sites may reflect levels of internalisation that are different from those located on 
brownfield sites. The case companies illuminated and developed the analytic framework 
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presented in Chapter 2 and, hence, were treated in some sense as representative. 
4.5 Summary 
The research design of this study is based on a comparative analysis of firms operating in 
similar industries with similar diffused work systems, but on different sites and under 
different forms of ownership. The focus of the research is more on the processural 
aspects of the diffusion process than on the structural aspects. In this way, limits to 
comparing firms of different structural parameters are reduced. 
The aim of the comparison is to investigate the impact of national and local institutional 
variation on the internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems. The research process 
is composed of 16 major stages that reflects a constant shift between theory and practice. 
The stages include (1), (8) exploration of arguments in the innovation processes, 
Japanisation and neo-institutional literatures, (2) construction of an initial conceptual 
framework, (3) exploration of research sites/ negotiation of access, (4) development of an 
interview protocol, (5), (7), (9) (11) data collection at the UK affiliate firms, (6) revision 
of the conceptual framework, (10) case write-up, (12) revised case descriptions and 
further readings on neo-institutionalism, (13) further data collection via a visit to Japan, 
(14) data processing/comparative analysis of the cases, (15) feedback from respondents 
on the analysis, and (16) final revision. 
The exploration of research sites began in mid-1997 and lasted eight months till 1998. 
This included interviews at five joint ventures and two subsidiary firms. The major data 
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collection started in 1998 and lasted until April 2000. Data were collected at two UK 
subsidiary firms, complemented with interviews at the Japanese parent companies, and an 
Anglo-Japanese technical collaboration, with interviews conducted at both partner firms. 
The selection of firms included brownfield and greenfield subsidiary firms and a 
technical collaboration `committed' to continuous improvement activities in the 
automotive manufacture sector. Criteria considered in the selection of firms included site, 
sector, form of ownership, and the nature of diffused work systems, that is efforts to 
achieve continuous improvement in quality and reliability. 
Data relating to employee and managerial perceptions of the way in which Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems were diffused to adopter firms and the characteristics 
that had an impact on their implementation and internalisation were gathered via semi- 
structured interviews with the following groups of people: Japanese advisors, British and 
Japanese directors, senior managers, and British team leaders and operators. Participant 
observation in factory settings was also of importance in securing such data. Additional 
data were collected from secondary sources including company reports, DTI reports, 
journal and newspaper articles, books and local council reports. Interviews were based on 
a pre-defined schedule and a list of questions (that is an interview protocol) aimed at 
capturing institutional, organisational and group influences. All interviews, with the 
exception of the 12 with British employees and those with Japanese members, were 
recorded, transcribed and fed back to gatekeepers. 
The data analysis took the form of a two-step comparative historical analysis. Interview 
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transcriptions and observation notes were scanned for tentative sub-themes, and key sub- 
themes were selected upon iterative loops of adding and amending. Systematic 
comparison of data determined necessary conditions in explaining the outcome. 
A range of methods and techniques for qualitative research was used to enhance the 
reliability and validity of the results. Reliability was enhanced through explicating 
methods used in data collection, such as tape-recordings of interviews and feedback from 
participants. Construct validity was promoted through preliminary interviews, 
triangulation of data and feedback from academics at conferences. Internal validity was 
enhanced through pattern-matching of key explanatory characteristics across the three 
cases. External validity was promoted through analytic generalisation, where research 
findings were fed back to the earlier-adopted analytic framework. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WORK SYSTEMS DIFFUSION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
This chapter presents the results of the field study conducted over the period 1998-2000 
in a brownfield subsidiary (Teniki UK), a greenfield subsidiary (Nissera UK) and a 
technical collaboration site (Rover-Honda) within the UK automotive industry. It 
provides an overview of the institutional legacies that are generally defined at the 
national level but have a clear impact on practices at the local level. The detailed and 
systematic descriptions of the three cases refer to key characteristics that have an impact 
on the diffusibility of work systems from Japan to the UK. These are (i) the local 
institutional characteristics of location site and area, skills base, government initiative for 
or inward investment and the level of industrial dispute, (ii) company characteristics of 
age, size and terms of financing, (iii) organisational characteristic of the nature of 
diffused work systems, and (iv) group characteristic of team attitudes towards alternative 
work systems. Contextual information relating to the local conditions surrounding the 
three companies is introduced first. This is followed by an analytical overview of the 
characteristics that had an impact on the implementation and internalisation of 
multinationals' work systems by affiliate firms at the organisational and group levels. 
Sensitivity to contextual influences at each site was crucial, as they helped shape the way 
in which employees responded to the demands of `new' work methods. For instance, 
Storey and Harrison's (1999: 661-662) case study of a specialist engineering products 
manufacturer, owned by an American firm and managed by the British, shows that it may 
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be possible to "install new manufacturing methods within a brownfield site and to win a 
sufficient degree of co-operation from the workforce", if there are sufficient levels of 
technological investment "in conjunction with due attention to an appropriate 
employment relations strategy, which is adapted to the needs of different cells". 
However, the authors do not consider the role of the control mechanism, organisational 
structure and local institutional characteristics on the diffusion process in their study. 
They thus fail to provide a thorough analysis of workers' response to alternative work 
systems. In contrast, this study addresses the diffusion of structural, cultural, control- 
related and technological practices. It also shows sensitivity to local institutional 
characteristics. The analysis of the characteristics, on the basis of which the three cases 
are compared, can be found in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda Collaboration Sites 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration sites are all located in the 
automotive manufacture industry. They involve similar types of production systems such 
as lean manufacturing techniques and philosophies, and are said to be more committed to 
continuous improvement than firms operating in chemical, plastics, pharmaceutical and 
health care, textiles and apparel, as well as food and drinks industries. Their strategic 
decisions may have a major impact on the sectoral patterns of technological activities and 
competitive performance. Other similarities concern structural developments such as a 
shift towards a team structure. However, there are also significant structural differences 
and variations in industrial relations among the. case firms that can be linked to past 
institutional developments. These influence the degree of internalisation of Japanese 
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knowledge-driven work systems in the firms. Similarities and differences among the 
firms are outlined in the sections below. 
5.1.1 The Automotive Manufacture Industry 
The three adopter firms investigated, Teniki UK, Nissera UK and Rover, face similar 
environmental challenges, stressing their need to be innovative and competitive. They 
aim to enhance manufacturing skills, and quality and productivity of their output by 
adopting the latest working practices, that is, in Invest in Britain in Bureau's (1999) 
terms, lean manufacturing systems and commitment to continuous improvement. The 
philosophy of the companies is based on exploring new technology and constant 
innovation, and enhancing the well-being of their staff, actively encouraging their 
personal development as well as supporting the communities in which they live. They 
claim to take pride in being committed to continuous improvement in quality, reliability 
and service to all their customers through a programme of total quality improvement. 
Japanese manufacturing investment in the 1980s was primarily attracted to two 
geographical concentrations: "new towns such as Milton Keynes, Telford or Livingstone; 
and old, industrial districts, such as South Wales, the West of Scotland and the North East 
of England" (Smith and Elger, 1998: 271). This investment was of a Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) nature, and focused on greenfield rather than brownfield sites. It is 
argued that in new towns (such as Redditch in which Nissera UK is located), large firms 
have enhanced their power over relatively underdeveloped local labour customs, 
practices and conditions, and are, thereby, in a better position to take advantage of the 
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conditions for new types of employment relations that are distinct from the British norm. 
For older industrial districts, such as Longbridge where the Rover plant is located, 
characterised by declining heavy or primary industries, the bargaining position of 
companies is claimed to be strong because of the high levels of unemployment in the area 
(ibid. ). For example, unemployment in the West Midlands and Great Britain as a whole 
(9 per cent) has been consistently higher than that of the Telford work area (7.8 per cent) 
(Wrekin Council, 1994 in Sharpe, 1998a: 91). In other words, workers would be expected 
to be more willing to accommodate to a new workplace regime out of economic 
necessity. However, some of the challenges they face vary, due to the nature of their site 
locations. Although, as discussed in Chapter 2, the major practices-structural 
(participation through teams), cultural (commitment to quality improvement schemes), 
control mechanism (the degree of Japanese involvement in strategic decisions and 
operations) and technological (the diffusion of advanced technology)-that are diffused 
to all three case companies are similar55, the degree to which they are infused with value 
and accepted in each research site differs. Remnants of an earlier culture in the 
brownfield site inhibit the degree to which alternative work systems are accepted. An 
organisational culture embedded in fire-fighting discourages the adoption of alternative 
work systems. The differences between the requirements of the previous and `new' work 
systems produce divergent interpretations of continuous improvement schemes. By 
contrast, the greenfield site is more conducive to the internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems, for `new' work systems are introduced from scratch and 
ss However, it should be noted that the nature of the value-added processes engaged in at Rover compared 
with the other two cases is not the same. The diffusion of continuous improvement schemes to Teniki UK 
and Nissera UK relate to a learning activity in a manufacturing facility. Whereas the shift to a project-based 
structure and team culture at Rover relate to a learning activity in an engineering department within the 
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a set of common norms are complied to. As regards the technical collaboration, heavy 
and direct involvement of boundary-spanning individuals, company visits and personal 
relations facilitate both the implementation by management and the internalisation by 
engineers of alternative work systems. The following sections provide detailed 
descriptions of the degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work 
systems in each site, with reference to local institutional, organisational (including 
company) and group characteristics. 
5.2 The Local Institutional Context of Teniki UK 
Teniki UK theoretically serves as a brownfield site. 56 It was owned by a British firm 
before being acquired by a Japanese car component manufacturer, Teniki, in 1996. The 
British firm had initially formed a joint venture with Teniki to manufacture carbon 
canisters, with the aim of gaining capacity to supply the European market. This prompted 
the development of a technical centre to develop air induction systems capable of 
meeting relatively tight European standards on vehicle noise emissions. Teniki UK's 
main product is the technologically advanced carbon canister (37 per cent). Air Intake 
Systems are the second major product (35 per cent). 
The parent company, Teniki, operates eleven manufacturing sites in Europe, Asia and 
Americas. Its biggest customer is a Japanese car manufacturer that holds 57 per cent of its 
context of a technical collaboration. 
56 Teniki UK is located in Salisbury, South Wiltshire, on a greenfield site and has recruited new members 
since its acquisition by the Japanese MNC. Nevertheless, it confronts challenges posed by the previous 
organisational culture. Hence, it can be argued that the company lies in between a greenfield and a 
brownfield site. "With the people in here, the 100 odd people that are still the old school, it is the 
brownfield, you have to change them and lead them by the nose a bit, then you get the resistance. With the 
people you bring in, you say this is how it will be done. I think it is half-and-half. I think the gurus would 
say it is a brownfield, because we are changing and developing" (British Operations Manager, 18 January 
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shares. Teniki's subsidiary in the UK is located in a centre for tourism where a large 
fraction of the labour force (38.8 per cent, Salisbury Economic Development and 
Tourism, 1998) is employed in the public sector (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Salisbury Employment by Sector 
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The region has low dependence on the manufacturing sector. Employment trends in 1997 
for Salisbury show that 12.3 per cent of the working population was employed in 
manufacturing. This figure has remained stable at 12 per cent over a six-year period, 
since 1991. 
Although statistics relating to social class by occupation in 1991 (see Table 5.1) indicate 
that the highest percentage (18 per cent) of the population is economically active in the 
2000). 
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managerial and technical group, this skills base is concentrated in the financial services 
sector. A good skills base is not visible in the manufacturing sector. 
Table 5.1 Socio-economic Groupings of Households (1991 Census) 
Occupational Division Salisbury (%) UK 
Professional 4 4 
Managerial and Technical 18 19 
Skilled, non-manual 10 8 
Skilled, manual 15 16 
Partly skilled 7 8 
Unskilled 4 3 
Armed Forces/No occupation 
stated 
4 3 
Retirement or otherwise 
economically inactive 
39 38 
Source: Salisbury Economic Development and Tourism Unit, 1998 
The weak manufacturing base in Salisbury has meant lower inward investment in the 
area. USA has the highest percentage of investment (40 per cent) in the area, mainly in 
the electronics sector. Japan, Germany and France rank second (8 per cent) in their 
selection of Wiltshire as an area for investment. 
Among the reasons for locating in Salisbury, grant regimes and the skills levels of the 
workforce are of low importance. In the case of Teniki UK, the main reason for locating 
in the Wiltshire region has been the geographical proximity to the company's major 
customer. 
As regards the level of industrial dispute in Salisbury, it is much lower than the industrial 
average in the UK over a period of 1991 to 1998, with working days lost per 1,000 
employees ranging from 0 to 54 (54 being an outlier). 
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Having discussed the key characteristics of the local institutional context, the section 
below details the organisational and group characteristics that have an impact on the 
diffusion process. The discussion is structured along the lines of the analytic framework 
outlined in Chapter 2. 
5.2.1 Background to Teniki UK 
The nature of the relationship of Teniki UK's previous owner (ABC Ltd. ) under a joint 
venture agreement with Teniki was such that ABC Ltd. provided the production facility 
and the local management team, and Teniki provided the technical expertise. "It [the joint 
venture] was run by a group of directors with limited sales. They ran the operation in 
terms of production lines, very limited product types going through" (British Operations 
Manager, 18 January 2000). The joint venture performed poorly with low quality 
standards and efficiency levels. It became a wholly owned subsidiary company of the 
Japanese partner in 1996. 
Before the acquisition of Teniki UK, the organisational culture was claimed to be 
ingrained in fire-fighting and poor management-worker relations. Older operators worked 
in a non-informative environment characterised by poor communication and weak 
control. "ABC Ltd. did not have anything in terms of Statistical Process Controls (SPCs) 
etcetera. They had no set standards. Japanese brought them as they came" (British HR 
Officer, 29 July 1999). Promises of training were made, but rarely delivered. Training 
focused on teaching skills related to an operator's immediate task. Operators were not 
introduced to an integrated manufacturing process. There seemed to be no real change to 
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the business structure, strategy or improvements in business culture (British Operations 
Manager, 18 January 2000). 
Following the acquisition of the joint venture in 1996, Teniki replaced senior 
management with a more market-oriented, quality-conscious team. Since the acquisition, 
there had been six Japanese advisors in technical and development operations, sales and 
marketing areas. Having no line responsibility, they were brought in from the parent 
company to act as technical experts, avoiding hierarchical position as a control and filter 
mechanism. 57 The people side of management was left to local managers. 
In terms of company characteristics, Teniki UK is classified as a medium-sized company 
with an employee base of 170 people (in 1999). It has not yet achieved economies-of- 
scale and this puts financial pressure on local management in its efforts to impart 
continuous improvement philosophies to the operators. Furthermore, 57 per cent of its 
parent company's shares are held by a Japanese car manufacturer-the biggest customer 
of Teniki. This arrangement also constrains Teniki UK's financial flexibility. Given its 
recent acquisition, Teniki UK has not been under the full ownership of the Japanese long 
enough to be fully ingrained with a continuous improvement culture. The implementation 
of Teniki practices is low. (The impact of the key company characteristics on the 
implementation and internalisation of the source company's work systems will be 
discussed in comparison to that observed at Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda 
collaboration in Chapter 6). 
57 Nevertheless, Japanese advisors occupy powerful positions. For example, Teniki requirements conveyed 
by the advisors to local management cannot be rejected. 
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5.2.2 Organisational Characteristics 
The key organisational characteristic that has an impact on the implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese work systems is the nature of practices, namely structural, 
cultural, control-related and technological, that are diffused. This key organisational 
characteristic also incorporates the influence of the degree of Japanese involvement on 
the internalisation of work systems. The selective discussion of particular issues under 
each type of work system is based on the iterative process of adding and amending sub- 
themes during data analysis to identify the key issues (see Section 4.3, Chapter 4). 
5.2.2.1 Organisational Structure: The Shift to Team Structure 
In the beginning of 1999, the organisational structure of Teniki UK shifted with the 
initiative of the local UK management from an hierarchical authority relations to a rather 
flat structure. Its structure under the previous ownership was set up along the line of 
superintendents, supervisors and hourly-paid workers (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Production Structure of Teniki UK Prior to 1999 
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Superintendents, who were responsible for all activities in the factory and had a wide 
span of control over hourly-paid workers, reported to the factory production manager. 
This structure saw a significant change in authority relations with the introduction of 
team leader positions. Team leaders played an important role in mediating relations 
between workers and management. The transition to a team structure, that is the 
implementation of structural practice, was based on the objectives of reducing costs and 
supervisor autonomy, and breaking `them' and `us' clusters in the company. 
We had less number of supervisors, hence it was a cost-saving measure in 
that way. We had a lot who did not understand the difference between a team 
coach and a supervisor. With the new structure, there is a lot more 
concentration on the training side. Team coaches have more man- 
management and planning responsibilities. All team coaches are trained to 
train people. The benefits will take some time to reap. 
(British Personnel and Training Assistant, 29 July 1999) 
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Although, currently, processes of selection and induction at Teniki UK emphasise ability 
to work in teams and to accept responsibility and flexible work roles, Teniki UK has 
difficulty in investing a high degree of ownership of continuous improvement processes 
in the hands of relatively self-contained teams. Operators do not see a major difference 
between the new and old organisational structure. To them, the shift suggests that team 
coaches have more administrative tasks to carry out at lower pay. 58 However, under the 
new structure, as can be seen in Figure 5.3, team coaches are responsible for maintaining 
daily records of performance within sections; controlling staff training records; 
monitoring absence, holidays, availability and hours worked; and developing, 
implementing and monitoring action plans to achieve a culture of continuous 
improvement. 
58 In reality, there is no pay difference between supervisors and team coaches. 
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Figure 5.3 Teniki UK Organisation Chart 
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In brief, the role of a team coach differs from that of a supervisor, especially with regard 
to monitoring efficiency along statistical control methods. 
In line with the ideas of continuous improvement, the factory is arranged in a cell layout 
with one to three people working in each cell on the assembly of carbon canisters and air 
intake systems. 59 This is seen as more efficient than having ten people on a production 
line. In addition, work processes are designed to eliminate many human errors. There are 
59 The factory also houses an air element production section. 
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mechanisms for monitoring causal factors, such as warnings close to exceeding 
tolerances. 
The shift to a team structure had a positive impact on the line of demarcation between the 
technical and the sales department at Teniki UK. A technical centre was set up to 
improve communication with customers. This was seen as a means of combining the 
roles of the technical and sales departments to match the structure of the parent company. 
According to the Japanese Technical Advisor (17 December 1998) "a highly technical 
supplier can better support the customer. Prototype development is mainly a technical 
rather than a sales job, but it involves both tasks. It is not just idea development. At 
Teniki, it is the technical group which tries to attract new business". 
Teniki UK finds it difficult to replicate an `esprit de corps' due to the length of time its 
structure has been in place, relatively low skilled workforce, short-term financing by the 
parent company and the indirect involvement of Japanese expatriates in shop-floor 
activities. These are explored in detail below, and will be analysed in comparison with 
Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration in Chapter 6. 
5.2.2.2 Organisational Culture: Commitment to Quality Improvement Schemes 
The transition to a team-based structure required high level of vigilance and care on the 
part of the operator. However, Teniki UK had difficulty imparting parent company's 
continuous improvement activities, such as discipline in the workplace and `5C 
housekeeping' principles, by securing everyone's commitment to the process. Its 
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emphasis on training had a significant impact on the internalisation of work systems by 
the operators. Although there were remnants of the old ABC Ltd. culture in terms of fire- 
fighting at Teniki UK (British Design Manager, 16 March 1999), the company was 
perceived as performing better since its acquisition by the Japanese: "there is a 
communication problem at Teniki UK. Days of ABC Ltd. were worse. There was too 
much slack" (operator in Air Element). 
Emphasis on Training 
The acquisition of Teniki UK by the Teniki brought drastic change in training: 
Training was ad hoc in the beginning [in 1998]. Even though it was 
Japanese-owned, we needed more training. Hence, I put up a strategy to 
emphasise training. We decided to try and understand the training needs, 
competence skills of people and the gap in their knowledge to achieve 
business aims. 
(British Personnel and Training Manager, 15 February 1999) 
The previous ownership focused on teaching skills that were related to an operator's 
immediate task rather than the overall production process. "I was told that all I needed to 
know was air cleaners" (operator in Air Cleaner assembly). Although job training under 
current management is typically provided internally and includes consultation with staff 
and a personal development plan, the training and development plan has not instilled a 
continuous improvement culture at Teniki UK. Information on continuous improvement 
has not yet cascaded down to the operator level. 
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I believe, people [direct labour] understand that they need to cut costs in the 
business. However, the adoption of the approaches and the ownership of 
correcting the problems, they do not do. That again is partly through 
training and the pressure on the business, not being able to release them to 
train because the first thing we need to do to is keep our customer happy. 
We had a massive delivery problem when I joined. We are now sort of 99.9 
per cent day in day out. Now that is stabilised, we can go back to people. 
(British Operations Manager, 18 January 2000) 
There is more emphasis on training the engineers and greater focus on developing 
National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) levels than QC philosophies at the operator 
level. As the skills level in the area is considered low, Teniki UK focuses on increasing 
operators' NVQ levels: "Teniki UK is located in an area popular for farming and armed 
forces. It is not an industrial location, so the education level is not that high. 60 per cent 
of the people have not more than 3 GCSEs" (British Personnel and Training Manager, 15 
February 1999). 
Japanese expatriates are not hands-on with the training of operators and team coaches. 
They feel that they are either not understood or listened to. For example, it is felt that 
"shop floor workers in the Thai plant think Japanese are better. They listen to the 
Japanese" (Japanese Technical Advisor, 17 December 1998). The Japanese perception of 
local management's emphasis on training is exemplified by the following quotes: "one's 
pay will remain the same even with slight increase in skill in Japan. However, at Teniki 
UK, a certificate can make a lot of difference in pay" (Japanese Senior Advisor in 
Engineering, 16 March 1999). 
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There is an emphasis on certificates in the UK. They initiate change 
from an analysis on paper. We analyse not on paper but in people's 
minds. It is based on experience, which includes lessons learnt from 
mistakes. You ask yourself the question of how you can improve. We 
have less documents, information on paper than the Europeans. 
(Japanese Senior Advisor in Sales and Marketing, 17 December 1998) 
Furthermore, financial and human resources available for training are limited. The four 
Japanese advisors who are in a position to train operators are occupied with start-up 
projects, hence they feel that they do not have the time to invest in training. The high 
labour turnover also discourages Japanese expatriates from investing their efforts in 
training. Low emphasis on training negatively influences the internalisation of continuous 
improvement principles. This is further exemplified in the following section. 
5.2.2.3 Control Mechanism: Degree of Involvement by the Japanese 
The level of involvement by local management at Teniki UK under the previous 
ownership was limited. "The company was started in 1991 by five guys. They sold their 
interest in 1993 to a holding company and milked the company dry over the next two 
years. They did not invest. In 1995, they put the company on sale" (British Account 
Manager, 15 February, 1999). ABC Ltd. was seen as providing "too much slack", and 
possessing poor organisation and a dirty, messy work environment (senior operator in Air 
Element). "ABC Ltd. did not have anything in place in terms of SPC etceteras. They had 
no set standards. Japanese brought them as they came" (British Personnel and Training 
Assistant, 29 July 1999). In other words, there were weak attempts to promote quality 
consciousness on the shop floor before the acquisition by the Japanese partner company. 
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This had repercussions on the shift to a new work style that met resistance at Teniki UK. 
With the acquisition of the company, the production facility received considerable 
investment from the Japanese. 
What the Japanese shareholders are doing with us is that they invested a 
lot of money in this facility. They are growing in European market. We 
have introduced many new different product types and with that we have 
introduced may different processes to achieve those products. Therefore, 
the style of the business has changed very rapidly, as I understand, over 
the three years that the investment has taken place. 
(British Operations Manager, 18 January 2000) 
Japanese advisors at Teniki UK are not involved in day-to-day running of the business or 
manpower planning. Nevertheless, they exert considerable pressure on the technical and 
financial side of affairs, and have the upper hand in setting future trends and aims and in 
specifying counter measures for current problems. 
Obviously they invest the money and provide the bank. They provide us 
with technology and new machines and new products. A new product 
which they have, which we do not have, we send our guys over there who 
learn the product, spend two to three months looking at the process. So, 
basically, they give us certain access to their processes and their products 
and we go pick up new ideas. 
(British Managing Director, 21 August 1998) 
The Japanese, in this context, are seen as passing information or explicit knowledge 
rather than know-how or tacit knowledge to Teniki UK, which is then interpreted and 
operationalised by local management. 
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They retain big influence on the design of our products. Therefore, they 
are imparting their know-how. In terms of running the operational side, I 
think they pass information on how best it should be done. `This is what I 
believe you should be doing'. Therefore, you are passing information. You 
then have to translate that into knowledge, competence and skill yourself. 
We do that by analysing that information and imparting training. 
(British Operations Manager, 18 January 2000) 
The design responsibility for European customers remains with Teniki UK, whilst 
drawings for Japanese customers are produced in Japan as "it is easier to meet quality 
requirements and communicate with the customer" (Japanese Deputy General Manager in 
International Operations at Nissera, 7 April 2000). The majority of products are designed 
around Japanese processes. 
They still require us to put in place best practice processes such as U- 
shaped cells, Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED), assembly cells, 
where minimum stock levels of product are within reach, ergonomically 
designed. So they expect best practice. However, achieving some of the 
best practices is problematic. (British Operations Manager at Teniki UK, 
18 January 2000) 
There is considerable financial pressure from the parent company on Teniki UK in terms 
of demands for rapid profitability, for the company has recently been acquired, and is 
provided short-term financing. Stringent parent company expectations constrain the 
budget allocated for training at the host company and inhibit the degree to which 
alternative work systems are implemented by Teniki UK management. Low degree of 
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implementation, in turn, discourages the acceptance of alternative work systems by 
workers at Teniki UK. 
The way the company development has been financed has restricted that 
[the diffusion of Japanese practices]. The Japanese normally take a very 
long-term view in any investment. They are always for the future. For 
some reason, the way this business has been financed is through short- 
term loans instead of a large-share capital by the parent company. And the 
request has been that we make a very quick return on the investment 
whereas normally you would have maybe a few years' grace. 
(Operations Manager at Teniki UK, 18 January 2000) 
Stringent budgetary control is seen as having a negative impact on the fundamental 
training necessary for Kaizen activities. "I have had experience with Japanese advisors 
who were a lot more hands-on, get really involved in the business and they will muck in 
with everyone. However, because we are a new company, they need to evaluate what is 
going on. The main concern is cost at the moment" (ibid. ). Teniki UK's financing is 
affected by the shareholding arrangement between Teniki and a Japanese car 
manufacturer. 60 
Approach to Discipline 
Teniki UK's approach to discipline in instilling a continuous improvement culture on the 
shop floor is found to be weak. The company had to abandon its `3S housekeeping' 
60 57 per cent of Teniki shares are held by a Japanese car manufacturer. This has implications for Teniki's 
level of competitiveness. "The majority of the Japanese car manufacturer's work automatically goes to 
Teniki. There is no quotation, no competition. They are under no pressure to reduce cost and things like 
that. They, therefore, design something, send the drawings over to us and the immediate question our 
customers will ask is 'how can we reduce the cost? '. We would then need to go back to Teniki and say `if 
you did this or this or this, then you could bring the overall cost down'. Long process. But then we need to 
revalidate all suggestions we come up with. And, more often than not, it is virtually impossible to do. Big 
problem" (British Design Manager at Teniki UK, 16 March 1999). 
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principles61 in 1997 due to a lack of commitment by its employees. The company has 
invested considerable resources in re-creating JIT/TQC system, for older workers tend to 
work according to their own rules and enjoy the freedom created by the weak control 
mechanism on the shop floor. They jig machines that do not work properly; eat and drink 
in production cells; fill in production time sheets at their own convenience (at the end of 
the working day rather than on an hourly basis) and manipulate scrap rate figures. 
The biggest thing, which we have not been successful in, I suppose, is the 
Kaizen, small group activity work. We all know the benefits of doing that 
but again, the managers and engineers can actually carry on these 
activities, but unless the people on the shop floor buy into them and 
understand them and want to be part of them, it is not sustainable. You can 
create Kaizen activity, get result and potentially walk away. And if the 
people do not buy into it and understand why they are doing it, it is 
wasted. Because we have not cascaded the information down and have not 
got the skills bottom up to top, we cannot achieve this sustainable 
continuous improvement within the plant. 
(British Operations Manager, 18 January 2000) 
The QC initiative has not taken off at Teniki UK. Operators are not seen as having fully 
grasped continuous improvement principles. 
Level of Trust and Communication between the Japanese and UK Staff 
Japanese expatriates' role as `boundary-spanning' individuals (Tushman and Scanlan, 
1981) is significant in the dissemination of information obtained from the parent 
company to the local staff. Although Japanese expatriates are strongly linked to the 
61 This is a modified version of the 5C principles consisting of sorting, straightening and standardising. 
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parent company for the diffusion of work systems, they are not necessarily linked to their 
more locally oriented colleagues (i. e. the UK staff). The stringent strategic and technical 
supervision and the communication barrier between Teniki UK and its parent company 
tend to contribute to perceived low trust between Japanese and UK employees. There is 
also weak communication that is due in part to the low British-perceived willingness on 
the part of the Japanese to learn from their subsidiary firm62 and cultural 
misunderstandings. According to the Japanese, the British cannot be trusted when they do 
not deliver what they promise. "It is common sense to do it, for Japanese have a guilt- 
conscious state of mind. Japanese will never say they will do it if they cannot keep their 
word. British believe `do not be so negative. You can do it... (Japanese Senior Advisor in 
Engineering, 16 March 1999). Both the communication barrier and perceived low trust 
between the British and Japanese negatively influence the degree to which work systems 
are accepted by workers at Teniki UK. One needs to invest in personal relations to be 
able to develop trust and have open communication with the Japanese. For instance, 
"emphasis on information sharing is there when you are in Japan, sitting face to face with 
them. When you are half a planet away they do not send you things out of courtesy" 
(British Product Engineer, 16 March 1999). The Japanese are seen as displaying a `not 
invented here, hence no good' syndrome at Teniki UK. "Being British, we are not as 
good as them. They are good in manufacturing, but need us for marketing in Europe" 
(British Account Manager, 15 February 1999). There is also the feeling that the Japanese 
provide little feedback on the spot. 
62 There is rather a `discreet' form of high willingness to learn. In other words, the Japanese are not explicit 
in their efforts to diffuse knowledge from the UK subsidiary to Teniki. 
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When you pass requests up or present detail [such as yearly business 
plans], it is `thank you very much, well done, ok, we will get back to 
you'... we tend to analyse something, want to go and change it very 
quickly whereas the Japanese want to analyse it, think about it, ponder it 
over, just checking their own mind whether it is correct, make some 
recommendations and then do it. That is different style of people than we 
are. (British Operations Manager, 18 January 2000) 
There is a high willingness on the part of the Japanese to learn the European market 
developments. "In case of plastic product manufacture, Europe is more advanced. They 
produce module systems, which are easy to disassemble. Environmental regulation such 
as recycling in Europe, is stricter than that in Japan" (Japanese Deputy MD in 
International Operations at Nissera, 7 April 2000). However, the Japanese are not explicit 
in their efforts to transfer technical expertise in moulding and plastic product manufacture 
from Teniki UK to the parent company. 
The low emphasis on control-related practices, encompassing a weak approach to 
discipline and a low level of trust between the Japanese and UK staff, is seen as hindering 
the degree of internalisation of alternative work systems at Teniki UK. 
5.2.2.4 Technology Diffusion 
Teniki UK is not a profound example of advanced technology in comparison to its parent 
company, which produces carbon canisters and high volume plastic products. It lacks 
design responsibility and serves more as a manufacturing facility, despite an investment 
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in 1999 in a Technical Centre and an extension to its factory63. Neither its level of 
automation nor the reliability of machinery in assembly area is high. For example, the 
pleating line in the Air Element section had 100 per cent rework before part of the line 
was replaced by Japanese Teniki engineers in July 1998. The line previously had a 
manual knob with which one could adjust the distance between pleats. This was replaced 
with two rollers and three metal disks for automatic separation of pleats and the scrap rate 
was reduced to 20 per cent. 
Information between Teniki and its UK division is exchanged at technical and business 
conferences. 
We introduced our new technology in air induction systems at one of these 
conferences [the technical exchange conference]. We also have an 
overseas global conference. In the first Global Business Conference, we 
discussed technical matters. Key engineers gathered in Japan and 
discussed problems that occurred in each overseas plant. In the following 
Global Business Conference, we discussed quality matters-how to 
manage to keep the same quality standards across all plants. 
(Japanese Deputy General Manager in International Operations at 
Nissera, 7 April 2000) 
The nature of the information exchanged at these conferences is more explicit than tacit, 
and thus can be disseminated through a conference medium. In general, there is more 
emphasis on diffusing explicit than tacit elements of continuous improvement schemes to 
Teniki UK. 
63 "For example, European countries are more advanced in bi-metal moulding. Teniki UK has three of these 
moulding machines. Teniki does not have that machine yet" (Japanese Senior Advisor in Engineering, 18 
January 2000). 
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5.2.3 Group Characteristic: Attitude of Teams towards Continuous Improvement 
Schemes 
There is resistance to continuous improvement schemes, noticeably among older workers 
who have been with the company before its acquisition by Teniki. "You sometimes get 
the wrong kind of people, non-team players. They can argue and not fit in. They are 
mostly older ones with fixed ideas" (middle-aged operator in the Air Element section). 
The lack of commitment among some of the older operators on the shop floor is due in 
part to the preference for the old traditional British manufacturing system of union 
activity and craftsmanship. A senior carbon canister assembler perceives the problem in 
the effectiveness of the system as the outcome of different institutional processes in Japan 
and the UK: "it [housekeeping] is ingrained in Japan. It goes back a long way. The 
European continental approach is different. Production, sweeping and paperwork 
represent three separate jobs". In other words, production is carried out by the operator, 
sweeping by the apprentice and paperwork by the supervisor. "We need the trade union 
down here to improve the work environment" (senior operator in Air Element). By the 
same token, the team coach of the carbon canister section argues that "they should take 
on apprentices. The company should also stress Health and Safety and accident logs. I 
have not seen it yet". 
The lack of conformity to continuous improvement philosophies is also influenced by a 
weak control mechanism. For example, the Air Element section shows that "people do 
not read the quality audits. They just put a check. Somebody at the end of the day should 
look at the sheets" (senior Operator in Air Element). The local managers seem not to be 
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too concerned with housekeeping as long as the targets are met. 
The discretion used by different team coaches in managing their cells and the impact that 
this has on operators varies across cells. For example, the team coach of the Air Element 
section, unlike those in the Air Intake assembly section, is seen as being keen on bringing 
a fresh mind and eagerness to the workplace. His attitude is regarded as paternalistic 
towards his cell members. In line with the training system of the parent company, he 
attempts to instil a sense of self-belief and pride by constantly encouraging team 
involvement and new ideas through regular team meetings. He also provides immediate 
feedback-"at first these meetings will not be very interactive, the teams members 
preferring just to listen. But before long, a few ideas and moans will be forthcoming. 
These must be acted upon and reported back" (Team coach in Air Element)-, makes 
himself visible, and provides positive reinforcement-"tell them [the operators] they are 
the best but at the same time really believe in it yourself and thank them for their efforts" 
(ibid. ). According to an operator "[the team coach in Air Element] gets the maintenance 
man when we need him. The rest act as typical British supervisors". 
In general, attempts to win worker commitment and loyalty by fostering high levels of 
job satisfaction at Teniki UK are inhibited by a shortage of human resources (due to the 
high labour turnover", see Appendix V for the change in employment between 1997 and 
1999) and low skills level of the workforce. This, in turn, hinders the internalisation of 
Teniki work systems. 
64 The team coach in Air Element (28 July 1999) claims that "high turnover is crippling. You cannot 
establish stability". 
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5.2.4 Overview 
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the findings concerning the characteristics that have an 
impact on the diffusion of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems to Teniki UK. 
Initiatives taken by local and Japanese management to introduce alternative work systems 
at Teniki UK are not as strong as those at Nissera UK and Rover. This is presented as 
`low degree of implementation' in Table 5.2. The degree to which alternative work 
systems are infused with value and accepted by workers at Teniki UK is also low. This is 
presented as `low degree of internalisation' in Table 5.2. The local institutional context 
includes location on a brownfield site in a centre for tourism, low skills base in 
manufacturing, low government initiative for or inward investment and low level of 
industrial dispute. The medium-sized UK firm was acquired in 1996, and has a perceived 
medium level of financial dependence on the parent company. Teniki UK constitutes a 
subsidiary relationship, involved in assembly of car components. Its Japanese expatriate 
management base is small. The company experienced a shift to a team structure in 1999. 
However, this is not accompanied by a high commitment to continuous improvement 
schemes. There is a low emphasis on training. In addition, there is a high degree of 
involvement by Teniki in its UK division's technical and strategic decisions. This takes 
the form of indirect involvement in shop-floor operations with a weak approach to 
discipline. Close control at the strategic level tends to have a negative impact on trust 
building between the Japanese and UK staff. The observed low level of trust is also 
associated with a high communication barrier. Moreover, Teniki UK is dominated by low 
technology diffusion in carbon canister and air element production and assembly. 
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Table 5.2 Key Characteristics that have an Impact on the Implementation and 
Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at Teniki UK 
Local Institutional 
Level 
Company 
characteristics 
Organisational Level 
Key characteristics 
Location: Site 
Area 
Skills base 
Inward investment 
Level of industrial dispute 
Size (in 1999) 
Age (year of acquisition to 
data collection) 
Nature of work 
Form of ownership 
Number of Japanese 
expatriates and their roles in 
the UK 
Skills level of the workforce/ 
Symmetry of expertise with 
that of the Japanese firm 
Financial dependence on 
parent firm 
Nature of diffused practices 
- Organisational 
structure 
- Organisational culture: 
Commitment to continuous 
improvement schemes 
* Emphasis on training 
- Control-related: Degree of 
involvement by the Japanese 
* Approach to discipline 
* Trust between the Japanese 
and UK staff 
* Communication barrier 
- Technological: Technology 
diffusion 
Teniki UK 
Brownfield 
Centre for tourism 
Low in manufacturing 
Low 
Low 
170 employees 
3 years 
(1996-1999) 
Assembly of 
carbon canister (37%), 
Air Intake Systems (35%) 
Subsidiary relationship, 
57% of Teniki shares held 
by Japanese car 
manufacturer 
4 (MD is British) 
Advisory role 
Low 
Medium 
Shift to team structure in 
1999 
Low 
High, Indirect 
Weak 
Low 
High 
Low 
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Group Level Attitude of teams towards the Low 
work systems of the source 
firm: level of commitment 
Outcome Degree of 
- implementation Low 
- internalisation Low 
of Japanese work systems at 
the UK adopter firm 
Source: See text 
The following sections describe the key characteristics that have an impact on the 
diffusion of Japanese work systems to Nissera UK that is located on a greenfield site. 
The discussion is structured along the same lines as that for the brownfield site. Attention 
is paid to the influence of local institutional, organisational (including company) and 
group characteristics. 
5.3 The Local Institutional Context of Nissera UK 
Nissera UK was founded in 1988 as part of a strategy to serve major Japanese customers 
in Europe. Its main product is instrument clusters for automobiles (83 per cent). This is 
followed by instrument clusters for motorcycles (13 per cent) and construction machines 
(4 per cent, in 1999). 
Its parent company, Nissera, employs 1881 people across eight domestic sales offices 
and six subsidiaries in Japan. It has plants in the USA, Taiwan and Thailand, in addition 
to its European operations in the UK and the Netherlands. The UK division is established 
on a greenfield site in a centre for manufacturing, where the manufacturing base accounts 
for 38.5 per cent of the jobs in the area (see Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4 Redditch Employment Sector 
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The service sector in Redditch (in the West Midlands) is not as strong as the 
manufacturing sector. "West Midlands as a whole is characterised by an above average 
dependence on manufacturing industry and a below average representation on the service 
sector when compared with Great Britain as a whole" (Redditch Borough Council, 
1998). The employment trends in 1996 for Redditch show that 38.5 per cent of the 
working population was employed in manufacturing as compared with 18.5 per cent 
nationally. 
A good skills base exists in the manufacturing sector. Statistics on social class by 
occupation in 1991, broken down along gender lines, show that the highest percentage 
(17.2 per cent) of the population in total is economically active in the managerial and 
technical group (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 Social Class by Occupation (10% sample, 1991) 
Occupational Males % Female % Total % 
Division 
Professional etc. 4.8 0.6 2.7 
occupations 
Managerial and 21.4 13.3 17.2 
technical 
Skilled 7.2 22.6 15.2 
occupations (non- 
manual) 
Skilled 27.2 3.7 15.0 
occupations 
(manual) 
Partly skilled 15.8 14.1 14.9 
occupations 
Unskilled 2.9 3.2 3.1 
occupations 
Other divisions include armed forces, on a government scheme, and economically 
inactive individuals such as the retired. 
Source: Redditch Borough Council, 1998 
Table 5.3 indicates that the higher proportion of economically active males is in the 
skilled manual group. The highest proportion of females is in the skilled non-manual 
group. 
The strong manufacturing base in Redditch has meant a strong government initiative for 
or inward investment in the area. Redditch is within the Department of Trade and 
Industry Regional Selective Area for assistance to businesses (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1995a). Furthermore, an inward investment survey carried out in 1995, 
highlights Redditch as successful in attracting foreign investment with over 60 overseas 
companies representing 10 countries, such as AT&T Istel (USA) and Heller Machine 
Tools (Germany). The largest number of businesses, as can be seen in Figure 5.5, is from 
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the United States (36 per cent in 1999). Japanese companies compose the third largest 
body of investment in the area (9 per cent), ranking second after the US in job creation 
(2 1 per cent). 
Figure 5.5 Overseas Companies in Redditch 
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An employers survey in 1997 shows the reasons for moving to Redditch as being `larger 
premises' and `more suitable premises', 71.7 per cent and 19.9 per cent respectively. The 
concentration of the automotive sector in the West Midlands attracts suppliers wishing to 
be closer to their customers. Hence, `access to markets' (9.8 per cent) is another 
significant factor for companies to locate in Redditch. 
As regards the level of industrial dispute in the West Midlands, it is seen as much worse 
than, for example, the South West region in terms of the working days lost per 1,000 
employees through strikes and stoppages. According to the Office for National Statistics 
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(1999), working days lost per 1,000 employees between 1991 and 1998 ranged from 7 to 
56, compared with the industrial average of 10 to 57 over the same period. 
The section below provides a detailed description of the degree of implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems at Nissera UK. As with the 
structure presented in 5.2.2, key organisational and group characteristics that explain the 
diffusion process are presented. 
5.3.1 Background to Nissera UK 
Nissera UK is a medium-sized company, employing 300 people (in 1999). It is 
financially more stable and less dependent on its parent company than Teniki UK, having 
been in operation since 1988 and attempted an organisational restructure as a cost-saving 
measure in 1997.65 There is a high level of implementation of Nissera practices in the 
subsidiary firm. The composition of its senior management team changed during the 
initial years of its foundation from 60 per cent Japanese employees to the current six per 
cent. There are 12 Japanese managers-two senior directors, eight managers in the 
engineering area and two managers in the financial area-serving liaison roles between 
the subsidiary and parent company. The Japanese MD, with a production engineering 
background was succeeded by an MD with a finance background in 1997. There are no 
Japanese expatriates in manufacturing or logistics. Production management and 
supervisors are predominantly British and recruited locally. "From the start, the 
65 Nevertheless, it has not achieved the economies-of-scale that warrants technology diffusion feasible due 
to its low volume and variety. 
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workforce was all local. Management structure was mostly Japanese. From day one, it 
was planned that British managers would be selected to fill in the roles occupied by the 
Japanese over time" (British Production Manager, 30 July 1999). 
Nissera UK is claimed to devote efforts to recruiting relatively qualified workers by 
British standards. This is said to be a group most likely to absorb and adapt to a new way 
of working, that is continuous improvement in quality and reliability. 
5.3.2 Organisational Characteristics 
5.3.2.1 Organisational Structure: The Shift to Team Structure 
Nissera UK's experience of a shift from traditional authority relations to management of 
work teams on the shop floor was realised in 1997. The shift to a team-based structure 
was seen as essential given the plunge in profits in 1995 and 1996. According to the 
General Affairs Department of Nissera (e-mail sent on 20 October 2000): 
From 1993 to 1996, sales rose satisfactorily but profits were getting 
worse. Profits in 1995 and 1996 fell sharply because of the strong Yen 
and the failure to localise main printed circuit board (PCB) assembly. 
After that year, 1998 and 1999 marked the best sales in the past due to 
support from Nissera66 and the reduction in the value of the Yen (see 
Appendix VI for the sales and profit trends between 1993 and 1999) 
The factory, which is composed of five sections-moulding, PCB production, print shop 
66 This support was in the form of delegating responsibility for the assembly of PCB and some instrument 
clusters to Nissera UK. In addition, Nissera engineers were dispatched to the UK plant for a period of time 
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and case assembly-has seven assembly and two sub-assembly lines that are laid out in a 
cell structure. 67 
One of the problems with the old structure was that too much authority was placed in the 
hands of the charge hands. There was a wide span of control over hourly-paid workers. 
We had supervisors, charge hands and operators. When the supervisor 
was out, the charge hand would take over the role. Charge hands, and this 
was virtually all of them, when the supervisor was off line, would not 
produce to meet the downturn. The job of a team leader involves more of 
man management and improvement activities. And we pay them hell of a 
lot more. (British Production Manager, 30 July 1999) 
Under the new structure, senior team leaders are held responsible for all aspects of the 
production area, with an emphasis on championing continuous improvement. As most of 
the supervisors and charge hands, who were interviewed for team leaders and assistant 
positions, still serve the company, there is the feeling among the operators that there has 
merely been a change in titles. 8 
Operators perceive team leaders as above the work group rather than as members of the 
group. For example, quite a number of operators (especially those with five to 10 years 
to increase productivity, and to reduce `quality failure cost'. 
67 An exception to this is the youngest (three year-old) line, which has a more visible line structure. 68 Charge hands' responsibility, under the new system, encompasses support to each cell by ensuring that 
all materials and equipment are readily available for ongoing production. As opposed to the structure at 
Nissera UK, the parent company in Japan has a separate group of workers for the line-feeding function. 
This group, labelled as the parts delivery group, serves 11 lines and nine sub-lines, and is composed of five 
members. The members have their own itinerary, where each member is assigned the role of delivering 
parts to a particular line. 
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experience at Nissera UK) claim that there is no real difference between a team assistant 
and a charge hand. The fluid job descriptions of operators, enhanced by multi-skilling, 
are not applicable to team leaders and assistants. Unlike the situation at the parent 
company, team leaders and assistants have clearly defined responsibilities and their 
positions are treated as managerial ones at Nissera UK. This is reflected in the British 
Production Manager's (30 July 1999) claim that "team leaders do not do the work. As 
long as they make sure the system is in, what comes out is efficiency, cost and quality". 69 
Nissera UK's adoption of a team-based structure has, to a certain degree, created the team 
spirit essential for operational improvement. In spite of the challenges faced, Nissera UK 
has been more successful than Teniki UK in running team-based activities. This is further 
exemplified in the following section. 
5.3.2.2 Organisational Culture: Commitment to Quality Improvement Schemes 
Nissera UK aims to instil a continuous improvement culture through total quality control 
methods, such as the Quality Control Initiative (QCI), employee suggestion scheme, 
discipline in the workplace, Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) and `5C housekeeping' 
principles. Operators believe that the suggested quality improvement ideas are good, but 
are unwilling to become involved in such schemes due to what they perceive as an unfair 
reward system. This is a problem associated with the way local management administers 
the QCI. 
69 A Japanese Electronics Engineering Manager at Nissera (14 April 2000), who has worked in the UK for 
five years, argues that "UK needs exact job description but, for Japan, this is not the case. Maybe it is 
necessary to make one's task clear [in the UK]". This is also supported by a manager in Corporate Planning 
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We were forced to go on this course [on quality circles]. They called it 
`family circle'. It is a big joke. Everything is a joke. It could be better if 
they were straighter with us. As long as we are concerned, they have 
deceived us. They will start with something and if it does not suit them, 
they will change it. (Operator in cluster assembly) 
Operators felt that they were deceived when three members of the QCI team were sent to 
Japan as a reward for their winning process-improvement idea. They were verbally given 
assurance that the whole group would be visiting the parent company in Japan. However, 
this plan could not be executed for financial reasons. 
Sending the whole team to Japan was never going to be the case. Some of 
those teams had 12 people. It costs immense amount of money. Do not get 
me wrong. The communication was not perfect. There was an assumption 
made. We, as management, took full responsibility that it was our fault. 
(British Production Manager, 30 July 1999) 
Although there seems to be willingness to learn and change on operators' part, local 
management style inhibits operators' commitment to and satisfaction with the diffused 
practices. A cluster assembler claims "ideas are good but the outlook, seeing it through is 
crap". 
Emphasis on Training 
The training, supervisory and advisory roles of Japanese management were reduced over 
the years at Nissera UK as the phase of implementing new management systems and 
and Control at Nissera (14 April 2000): "UK provides job descriptions even for small tasks". 
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practices in the organisation were completed. Japanese expatriates were directly involved 
in the training of British supervisors and workforce in the initial years of the company's 
establishment. Information was passed on in the form of job instructions rather than 
formal off-the-job training. Furthermore, job instructions were demonstrated to operators. 
"Although they had more strict rules, Japanese managers would help you work. They 
would go to the source of the problem. British managers make up titles and waste 
money" (operator in PCB manufacture). A good practice would be demonstrated, and the 
purpose and the effectiveness of the action would be fully explained by the Japanese 
manager serving the role of a trainer. This explanation would be repeated as many times 
as necessary. The operator would be allowed to mimic the action and be observed. A 
cluster assembler in Cel15 (16 June 1999), who had been trained or `shadowed' for three 
months by a Japanese engineer in the initial years, claims: 
the Japanese guy was very patient. He would tell you all you needed to 
know. He explained things like angle setting, generally about the 
equipment. If there was a reject, it would go to the line that produced the 
fault for rework. Japanese look for the source of the problem. In the UK, 
you are just told what to do. 
On-the-job training (OJT) is currently not given such emphasis at Nissera UK. Due to the 
replacement of Japanese expatriates with local management, operators are no longer 
shown the flow of the process for an integrated understanding of the factory operations 
and the way individual tasks contribute to the overall outcome. They only receive a few 
hours of lecture on regulations and contract terms and are, then, sent for OJT. This 
deterioration in the emphasis given to training hinders the internalisation of the parent 
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company's work systems by newcomers to Nissera UK. 
As with the labour turnover problem at Teniki UK, Japanese management at Nissera UK 
feels that there is no opportunity to sustain the training system set by the Japanese due to 
the lack of stability in Nissera UK's employee base (Japanese Quality Assurance 
Manager, 13 April 2000, and Japanese Assistant Finance Manager at Nissera, 14 April 
2000). "Employees constantly change. Of the 100 UK employees that were trained at the 
start of operations, only three remain at Nissera UK" (A Quality Assurance Manager at 
Nissera, 13 April 2000). This has a negative impact on know-how diffusion from the 
parent company. 
5.3.2.3 Control Mechanism: Degree of Involvement by the Japanese 
Nissera is heavily involved in its UK subsidiary's decisions over the implementation of 
continuous improvement techniques and philosophies and provision of technology, new 
machines and products, as well as finances for investment. Nissera UK is required to 
report to Nissera discussions on major managerial issues, such as annual shareholder 
meetings and significant organisational changes. These are then discussed within the 
framework of efficiency checks against investment. Proposals are then summarised and 
reported to the board of directors. Moreover, up until 1997 (when the Japanese ex-MD's 
contract ceased), there was high involvement in day-to-day running of the factory. 
However, commitment on the part of Nissera to broad range and long-lasting effort to 
create the dedicated human and organisational capabilities decreased as Nissera UK 
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failed to develop its own knowledge base and satisfactory financial results. 70 
First time I was in the UK, we brought know-how with documentation and 
information [such as quality standards, instruction manuals, QC process 
charts and drawings]. Japan did not send any know-how after that. Their 
manufacturing is old and manual, so we cannot transfer know-how. 
(A Japanese Quality Assurance Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000) 
One of the reasons for the limited diffusion of know-how is the financial outcome of 
Nissera UK. "Since 1993, Nissera UK has had bad profits. They could not manufacture 
anymore. Nissera brought manufacturing, such as product machine part, from Japan to 
the UK. Since then, Nissera has minimised know-how transfer" (Japanese Quality 
Assurance Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). 
Approach to Discipline 
Nissera UK's approach to discipline, as part of its Kaizen philosophy, is more forceful 
than that at Teniki UK. This is applicable in particular to housekeeping on the shop floor. 
The company's emphasis on `5C housekeeping' principles-classifying, clarifying, 
cleanliness, clean-up and custom-is based on its belief that it helps create a visual 
workplace with visual displays and visual control in time for corrective actions to be 
instituted immediately. For example, "the ex-MD used to say there is dirt on the floor. At 
the same time, we might have run out of parts on a line. The second issue is more 
important for the British. On a well-organised line the next biggest issue is cleanliness" 
70 Nissera's subsidiary firms are expected to produce profits in their fourth or fifth year of operation. "We 
invest. Our profit is generated from the products we manufacture. We sometimes try to forget about 
profitability. For the first three years, we do not expect a profit" (Japanese Manager in Corporate Planning 
and Control at Nissera, 14 April 2000). 
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(Ce112 Team Leader in Cluster Assembly, 14 June 1999). 
It is argued that managers used to closely `police' the operators in the past (until 1997 
when the ex-MD was succeeded) to inculcate the housekeeping routine into them. As the 
Japanese expatriate management was gradually replaced with local management, the 
attention paid to these principles became weaker, and so did the dedication to 
housekeeping principles. Nowadays, "there are random checks by management twice a 
month, but we always know they are coming. The team assistant is always running 
around cleaning the place" (cluster assembler). 
In spite of the rather coercive, strong approach to discipline, workers at Nissera UK 
displayed a higher level of acceptance of alternative work systems than those at Teniki 
UK where the approach to discipline was much more lenient. 
Level of Trust and Communication between the Japanese and UK Staff 
The level of trust between the Japanese and UK management is low due mainly to the 
Japanese-perceived low level of competence at Nissera UK. "They do not understand our 
product [instrumentation]. They understand the manufacturing process, how to move the 
instrument, but cannot see the bigger picture, how to fit the product" (Japanese Quality 
Assurance Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). One of the counter-measures for this 
problem is given as the transfer of people for training or problem resolution purposes. 
This aids the Japanese in understanding the overseas context better. "The UK employee 
asks `why' questions. A manual is not enough to explain the process. UK people can 
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understand when the reason is given. The Japanese never ask `why'. So I had the chance 
to learn by rethinking the process" (Japanese Production Manager at Nissera, 13 April 
2000). This indicates that in order for the Japanese work systems to work effectively, 
both tacit and explicit components need to be diffused to the context of the adopter firm. 
(Further discussion on this matter can be found in Chapter 6). 
Low trust is also associated with failure to deliver promises and a communication barrier. 
Japanese management staff hold everything back. They do not open 
information to UK staff. It is a communication and a trust problem. 
Japanese do not perceive UK managers as capable. They have limited 
capability. When we ask questions, UK staff come back with an answer 
after a week or so. They do not care about the due date. 
(Japanese Quality Assurance Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000) 
British staff are seen as constantly changing delivery dates rather than pushing to meet 
the schedule. 
The lack of communication between engineering and management levels at Nissera UK 
and its parent company is due in part to the language difference7' and the perceived lack 
of information sharing on the part of Nissera. "I do not feel that the relationship between 
us is very good. Nissera UK seems to feel that they lack technology-related information 
and sufficient support from Nissera, while Nissera seems to feel that they do not receive 
customer requests and requirements from Nissera UK properly" (Japanese Electronics 
71 For example, during the period that a Nissera Electronics Engineering Manager (14 April 2000) was 
working at the UK plant (1995-1998), he "did not have enough capability to translate Japanese into 
English. I did not want to communicate with the UK staff [due to my poor spoken English]. I like writing in 
English. I always used mail to request for a task to be completed, because I needed a record [for Nissera]. If 
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Engineering Manager at Nissera, 14 April 2000). This hinders the Japanese willingness to 
diffuse tacit knowledge. However, the level of trust on the part of the UK workforce on 
the shop floor towards the Japanese management is higher than that found at the local 
management level at Nissera UK, as well as that at Teniki UK. 
Nevertheless, Nissera is making an effort to learn from its UK subsidiary. As with Teniki 
members, Nissera members cite cultural differences and European market preferences as 
areas for learning. For example, Nissera is studying European PCB design to reduce 
manufacturing costs. Electronic components, such as Integrated Circuit (IC) tips, are 
being introduced to reduce the number of electronic components. 
5.3.2.4 Technology Diffusion 
Nissera UK is not as technologically advanced as its parent company. Nissera has a much 
wider product range than its UK division. For example, it is heavily involved in LCD 
production, and directs development techniques for automobile products to new products, 
such as water heaters and air conditioner remote controls. On the other hand, its UK 
subsidiary is only responsible for PCB production and instrument cluster assembly. 
Nissera cites two reasons for the limited diffusion of technology. Firstly, Nissera UK is 
not perceived as possessing the knowledge necessary to develop its own production 
lines. 72 Secondly, "Nissera UK has low volume and wide variety. It is difficult to 
introduce new technology" (Japanese Production Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). 
Although the assembly itself is not very different from that at Nissera, support functions 
I communicated verbally, the working relationship would have been better". 
72 Assembly lines are developed and transferred to the UK plant by Nissera. 
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such as purchase, inventory, quality assurance, production engineering and 
maintenance73, are quite different. 
It is claimed that "Nissera tries to disclose the latest information on R&D technology74 to 
the Technical Centre in order to support Nissera UK's sales activities (Japanese 
Electronics Engineering Manager at Nissera, 14 April 2000). However, Nissera UK only 
produces `profitable' products rather than creates advanced product technology. "They do 
not need advanced technology or know-how. They cannot meet customers' advanced 
expectation" (Japanese Quality Assurance Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). The 
difficulty in the diffusion of technology is seen as associated with UK staff's lack of 
capability and willingness to learn. 
Even if we want to transfer [know-how], who can take it? If I want to 
transfer everything to the UK, they may need three times more persons. If 
there is a mechanical engineer, he only knows the field [of mechanical 
engineering]. He does not understand electronic engineering. In Japan, an 
engineer will know both. 
(Japanese Quality Assurance Engineer at Nissera, 13 April 2000) 
According to Japanese management, Nissera UK needs greater financial resources and 
number of employees, larger facilities and a grasp of technique or insight into the 
integrated process of manufacturing. Nevertheless, on the whole, Nissera UK has been 
more diligent in its emphasis on the diffusion of both tacit and explicit elements of 
73 "For example, production engineering's responsibility also includes maintenance [in the UK]. In Japan, 
these functions are separate" (Japanese Production Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). 
74 For example, the PCB design data or CADAM are transferred electronically to the Technical Centre at 
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continuous improvement schemes. 
5.3.3 Group Characteristic: Attitude of Teams towards Continuous Improvement 
Schemes 
Workers' response to continuous improvement schemes differs on the basis of each team 
leader's management style, size of the team, its target level and the training offered to 
team members. 
Although Nissera UK is perceived by management as proficient in quality management, 
researcher's work experience in the factory shows inconsistency in the priority given to 
quality standards by operators. "Getting assembly operators to do what you want is 
difficult in the UK. In Japan, they are very dedicated, 100 per cent committed" (Ce113 
Team Leader in Cluster Assembly, 15 June 1999). For example, quality checks in Ce112 
are flimsy. The SPC data are manipulated to give the impression to management that 
measurements fall within control limits when they are clearly outside tolerance levels. 
Moreover, quality tests that take seven minutes to complete on fuel and temperature 
indicators are halted after two to three minutes as the seven-minute duration is found to 
be too long. Similarly, forms that are filled in on Cel12 rejects and reworks are frequently 
recorded as `other supplier's fault' rather than `self responsibility' or `machine fault'. The 
low sense of personal liability felt in this cell tends to have a negative impact on the 
overall quality of products and customer relations. 
We supply many products to [our biggest customer]. We know that the 100 
Nissera UK. 
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components from Nissera will be good. We cannot be so sure at Nissera UK. 
The control system is not so different from Nissera. For instance, the process 
quality control chart is the same as that at Nissera. Over the past two years we 
have tended to go back to the Japanese parts. Every single part needs to meet 
quality standards. In the UK, the attitude is, out of million, surely there can be 
few defects. There is a wider tolerance level in European supplier context. 
This is not the case in Japan. Customers, unlike in the UK, expect zero 
defects in Japan. 
(Japanese Quality Director at Nissera UK, 13 September 1999) 
Nevertheless, there are certain cells that display a strong sense of commitment to 
continuous improvement schemes. This is especially visible in one of the low-target 
assembly lines, Ce115. This cell is composed of a small group of six people who work on 
interdependent tasks in a non-competitive environment. Its members produce in batches 
by working collectively through the first few stages of the assembly line in the first half 
of the working day. They move down the line in the second half and increase their pace 
of work to meet the target for the day. The cell demonstrates a good team culture due to 
its low target, long working relations and task sharing among its members. Some of the 
operators were trained by Japanese expatriates in the early years of Nissera UK's 
operation. As the concerned line is five years old, it cannot be argued that the technical 
sophistication of the line is a major influence on the effectiveness of the team. 
The PCB section displays a different response to continuous improvement schemes from 
the assembly section. Quality control principles are not enforced to the same degree in 
this unit. For example, PCB operators are not evaluated against the `5C principles'. There 
is a more relaxed atmosphere that allows operators to joke and talk at work, despite the 
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more strongly felt hierarchy in the area. As the department has recently taken on more 
work, it is felt that there is no time to maintain machines or to implement the `5Cs'. 
Some of the operators at Nissera UK see `5Cs' as "basically cleanliness, [it] is more 
cosmetic than anything else" (Cell 1 and Ce113 Team Leader in Cluster Assembly, 14 June 
1999). The Japanese expatriate management feels that this is due to poor supervision at 
Nissera UK, as compared with that at parent company. "If a supervisor does not explain 
or check, the operator will just pass the equipment [even if the quality is low]. In Japan, 
every operator has to clean self-area [including the head office staff]. In the UK, a 
separate company does the cleaning. I explain, but it is difficult for them to implement" 
(A Japanese Production Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). In spite of the Japanese- 
perceived low commitment to QC programmes, Nissera UK operators have internalised 
the QC principles to a greater extent than Teniki operators. This is related to greater 
financial stability and high and direct involvement of the Japanese in operator training. 
Moreover, the skills level of Nissera UK workforce is higher than that at Teniki UK, and 
the company is located on a greenfield site: "we can easily select manufacturing staff. 
People can understand our requirements ... In the beginning, we asked 
for a lot of help 
from the local staff, so we could not provide job descriptions. A brownfield site is more 
disadvantageous from that perspective" (Japanese Corporate Planning and Control 
Manager at Nissera, 14 April 2000). 
5.3.4 Overview 
Table 5.4 summaries the findings on the characteristics that have an impact on the 
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diffusion of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems to Nissera UK. Initiatives taken by 
local and Japanese management to introduce alternative work systems at Nissera UK are 
much stronger than those taken at Teniki UK. This is presented as `high degree of 
implementation' in Table 5.4. The degree to which alternative work systems are infused 
with value and accepted by workers at Nissera UK is higher than that at Teniki UK. 
However, there is room for improvement as is described in section 5.3.2.2. Hence, this is 
presented as `medium degree of internalisation' in Table 5.4. The local institutional 
context includes location on a greenfield site in a centre for manufacturing, high skills 
base in manufacturing75, high inward investment and a high level of industrial dispute. 
The medium-sized UK firm was founded in 1988. It has a perceived low to medium level 
of financial dependence on Nissera. Nissera UK constitutes a subsidiary relationship, and 
is involved in assembly of car components. Unlike that at Teniki UK, it has a sufficient 
Japanese expatriate management base to dedicate resources to training the UK operators. 
At the organisational level, there was a shift to a team-based structure in 1997. This was 
accompanied by a medium level commitment to building quality and highly disciplined 
work and quality assurance procedures. The emphasis on training was high, and the 
approach to discipline was strong until 1997. Both deteriorated thereafter. Moreover, the 
Japanese involvement in strategic decisions, as well as shop-floor activities, at Nissera 
UK had been high and direct until 1997. The low level of perceived capability at Nissera 
UK generates relatively low trust (labelled as low to medium in Table 5.4 in comparison 
to Teniki UK) and creates a communication barrier between the Japanese and UK staff. 
Furthermore, there is low technology diffusion from the more technologically advanced 
75 However, the skills level is lower than that at the parent company. Hence, it is categorised as `medium' 
in Table 5.4. 
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parent company. In general, there has been an effort to diffuse tacit and explicit 
components of continuous improvement schemes, high number of Japanese expatriates 
aiming to diffuse these components and the financial resources necessary for their 
diffusion to Nissera UK. 
Table 5.4 Key Characteristics that have an Impact on the Implementation and 
Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at Nissera UK 
Key characteristics Nissera UK 
Local Location: Site Greenfield 
Institutional Area Centre for manufacturing 
Level Skills base High in manufacturing 
Inward investment High 
Level of industrial dispute High 
Company Size (in 1999) 300 employees 
characteristics Age (year of establishment to 11 years 
data collection) (1988-1999) 
Nature of work Assembly of instrument 
clusters for automobiles 
(83%), 
motorcycles 
(13%), 
construction machines (4%) 
in 1999) 
Form of ownership Subsidiary relationship, 
parent company is not owned 
by a car manufacturer 
Number of Japanese expatriates 12 (including MD) 
and their roles in the UK Mainly director role 
Skills level of the workforce/ Medium 
Symmetry of expertise with that 
of the Japanese firm 
Financial dependence on parent Low-Medium 
firm 
Organisational Nature of diffused practices 
Level - Organisational Shift to team structure in 
structure 1997 
- Organisational culture: 
Commitment to continuous 
improvement schemes High (till 1997)/Medium 
* Emphasis on training thereafter 
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- Control-related: Degree of High, Direct 
involvement by the Japanese 
* Approach to discipline Strong(till 1997)/Mediocre 
thereafter 
* Trust between the Japanese and Low-Medium 
UK staff 
* Communication barrier High 
- Technological: Technology Low 
diffusion 
Group Level Attitude of teams towards the Medium 
work systems of the source firm: 
level of commitment 
Outcome Degree of 
- implementation High 
- internalisation Medium 
of Japanese work systems at the 
UK adopter firm 
Source: See text 
The following sections outline the characteristics that have an impact on the diffusion of 
Japanese work systems to a technical collaboration site at the local institutional, 
organisational (including company) and group levels. 
5.4 The Local Institutional Context of the Rover-Honda Collaboration Site 
The strategic alliance between the Rover Group and Honda was formed in 1978.76 The 
decision to forge a collaboration between Rover, the UK-based car manufacturer, then 
called British Leyland Motor Corporation (BLMC) and the Japanese company, Honda 
Motor Corporation, was made as part of a strategy to increase economies-of-scale. Rover 
was looking to reduce the cost of developing and maintaining a complete and viable 
product range and help remedy its historic problems with product quality77 (Fairhead, 
76 Rover members see the start of their collaboration with Honda as 1978, as the talks began in that year. 
However, Honda members see it as 1979, which marks the year in which the official agreement was made. 
77 Rover was marked by `disoriented' production management, high turnover particularly between 1976- 
1978 (Clark and DeBresson, 1990). 
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1998), whilst Honda wanted to increase its sales volume in Europe. 
At the time of the collaboration, there had been a decline in the uncompetitive British 
manufacturing sector, which produced dramatic changes in the level and composition of 
employment. For instance, between 1970 and 1983, Britain lost 2.4 million 
manufacturing jobs (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). West Midlands, being the traditional home 
of Britain's car manufacturing base had taken the lion's share of this loss. Problem with 
management was seen as a crucial cause of the perceived manufacturing failure. 
The British management problem is that, within their area of discretion, 
British managers consistently take poor decisions about the priority of 
different problems and execute their strategies in a way that is generally 
inept-Before the 1979-83 recession it was possible to blame poor 
organisation of production on the workforce and the unions. But that 
excuse is no longer plausible, The organisation of production inside the 
factory is now clearly the prerogative of management. 
(Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989: 82) 
It is argued that the location of Rover's Longbridge plant in an old industrial district, 
which is characterised by declining heavy or primary industries, strengthens its 
bargaining position in view of the levels of unemployment in the area (ibid. ). 78 Under the 
circumstance, workers could be expected to be more willing to accommodate a new 
workplace regime out of economic necessity. 
78 The unemployment in West Midlands and Great Britain as a whole (9 per cent) have been consistently 
higher than that in, for example, the Telford work area (7.8 per cent) (Wrekin Council, 1994 in Sharpe, 
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The West Midlands has witnessed an attraction of Japanese investment of mainly an FDI 
nature in the automotive sector in the 1980s. This has meant a high government interest 
in investment in the area. There was immense government support for the Rover-Honda 
collaboration. For example, by 1982, "government financing stood at £1.4 billion and 
there had been substantial private funding" (Autocar, 1988). 
Labour relations in the West Midlands have been described as significantly worse than 
those in new towns, such as Telford, with high levels of industrial dispute experienced in 
the West Midlands over a period of 1986-1993 (Sharpe, 1998a). At the organisational 
level, there has been heavy unionisation at Rover. For example, Sir Michael Edwards, 
who was offered the job of executive chairman of British Leyland in 1977, "took a tough 
line with the trade unions, in particular with the powerful shop stewards, who were 
obviously not happy about massive redundancies among their members" (British Motor 
Industry Heritage Trust, 1997: 58). 79 
The section below provides a detailed description of the degree of implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems in a collaborative project 
between Rover and Honda that constituted `side-by-side' work rather than an `arm's 
length relationship'. Key characteristics that had an impact on the implementation and 
internalisation of Honda-diffused practices at the organisational and group levels over the 
development of the R8/YY project are discussed. This discussion also includes the 
1998a). 
79 "Several factories were closed, starting with the Triumph factory at Speke on Merseyside, followed by 
the old MG factory at Abingdon. . and even the new Rover SD1 factory at Solihull, later brought back 
into 
commission for expanded Land Rover production" (British Motor Industry Heritage Trust, 1997: 58). 
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boundary-spanning role of the liaison members and the impact of company size, age and 
the approach to development adopted by the Japanese partner on the diffusion process. 
5.4.1 Background to the Rover-Honda Alliance and the Rover 200/Honda Concerto 
Project 
"Over its history, the [Rover-Honda] alliance has evolved from a limited licensing 
agreement to a multifunctional relationship including joint development and production 
and a 20 per cent share exchange between the two companies" (Faulkner, 1995: 146). At 
the start of the collaboration, both companies were on an equal footing in terms of sales 
volume. 80 However, Honda was profitable and growing rapidly, while Rover was making 
a loss and produced projects that had a negative impact on its corporate image. Honda 
carried the image of the most innovative Japanese manufacturer in the mid-1980s. "A lot 
of their technology came from their motorcycle technology. That affected the way they 
approached car design" (Rover Chief Designer, 14 May 1999). Moreover, technology, in 
terms of producing front-wheel drive, and company size matched those of Honda. 
Honda had the characteristic Japanese TQC attitude to manufacturing, which was 
diffused to Rover over a lengthy tuition period. According to Faulkner (1995), Honda had 
the technology to gain the necessary cost economies in unit terms and the financial 
strength to collaborate with Rover in the production of new models. "There was the 
80 "Rover had a weakness in its lower sector model range. The engineering resource and the financial 
reserve were lacking. Under the circumstance, a Japanese partner was the most appropriate for they were 
seen as perfected the car manufacturing process. Nissan would have been a more appropriate partner to 
select, for Austin Morris had a long relationship with Nissan. However, there was a difference in size. 
Nissan's bulk in terms of its sales volume would have been overwhelming for Austin. In the case of Honda, 
they were short of 1 million produce. This was similar to that in Rover" (British General Manager of Honda 
Collaboration at Rover, 15 April 1999). 
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recognition within the British Leyland Group that we were a small company in what is a 
huge market and that we could not financially afford to go developing new cars on our 
own. So I think we were mostly financially driven" (Principal Electrical Engineer G, 12 
May 1999). Quality and other learnt practices and philosophies were seen as useful by- 
products of the collaboration. 
The first project, built under a limited licensing agreement by BLMC in 1979, was the 
Triumph Acclaim. According to Honda, this was the first true example of large-scale 
parts procurement overseas. Austin Rover Group (which BLMC later came to be known 
by) made changes in materials configuration and manufacturing processes in order to 
ease the process of procuring parts in the UK. This negatively affected quality. 
Compromises meant that the Triumph Acclaim's quality was not as satisfactory as that of 
Ballades produced in Japan. Nevertheless, this model generated good sales in the UK and 
received favourable reviews on the continent and, hence, was deemed a success. 8' The 
next collaborative work between the two companies was in 1982 on the Rover 
800/Honda Legend. This "resulted from Rover seeing the need to replace its SD 1 range 
of large, executive cars and Honda's keenness to enter the executive car market where it 
had as yet no presence" (Ohtani et al., 1997: 67). As the requirements of the two 
companies were different, particularly in terms of design standards and the problems 
posed by factory conditions and differing market demand for features, it was difficult to 
reach a final agreement. There was a shift in design responsibility of the body from Rover 
to Honda, as "it was extremely difficult to get Austin Rover Group to make changes in 
81 This is an extract from Honda's internal document, a report based on a lecture given to Honda US 
expatriates in the mid-1980s. 
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design of the car's body to accommodate changes in the engine, so Honda ended up 
taking over the design of the body in mid course". 82 The Rover 800/Honda Legend 
project was followed by the Rover 200/Honda Concerto collaborative work in 1985. It 
involved a high level of common componentry, such as exterior skin panels, interior door 
panels and facia, as both cars were to be manufactured at Rover's Longbridge plant. 
Confidence had grown by then and the alliance had matured into a much more involved 
collaboration. Hence, the passage of time and the positive experience on the previous 
collaborative projects (which is labelled as company age in Table 5.5) were favourable to 
the internalisation of Honda practices at Rover. For example, based on the experience of 
developing an earlier project (Rover 800/Honda Legend)83, it was realised that joint team 
meetings were essential on the R8/YY project (Japanese Engineer at Honda HA, 29 
March 1999). The collaboration was seen as taking the form of Rover doing everything 
on its own to Honda delivering everything. In this framework, Rover 200 was perceived 
as a model that involved genuine joint work84 (see Appendix VII for a list of key events 
in the Rover-Honda relationship). 
Whilst there have been a series of collaborative projects over the course of Rover's 
82 The body of the car had to accommodate Honda-designed engine. [This is an extract from Honda's 
internal document, a report based on a lecture given to Honda US expatriates in the mid-1980s]. 83 The factors that influenced failure in this project, from Honda's perspective, were: i) Rover was three- 
four times slower than Honda in turning out a finished prototype, ii) UK suppliers were not equipped to 
supply prototype parts, iii) Honda ended up producing prototype parts as well, iv) As the locally purchased 
content had to be 60 per cent for the first year and 80 per cent in the second, production of many parts 
developed in Japan had to be shifted to the UK or a location in the EC. However, due to requests from 
ARG and differences in suppliers, there were many cases where the specifications for the parts developed 
in Japan were not fully met, v) Honda engineers felt that the quality of parts produced in the UK/EC was 
not satisfactory, whilst Rover found it acceptable, vi) Production of Rover 800/Legend was delayed as 
European suppliers took a long time to manufacture parts, and vii) Lack of commonality adversely affected 
ARG plants' manufacturing efficiency and resulted in unstable quality. This eventually became a burden on 
both companies. 
84 This is not necessarily the view held by Honda. According to Honda, the Rover 800 project was more of 
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partnership with Honda, this study focuses on the Rover 200/Honda Concerto (coded 
R8/YY project by the engineers). It is perceived as the most successful project by Rover 
engineers and senior managers in terms of the degree of collaboration, quality and 
process improvements, problem resolution and learning benefits. The R8/YY project was 
a turning point for Rover in financial terms. It marked the launch of structural and 
cultural change, such as the Total Quality Initiative, and replaced a core product line at 
Rover. There was a high level implementation of Honda practices during this period. 
According to the British General Manager of Honda Collaboration at Rover (15 April 
1999), "the success of the model in the market place made a significant contribution to 
returning Rover to financial profitability. The extent of learning from Honda also reached 
a peak during the period of R8/YY manufacture" (see Appendix VIII for the benefit 
scale). In comparison to Teniki UK and Nissera UK, the Rover Group was a large-sized 
company, employing more than 30,000 people at the time of the R8/YY project. 
Financially it could afford to launch a structural and a cultural change programme in 
1985, whilst, for instance, Teniki UK had difficulty in allocating resources to cultural 
change. The Japanese partner had a long-term view to development of capabilities at 
Rover. This was indicated by Honda's willingness to invest in a 20 per cent cross 
shareholding arrangement with Rover twelve years after the collaboration was 
established. 
The following sections outline the deep-rooted change of a `paradigmatic' nature that has 
led to `leveraged learning' during the Rover-Honda alliance. 
a 50-50 collaboration. Honda's design responsibility was perceived in the ratio of 70: 30 on the Rover 200. 
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5.4.2 Organisational Characteristics 
The nature of the diffused work systems also has an impact on the internalisation of 
practices by UK adopter firms. As it is shown in the following sections, the explicit 
structural system is more easily diffused to the UK business system than the tacit cultural 
and control-related systems. (This will be discussed in further detail Chapter 6). 
5.4.2.1 Organisational Structure: The Shift to Team Structure 
The Rover 200/Honda Concerto project saw the initiation of a change in Rover's 
organisational structure. 85 There was a shift from functional authority relations to a 
project-based structure in 1985.86 
Within a functional structure, Rover would allocate resources to different functions, 
where individuals would be working on a number of projects. A core expertise could not 
be sustained within such a structure (British Principal Electrical Engineer F, 21 June 
1999). On the other hand, within a project-based structure, engineers who were assigned 
to teams could consult a central group of expertise upon technical difficulties. A project- 
based structure was seen as the best way to deliver a project, for technical problems 
could be solved accurately and quickly. The project could also be delivered to the 
required quality despite the fact that the components used could not have been tested and 
approved. However, the project groups ran the risk of becoming insular and their goals 
85 Rover reverted to a functional structure upon the completion of the R8/YY project. 
86 Although a project-based organisational structure in an engineering firm differs from a team-based 
structure on the shop-floor of a subsidiary firm due to the difference in the nature of the work carried out, it 
is categorised here under the same heading for a comparative analysis. This is based on the assumption that 
both structural arrangements are founded on a team-based effort to delivering a product, whether it is a car 
component or a car. 
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being displaced to the detriment of the corporate objectives (British Design Director, 22 
June 1999). 
The shift in organisational structure from `business units' to `central competencies' 
created an opportunity to build a team spirit among the engineers. This is ingrained in the 
saying "you have got a spirit and motivation of not wanting to let each other down. It 
gives you a bit more drive and impetus" (Design and Development Engineer at Rover, 23 
June 1999). 
There is something uniting everyone and that is the delivery date. You feel 
more exposed to the pressures of working for an engineering firm. 
Whereas in a functionally-based organisation, people are more interested 
in getting more focused on becoming an expert on their project. There is 
less of a focus on the actual delivery of a project and more on a delivery of 
their part. There is less immediate pressure to hit that delivery date and 
there is a problem of getting people to work together. 
(Principal Electrical Engineer K at Rover, 2 June 1999) 
A project-based organisation also enabled Honda members to approach Rover engineers 
directly. Problems with information dissemination, due either to politicking or filtering, 
could be minimised. "Rover sometimes hired a new manager with high academic 
qualification, who decided without knowledge [experience]. So we skipped management 
staff and contacted the engineering level directly" (Japanese Project Manager at Honda, 5 
April 2000). 
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From Honda's perspective, Rover could not implement a project-based structure in the 
`true sense of the word'. This implies that even though the diffusion of a structural 
practice was possible, the method of enforcing the effective operation of the structure (or 
the source company's meaning of the structural practice) was difficult to diffuse to 
Rover. Honda felt that functional or section managers at Rover had more control than 
project managers (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 Organisational Structure of Rover as Perceived by Honda 
Director 
1 -1 
Section 
Body and Chassis Engine Styling managers 
design section section section 
LPL 
Project 
Concerto 
LPL 
Project 
Accord 
LPL 
Project 
Civic 
LPL: Large Project Leader 
Source: Interview with the Japanese Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe, 29 March 
2000 
There was still a top-down approach and Rover managers continued to be hands-off. It 
was argued that the Rover directors had more power than the Large Project Leaders. In 
addition, there were conflicting interests between section and project leaders. The section 
managers preferred to avoid risk, whilst large project leaders wanted to take risks in 
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order to develop a competitive, innovative product. 
Honda, regardless of its collaboration with Rover, always upheld a project-based 
structure. 
We always have a weekly meeting with every project leader. Rover had a 
problem, because its body engineers were in Cowley, interior engineers in 
Canley and other engineers in Longbridge. They tried to gather and 
established Gaydon [where the design centre is]. Communication then 
improved. (Japanese Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe, 29 March 
2000) 
Nevertheless, the timing of the build phases could still not match that of Honda. 
We agreed on a schedule. Rover could not understand this schedule, could 
not understand how to manage or carry out their own job. Honda sets up a 
project manager to manage the timing. They control the progress of the 
team. They also receive the services of a support function. [The support 
function is resembled to oil or lubrication necessary for the effective 
functioning of a piston, that is the project group]. 
(Japanese Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe, 29 March 2000) 
To Rover, Honda appeared to be able to operate a project-based process, delivering 
projects at the same time as having specialists (Design Director at Rover, 22 June 1999). 
Nevertheless, there was a subtle pecking order, in addition to cross-functional teams at 
Honda. 
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On the whole, the internal dynamics of a project-based organisation were seen as 
conducive to solving problems quickly. When a serious problem emerged, project 
members were summoned to solve the issue immediately. Whereas in a functional 
organisation, members were less reluctant to immerse themselves in problem resolution. 
5.4.2.2 Organisational Culture: Commitment to Quality Improvement Schemes 
It was widely recognised that Honda's culture, which was perceived by Rover members 
as the Japanese culture, 87 was different from that of Rover, which was seen as reflecting 
the UK culture. "We are talking about two sets of people that have different thinking 
processes. We think in a very connected kind of way. The Japanese do not think in a 
very ... where things are like in isolated boxes" (Design Director at Rover, 22 June 1999). 
Honda engineers were seen by Rover engineers as involving everyone in decision- 
making. This was regarded as a more structured way of arriving at conclusions than 
holding a series of small meetings (Principal Electrical Engineer K at Rover, 2 June 
1999). Honda's consensus decision-making process88 contradicted Rover's process of 
arriving at `hasty' decisions. It was seen by Rover engineers as a `painful, arduous' 
discussion process, because, at first, the benefits would not be apparent. 
97 Although Honda was perceived as a Japanese company by Rover, the company is not a typical example 
of a large traditional Japanese company. "Honda looks like a US company. We cannot keep the Japanese 
culture" (Japanese Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe, 29 March 2000) due to the company's global 
operations. Nevertheless, Honda carries the features of the Japanese culture. This is especially observed in 
the division of labour. The right-hand duty partition at Honda is not as strict as that at Rover. "In Western 
companies, it [the right-hand duty partition] is very strict" (Japanese Project Leader at Honda, 13 April 
2000). 
88 It should be noted that the ringi method of arriving at decisions does not apply to technical decisions. 
One seeks approval on project-related decisions from section and project leaders alone (Japanese Executive 
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It would go on for some time. But when they finished, they had finished. 
They would not revisit it. Whereas our style tended to be more of `let us 
have a quick discussion. Yes, we have come to a conclusion, we will do 
that'. Three or four days later, someone will say `did you think of this? ' 
And it would be a case of `no, we did not. We better revisit the decision'. 
(ibid. ) 
Honda's effective implementation of project-based work (even in design, which was 
considered by Rover as individualistic work) was seen as yielding a product that was 
"perfect in all sense of quality, cost-timing and finish of the car", because one spent time 
focusing on what the product would be like early on in the process (Chief Designer at 
Rover, 14 May 1999). 
A project-based work style could be more easily adopted in a context where small 
batches of cars were produced. Honda could mature its product very quickly from one 
batch to another as it produced in batches of four. On the other hand, Rover produced 30- 
40 cars in the build phase. 
Honda extended its internal teamwork to its external relations by forging close working 
relations with its suppliers. "Honda would work in partnership with all their suppliers. It 
was `Japan PLC' versus the world and they were working together as a united team, 
whereas we were not" (Team Leader J at Rover, 27 May 1999). Honda's team orientation 
also had an implication on its cross-functional communication. Consequences of actions 
taken in one department on the activities of other departments would be taken into 
VP of Honda R&D Europe, 29 March 2000). The ringi system is applicable more to investment decisions 
(e. g. Japanese project member on the XX, Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 3 April 2000). 
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account. For example, "when minor problems in production emerged, such as that in 
parts number, Honda specification control team considered the impact of the counter- 
measure on both its own work as well as that of the assembly welding section" (Japanese 
project member on the XX at Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 3 April 2000). Other departments 
were consulted upon a change, for example, in a part number before a drawing was 
issued. This working style was claimed to be ingrained in the Honda culture, rather than 
written in procedures. In contrast, "Rover issue specification immediately. When Rover 
specification comes suddenly, assembly people are taken by surprise. They cannot 
understand the information or the contents of the change immediately" (ibid. ). 
Although considerable willingness to co-operate with the Japanese was not apparent at 
the outset, frequent and intense interaction over time, and Honda's engineering-oriented 
approach to building cars enhanced Rover's willingness to learn from its partner. In 
addition, there was respect for Honda's knowledge (Principal Mechanical Engineer L at 
Rover, 22 June 1999). In general, Rover held Honda with high esteem at meetings, as its 
quality was regarded as far better than that of Rover (Principal Electrical Engineer I at 
Rover, 24 May 1999), and its processes were seen as the most efficient and the quickest 
in design and development (Team Leader J at Rover, 27 May 1999). The senior 
management team strongly supported the adoption of Honda practices at the time of the 
Rover 200/Honda Concerto project. "As the project went on, we were more and more 
subtly encouraged to go the Honda way on everything. In essence, we adopted our 
specifications to meet theirs at the end of the day" (British Principal Electrical Engineer 
I, 21 June 1999). Honda practices, such as the Gebba-Kai process (i. e. quality circles 
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adopted by engineers to solve problems at the end of each build phase), close supplier 
relations and formalised build phases, were implemented where there was a perceived 
benefit in doing so. 
The Gebba-Kai process basically represented a day set out in a project after a build 
sequence to iron out any problems related to a part not fitting on to the vehicle, or 
misunderstandings that existed between engineering and manufacturing. Suppliers and 
Honda engineers were also invited to these meetings. This practice involved Rover 
members in decision-making and improved communication across sections (Electrical 
Group Leader E at Rover, 7 May 1999). However, the implementation of Gebba-Kais at 
Rover differed from the way they were put to practice at Honda. Although one was to 
have an internal and an external Gebba-Kai that lasted for two days, as at Honda, Rover 
had "changed it a little bit for the worst" (British Senior Manager in Manufacturing 
Integration, 25 August 1999) with fewer number of days spent on and less number of 
people attending problem resolution sessions. Hence, there was an appropriation of work 
systems where Honda members were not directly involved in the implementation of the 
less codifiable practices. This was seen as the influence of the people who had not been 
over to Japan and seen how the process worked. "The aim is to always arrive at a 
decision. I think if we followed it [the Gebba-Kai process] literally and the way some of 
the Honda engineers worked, then yes, we would always arrive at a decision because 
they would not leave without a decision" (Design and Development Engineer at Rover, 
23 June 1999). 
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One of the major lessons that Rover learnt from Honda was the use of suppliers as guest 
engineers. 
Traditionally, the engineers would do a design, a drawing, send it to 
Purchase. Purchase would send it to supplier. The supplier would think 
about it, say no and send the answer back to Purchase. Purchase would 
send the answer to us. It is a very long process of designing something. It 
seems absolutely common sense with hindsight but the Japanese had 
offices and parts of offices partitioned off for suppliers to come and join 
them in the working environment. 
(Team Leader J at Rover, 27 May 1999) 
Having supplier engineers on site (i. e. implementing concurrent engineering) meant that 
meetings could be held quickly and drawings could be produced in a single format with 
instant feedback from suppliers. This practice was adopted to the extent that `guest 
engineers' could be seen as equal members of the Rover team (British Principal Systems 
Engineer on Rover 800, G, 10 May 1999). Initially, there was the fear that "we cannot 
have the suppliers in our office. They will find out too many secrets" (Team Leader J at 
Rover, 27 May 1999). Honda helped knock those barriers down and made it much more 
of an open relationship or partnership with the suppliers. 
Rover's build phases were formalised to match Honda's evolutionary process in car 
development. "Learning from Honda was that you must go through a process of evolution 
and all the components that fit into the vehicle must be off-tool and off-process. One of 
the requirements that Honda laid down was that the more you practised, the better the 
product" (British Principal Systems Engineer on Rover 800, G, 10 May 1999). However, 
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Honda saw Rover's adoption of the build phases as simply an adoption of labels. 
It was more important to understand the reasons behind Honda engineers' actions than to 
concentrate on their actions alone. In other words, Rover had to understand the 
underlying philosophies of surface actions in order to successfully internalise Honda 
practices. The internalisation of Honda practices was approximated and never fully 
realised. 
Emphasis on Training 
The process of learning effectively at Rover was accomplished through company visits, 
boundary-spanning individuals, cross-functional teamwork and goodwill trust, formed 
through personal relations. This was far from being a transmissive form of teaching 
carried out in a condescending manner. Rather, Honda processes were validated and 
demonstrated to Rover engineers. 
We had to have a Gebba-Kai because that was how they did their business. 
They forced us to use it but since they have left we have still used it. 
Imitation, being the sincerest form of flattery, we have continued to use 
the process-they did not try to teach it to you in a condescending manner 
though. In my experience, they did it, you asked why they did something 
and they shrugged their shoulders and said `well, we always do it like that. 
It is the Honda process. So they did blindly follow the Honda process but 
it was a good process. So they did not come over and banged the table and 
said you must do it like that because we know best. 
(Team Leader J at Rover, 27 May 1999) 
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Knowledge within this framework was shared through "influencing, copying each other" 
(Japanese Manager at Rover Liaison Office of Honda Motor Europe, 29 April 1999). 
Knowledge sharing occurred in a context of team building, which led not only to 
surfacing of innovative ideas but also allowed one to learn on the job (Principal Electrical 
Engineer B at Rover, 9 April 1999). 
Honda's emphasis on OJT (Principal Electrical Engineer B at Rover, 9 April 1999) 
created a high engineering skills base or specialist knowledge, which the company could 
effectively tap on. This contradicted Rover's, or perceived UK's emphasis, on 
certification. "We are training for the sake of training ... for obtaining certificates that will 
improve our chances of progress in career. The Japanese provide training that is more 
oriented towards the job" (British Senior Purchasing Manager of Rover Group Projects, 
16 February 1999). Wherever a Honda engineer was seen as too specialised to answer a 
particular product-related question, the matter, given the strong internal links, could be 
directed to other experts in the company (Principal Electrical Engineer C at Rover, 13 
April 1999). In contrast, it was claimed that Rover had a low skills base that was 
compensated for through reliance on bureaucracy. 
We have far more mediocre to good guys. Because we had higher 
proportion of mediocrity, we had to put systems in place to compensate 
for that, some degree of bureaucracy, reviews, paperwork systems, to help 
bring the whole thing together. 
(Principal Electrical Engineer C at Rover, 13 April 1999) 
Honda's methodical steps in delivering components contrasted with Rover's indulgence 
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in carrying out tasks in different ways across engineers. Each Honda engineer knew what 
he was supposed to do, and how to get from point A to B. Processes had been tested 
before, hence there were clear reasons as to why they abided by them. 89 However, Rover 
engineers applied processes as they saw fit. "I think we tend to look for compromise and 
modify as appropriate or we feel we have to because we have money constraints" (British 
Principal Systems Engineer on Rover 800, G, 10 May 1999). 
Given Honda's custom of limited documentation, it was difficult to transfer exact 
standards to Rover. "Standard [represents] old technology, hence we do not concentrate 
on documentation. 90 In the context of transfer, it is bad, but internally, there is no 
problem due to the emphasis on face-to-face communication" (Japanese Project Manager 
at Honda, 5 April 2000). On the other hand, Rover was always seen as providing and 
sticking to documents. For example, they were said to have vehicle test specifications in 
every area with an "out-of-date content" (ibid. ). 
In the case of the shop floor, there was `watering down' of diffused Honda practices 
where there was poor training. For instance, the Manufacturing Integration Manager at 
Rover (25 August 1999) explains that the first shift that worked in the methods-build on 
the R8 was trained very well. There was time to build relationships with people. 
However, in the second and the third shifts, the impetus was lost, because "they were off 
the job on Metro and on this job within a matter of days almost. They [operators] were 
89 Honda's previous experimentation had led to a book of standards. "We have past history record like 20 
years' experience in the form of checklists. We review our previous bad experience" (Japanese project 
member on the XX, 3 April 2000). 
90 Honda's practice of not documenting processes is seen as a typical feature of Japanese companies 
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not embedded in the culture as they should have been. Instead of adopting everything in 
the purest sense, I think it got watered down". It was felt that the hasty implementation of 
processes `diluted' the whole business ethic. 
5.4.2.3 Control Mechanism: Degree of Involvement by the Japanese 
Rover regarded the R8/YY project as constituting a 50-50 collaboration, where it had as 
much input into the collaboration as Honda. In other respects, it had been more a case of 
Honda leading Rover, and "actually dictating to Rover `this is what you are going to get, 
this is what you are going to do" (Chief Designer at Rover, 14 May 1999). 91 Overall, 
Honda was dominant to a large degree. It would provide the engineering design and 
expertise. The working relationship also included on-site support maintenance by Honda. 
"Honda was keen on laying out its philosophy" (Logistics Operations Manager at Rover, 
23 April 1999). There was constant negotiation for acceptance by Rover. Honda seemed 
to believe that "combination of cultures does not work [in the development of a new car]" 
(Japanese Project Manager at Honda, 5 April 2000). This indicates that knowledge was 
not diffused to Rover in a linear fashion free from power struggles, and social inclusion 
and exclusion. 
The exercise of power by Honda92 was influenced by differences in goals and the relative 
business situations or financial circumstances of the companies at the time. Given the 
(Japanese Project Leader at Honda, 13 April 2000). 
91 From Honda's perspective, the project was based more on 70: 30 collaboration with Honda taking the 
leading role. "The project before the Rover 200 project was a combination. It did not work. YY used Honda 
development way, whilst manufacturing used the Rover way. It was more successful" (Japanese Project 
Manager at Honda, 5 April 2000). 
92 It is important to note that "Honda exerted influence but did not have authority" (British Ex-Director of 
Honda Collaboration at Rover, 21 January 1999). 
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nature of the relationship (technical collaboration rather than a subsidiary relationship), 
partners could not fully engage in free flow of information and knowledge sharing. They 
were competing in the same market. Moreover, Honda perceived Rover as possessing 
low engineering skills and lacking professionalism. 93 
If Honda sees it [a given problem raised by the after-sale division] as 
urgent, then it will assign an engineer to work on it. A counter-measure 
will be taken. We address the problem and not the emotions like Rover 
does. Rover will say it is not serious enough.... They will either ignore or 
give a nice speech appealing to emotions such as `we are sorry we cannot 
do something'. (Japanese Manager at Rover Liaison Office of Honda 
Motor Europe, 29 April 1999) 
Honda could not trust Rover suggestions in areas outside concept design, because "they 
thought they were the experts and did not feel that they should be told to try another 
alternative. You needed to prove to them that the alternative would work. Mountains of 
results were needed" (British Senior Purchasing Manager of Rover Group Projects, 16 
February 1999). Honda's manufacturing people were not confident of Rover's ability, 
especially in areas of quality and supply control management. According to the Japanese 
Project Leader at Honda (13 April 2000), Rover engineers were talented but not well 
organised. "Honda engineers work on a new car as they launch another [whereas] Rover 
engineers' responsibility extends over to manufacturing" (ibid. ). 
93 The perception of low engineering skills also includes lack of intuition or insight on Rover's part 
(Japanese Project Manager at Honda, 5 April 2000). 
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Approach to Discipline 
Honda members were perceived by Rover members as following instructions to the letter. 
"It is a culture whereby they will respect their superiors. Once they are told that they 
must not take us through the secret area, then they will not. The Japanese always comply 
with their orders. We will comply if the orders suit us" (British Principal Systems 
Engineer on Rover 800, G, 10 May 1999). It was perceived that in the UK context, an 
employee would try and find another way of carrying out a task, rather than working to a 
process. This made it difficult to work in a regimented manner and abide by an agreed 
structure at Rover. According to a British senior manager in Manufacturing Integration 
(25 August 1999), Rover lacked the mechanism of self-control, that is the ability to prove 
a process, train people and introduce double checks to stabilise a process. For example, 
this was observed in the way Rover raised Project Change Requests (PCRs). 
Again we might not have the discipline that they adopt in terms of the 
PCR changes. PCRs are supposed to be all resolved and signed off at the 
event. But not everybody turns up. Sometimes it is quite difficult to judge 
whether you should invite all your suppliers, because some of our 
suppliers come a long way. So we might not have the discipline to fully do 
it but we still basically adopt it. 
(Principal Electrical Engineer I at Rover, 24 May 1999) 
The regimented working style of Honda engineers94 encouraged Rover engineers to 
approach vehicle development phases in a methodical manner. The formalisation of 
94 This was based on Honda's history of stable engineering base. "Most of its engineers had not flicked 
from one component to another, or from one discipline to another, so if you spoke to a switch engineer, the 
guy probably had been doing switches for a good number of years. Whereas, within Rover, there was a 
culture that suggested we want people to do what they enjoy doing. And so you had a lot of hopping about. 
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development phases initiated the use of Gebba-Kais, which stayed on long after the 
Rover 200/Honda Concerto project. However, they were not running as effectively 
thereafter as they used to with Honda's involvement in 1985 (Principal Electrical 
Engineer K at Rover, 2 June 1999). Hence, the effective implementation of a control- 
related practice, discipline, was more difficult in the absence of Japanese involvement. 
Honda engineers were regarded as displaying high levels of attention to detail. This 
provided them with the opportunity to explore every possibility in carrying out a task. 
This was an important feature of the engineering work carried out by both parties. Honda 
would be quick to come up with a counter-measure, and at times quicker than Rover, 
during the validation stage. Its specifications were found to be simpler and more attuned 
to what one actually saw in the real world (Principal Electrical Engineer I at Rover, 24 
May 1999). 
Honda engineers could afford to be attentive to detail and focus on the engineering 
function, because they were stripped of their administrative role of paperwork and 
politics. They would have project management assistants who would create the drawings 
for them. On the other hand, Rover engineers were responsible for more than just the 
engineering function. "We did all the paperwork, ordering systems. We did more 
functions than they did. We have less time on the engineering, less time on the attention 
to detail. I think that is where the Japanese beat us" (Principal Electrical Engineer I at 
Rover, 24 May 1999). Honda's tight control and focus on limiting variation within 
I guess Honda always had the consistency of people that followed a product through from start to end. They 
all had good level of experience" (British Design and Development Engineer, 23 June 1999). 
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processes minimised faults. Whereas, Rover had to be skilled at fault-finding. Although 
Rover had many standards-"some more stringent than those of Honda-their engineers, 
factory workers could not keep to that standard... sometimes they lacked know-how95 to 
correct some of the detailed drawings or manufacturing testing. This could also have been 
due to a lack of supplier capability. Maybe they could not instruct the supplier" (Japanese 
Principal Engineer at Honda, HC, 29 March 2000). As the Japanese project member on 
the XX at Honda (3 April 2000) claims: 
In Japan, suppliers are very hardworking. They have to meet the expected 
time and quality. Rover could not enforce that on its suppliers. If there is a 
problem, we will visit the supplier and check all process from start to end. 
Our people examine the process together with the supplier. We carry out a 
`five-why analysis' and even suggest process improvements. Honda has 
close supplier relations. 
At times Rover's adaptability to new work methods was constrained by the company's 
long tradition of following a particular means of operating. This is exemplified by the 
differences in design requirements of the two companies. 
[Rover] has many connections in the engine. They installed engine ECU 
[Electronic Control Unit] under the bonnet. Engine harness was connected 
directly to the engine ECU. In Japan, we clamp that wire connection in 
95 The reason for the lack of know-how at Rover was presented as the recruitment process. "Some 
engineers have been working at Rover for many years. However, the top management system in the UK is 
based on qualifications without the need to become a principal engineer at first. Managers as university 
graduates come to Rover and become a Chief Engineer. They do not know the actual capability of the 
engineers, and they force them to carry out certain tasks. " (Japanese Principal Engineer at Honda, HA, 29 
March 2000). It is felt that this results in knowledge discrepancy between the chief engineer and principal 
engineers at Rover. On the other hand, the seniority-based promotion system at Honda is claimed to ingrain 
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order to prevent small vibrations from negatively affecting the ECU. 
Rover design did not incorporate this. When I explained why we clamp, 
they [engineers based in Japan] understood. The English have lots of 
experience [long tradition] of working without this clamp, so they asked 
`why do we need it? It will increase cost'... At the end, we could not come 
to a compromise. (Japanese Principal Engineer HA at Honda, 29 March 
2000) 
High levels of commitment could only be observed where a joint project was formed and 
the British and Japanese engineers worked together in a context of direct influence of 
tacit elements of the work that was carried out. In other words, side-by-side work in a 
context of direct exposure to habits, skills and routines of the collaborator positively 
influenced the diffusion of alternative work systems. 
Level of Trust and Communication between the Japanese and UK Staff 
In general, Rover engineers felt that Honda was secretive. Information that could `easily 
be transferred and adopted' was seen as jealously guarded given the competitive nature 
of the collaboration. Honda's secrecy was not applicable to process-related information 
"because we [Rover] had to understand the process in order to operate" (British Engineer 
I, 21 May 1999). 96 In other words, the underlying principles of Japanese quality systems 
were more difficult to diffuse than the tangible features and tools of such systems. 
(Further discussion can be found in Chapter 6). With respect to design information on the 
R8/YY project, Rover felt that there was a delay in delivery of such information. 
Practical engineering skills in its engineers before they attain managerial positions. 
6 In other words, source company's intention to diffuse process-related knowledge, which required 
interpretation or sense-making during internalisation, was stronger than that of technology-related 
knowledge. 
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I think they made sure that their design was done first, obviously, before 
they released the information for us to do ours. We had to wait for them to 
supply us with information before we could do some of our design work. 
We felt that sometimes they held back a bit too long before giving us that 
information, information like body in white panels because they were 
common. 
(Principal Mechanical Engineer L at Rover, 22 June 1999) 
From Honda's perspective, such `secrecy' was justified for it was `natural' to be 
secretive in the R&D field. Honda served the US and the Japanese markets in addition to 
that of Europe. 97 
Honda members felt that the knowledge they diffused to Rover was not shared within the 
company. 
We found out that know-how did not transfer to others, because Rover 
[member] kept knowledge to himself, and then quit and transferred to 
another company. On one occasion, we were surprised to see that a 
manager received good information from Honda, but intentionally did not 
inform the boss, who, in turn, made the wrong decision. Rover managers 
are more like politicians than managers. (Japanese Project Manager at 
Honda, 5 April 2000 and Project Leader at Honda, 13 April 2000). 
At the level of Rover liaison engineers who had been seconded to Japan and developed 
relations with Honda engineers and seen their openness in informal settings, Honda's 
secrecy was justified as avoidance of public face. Honda engineers would not inform 
97 The European market for Honda was much smaller than the US market. 
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Rover engineers of their solution or idea until it was fixed. Hence, one's perception of 
Honda's secrecy would depend on how far Honda would be in resolving a problem when 
directed a question. A delay in response was possible due to the time-consuming process 
of reaching consensus in decision-making at Honda. 
Rover's liaison officers or `boundary-spanning' individuals facilitated information flow 
and helped forge good working relations with the Japanese. This aided in minimising the 
communication problem. 
During the early stages of development, 20-30 engineers were based in 
Japan, at Wako R&D for six months. Afterwards, we moved to Tochigi. 
We had a joint special room for them. We discussed many things face to 
face. Based on the XX project, we realised that we had to have the joint 
team meetings. 
(Japanese Principal Engineer at Honda HA, 29 March 2000) 
Face-to-face meetings were seen as an important mechanism for sharing ideas. They 
provided Rover engineers with an opportunity to work closely with Honda engineers. 
"To see your name on a piece of paper then to actually meet them, you find a step 
improvement in terms of helpfulness and communication" (Principal Electrical Engineer 
F at Rover, 21 June 1999). 
Similarly, Honda engineers were stationed in Rover's plant. "The Japanese would come 
for two weeks, then leave for six weeks, then come back for another four to six weeks 
over a period of three years [from 1986 to 1989]" (Senior Purchasing Manager of Rover 
Group Projects, 16 February 1999). There was a greater understanding of Honda's 
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`cultural way of working' as Rover moved towards a stronger relationship with Honda 
with the use of liaison members. 
Trust was developed over the course of the collaboration, 98 and Honda was freer with 
information as confidence was built at a personal level. Social relations helped develop 
goodwill trust and lower the communication barrier. The language of senior managers 
was made difficult with differences in work philosophies and `strategic talk', as well as 
cultural differences. For example, Honda managers had difficulty in reading the `English 
mind'. "Now, I am working with a Japanese company on a project. I know their mind in 
detail. Sometimes they say they agree, but that is not really the case. They say they 
understand but I can read their mind. We could not do that with the British" (Japanese 
Executive VP of Honda R&D Europe, 29 March 2000). In contrast, communication was 
less of a problem where there was a technical issue related to a product common to both 
companies (British Principal Systems Engineer on Rover 800, G, 10 May 1999). "In 
terms of technical, you can explain and people can understand a lot quicker than when 
you are trying to explain socially. You are more product-focused. If the product is the 
same, it is slightly easier to get the point across" (Principal Electrical Engineer F at 
Rover, 21 June 1999). This points to the relative ease with which explicit technical 
knowledge, as opposed to more tacit philosophies, could be diffused to the UK context. 
With the Japanese, the less informal the situation, the easier it was to communicate and 
get agreement (Principal Mechanical Engineer L at Rover, 22 June 1999). 
98 According to the British Principal Systems Engineer on Rover 800, G, (10 May 1999), "I think they were 
right in not trusting us, to be honest. If you think back and look at their product at the time and our product, 
they were not the same level of standard. Their quality, supplier control, whole approach to development 
build phases were well in advance of ours, and it is probably not until the early 90s that we really caught up 
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Rover's high dependence on Honda led Rover engineers to perceive low willingness on 
the part of the Japanese partner to learn from its British collaborator. This was not felt at 
the senior management level. For example, "we got into electronic diagnostics before 
Honda. We interrogated their equipment, brought it back to our understanding. They later 
copied us. The equipment was partly used for immobilisation of the car [against car 
theft], hence they saw it as advantageous to copy it" (British GM of Honda Collaboration, 
15 April 1999). The most important learning opportunity for Honda seemed to be British 
styling (Principal Electrical Engineer H at Rover, 12 May 1999). Honda also learnt from 
Rover's experience in manufacturing large cars99 and negotiations held with European 
suppliers. '00 However, in terms of general development in production, Honda had nothing 
to learn from Rover (British Purchasing Divisional Manager at Honda UK 
Manufacturing, 22 September 1999). 
5.4.2.4 Technology Diffusion 
In general, Honda was technologically more advanced than Rover. "We developed 
various types of cars. In case of Rover, its products were not exported as much. Its 
flexibility was low. Honda's facility was much better" (Japanese Executive VP of Honda 
R&D Europe, 29 March 2000). Honda was seen by Rover as an "interesting mixture of 
amazing craftsmanship and very high technology at the same time" (British Design 
with them. Of course, by then, they had moved on no doubt". 
99 Honda dealers were claimed to have experience in selling only small cars, such as the Civic. "Honda 
entered the large car sector by developing the V6 engine in the project prior to the R8/YY. It was a fast 
entry thanks to Rover" (Japanese project member on the XX, 3 April 2000). 
100 "The relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier in the UK, and maybe in Europe, is different 
from that in Japan. The Japanese supplier is very obedient to the car manufacturer. The European supplier 
is very confident of its capability and is not reluctant to refuse car manufacturer's requirement. We had to 
prepare carefully [for meetings with the European suppliers]" (Japanese Project Leader at Honda, 13 April 
2000). 
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Director, 22 June 1999). 
Rover was using two-dimensional (2D) drawings at the time of the R8/YY project, whilst 
Honda was working with CATIA (a CAD software) for modelling. It was claimed that 
the difference in the software used did not affect the work that was carried out in the 
electrical department of Rover, "because in terms of design specifications, we always 
dealt with paper copiers" (Principal Electrical Engineer F at Rover, 21 June 1999, see 
Appendix IX for Honda Motor Corporation's communication network). 
The white scan board was commonly cited as an extremely effective tool in arriving at 
consensus-based decisions. At R8/YY meetings with Honda engineers, notes would be 
taken in Japanese and English on an electronic copy board, and hand-written copies 
would be distributed spontaneously to all the participants. The benefit of writing the 
issues on the board was that "anybody can say `no, you have written that down wrong. 
You have to change it... (Principal Electrical Engineer H at Rover, 12 May 1999). All 
participants were made aware of the issues discussed and agreed upon at the meetings. 
The sharing of tacit knowledge required the close involvement and co-operation of the 
knowing subject. 
You knew exactly what was put on there, and whom it was actioned 
against. I think before that we were in the same meeting, everybody took 
notes in the way it suited them. Everybody saw things differently. With 
notes on whiteboards, you knew then who was actioned to do what and 
when they were supposed to do it. We would all have pens in our hands 
and we would be sketching away... Our communication was through 
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sentences and paragraphs, and theirs was pictorial. 
(Electrical Group Leader at Rover, 7 May 1999) 
These boards were also used for documentation purposes or as a way of formalising 
agreements. It was questionable whether IT could replace `people transfer', for Honda 
strongly emphasised teamwork, personal relations and trust. 
If we asked a technical question such as `is it possible that you could do 
this? ' And the answer would come back `very difficult, no' and that meant 
it was absolutely impossible... And making friends with them enabled 
contact and communication. And once you had communication you could 
then discuss things much better. 
(Team Leader J at Rover, 27 May 1999) 
Matters subject to negotiation required personal visits. "Emphasis on social processes is 
more important. Technology is there to transfer data but this is not knowledge. It is only 
a subset" (Chief Advanced Power Train Engineer, 2 April 2000). 
There was also investment in Rover's assembly lines. For example, Honda tried to 
modify the welding line at Longbridge during the R8/YY project. They were not able to 
change it, as Rover's production line was very long. "Rover asked EG [Honda 
Engineering] to build the whole production line. Hence, Honda exported and installed 
unique equipment to build the R8/YY. Rover saw and reviewed the reconstruction plan" 
(Japanese project member on the XX at Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 4 April 2000). As the 
Rover 200/Honda Concerto project involved a high level of common componentry and 
was to be manufactured at Rover's Longbridge plant, it was to Honda's benefit to invest 
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in the UK manufacturing plant. 
The diffusion of technology complemented the availability of a skilful blend of people 
and the diffusion of tacit and explicit processes, supporting relatively high internalisation 
of work systems by Rover engineers. 
5.4.3 Group Characteristic: Attitude of Teams towards Continuous Improvement 
Schemes 
The level of commitment to continuous improvement schemes differed between shop- 
floor operators and engineers who served liaison roles. There was resistance on the shop 
floor for fear of `Japanising' or being asked to do more than what one was responsible 
for. '°' Operators felt insulted to be asked to work in a `non-traditional' manner to 
improve processes. They would resist by saying "I have been working on this for 10 
years. I have always done it that way" (Project Engineer on Central Components at 
Rover, 21 July 1999). 
There were some who would be awkward. They wanted to start at the 
back of the line, work very quickly down the line to take a break for a 
smoke etceteras early. Because they were working far ahead of others, 
they would block other operators' work. Since then a lot has improved. 
(ibid. ) 
It was felt that new recruits could internalise new processes in manufacturing more easily 
than older workers. 
101 This also applied to some of the engineers. "Their [Honda's] demarcations were greyer and the 
engineers would be more flexible in those terms even though they did more engineering than we did. So 
there was a bit of fear on our side that `having Japanese workwear', even at a director level, you could be 
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Obviously they did not come from a BMC Austin work ethic where you 
got major cultural differences regarding the relationships between 
management and workers and so forth... In the Edwards' days we were 
very contentious. There was the `them and us' situation rather than the 
team working approach which is very strong in Honda. (Senior Manager 
in Manufacturing Integration at Rover, 25 August 1999) 
It took many years to obliterate strikes and shift management-operator relations from "`I 
am the boss. I am right. This is the way it will be done' to `I am the leader of the group. 
Everybody has a say, but I will still be able to make a decision at the end"' (ibid. ). 
In spite of resistance, there was a positive shift in shop floor culture and an improvement 
in processes. Uniforms were introduced to reduce the segregation between engineers and 
operators. People became comparatively more disciplined and committed to teamwork. 
According to the Japanese Rover Liaison Office Manager at Honda Motor Europe (29 
April 1999), Rover learnt to become more agile and flexible, and adopted cross- 
functional communication style during the R8/YY development. 
In contrast to shop-floor workers, Rover engineers, who were assigned liaison roles to 
aid in information flow between Rover and Honda, responded more positively to Honda 
practices. The secondment of Rover engineers to Japan for six-12 months, and joint 
engineering team meetings either in the UK or Japan had a significant role to play in the 
internalisation of Honda's continuous improvement techniques and philosophies as 
applicable to engineering. It helped overcome cultural barriers and minimised 
asked to do more menial tasks" (Principal Electrical Engineer I at Rover, 24 May 1999). 
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communication problems. It was beneficial to have people serving as an interface to "get 
the relationship going rather than talking to a stranger that may not speak English. It is a 
question of trust and communication and that always works with engineering" (Principal 
Electrical Engineer H at Rover, 24 May 1999). Engineers saw it as essential to build 
social relations based on trust, for "you could have a discussion and there would be lots 
of nodding and agreeing, and it did not mean they agreed with what you were saying" 
(Principal Electrical Engineer H at Rover, 21 June 1999). The main concern was not 
whether information flowed back and forth, but whether the message could be conveyed 
correctly, and this depended on a working relationship with Honda (Design and 
Development Engineer at Rover, 23 June 1999). Rover engineers quickly discovered that 
they could not start business immediately upon their visit to Honda in Japan. "The thing 
you soon learnt then was if you wanted to get information, you had to build a relationship 
with your opposite number. You got to be out drinking with them, then, after that, it 
starts to hold business" (Principal Electrical Engineer A at Rover, 24 February 1999). 
Although Honda displayed low formal trust, due in part to the perceived low engineering 
skills and quality processes at Rover, it was freer with information as confidence was 
built at a personal level. 
As you got to know more and more of their engineers, and they got to 
know us, we would be designing things in the pub afterwards with Honda 
engineers. We would draw a design on beer mat, pass it over to a Honda 
engineer. He would improve it and give it back to me. That would spark 
another idea in him and then we shake on that. And then the next day, he 
would draw it up. We used to do a lot of our work like that. 
(Principal Mechanical Engineer L at Rover, 22 June 1999) 
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Trust between Rover and Honda members could be built in two ways: socially, which 
involved the element of friendship (i. e. goodwill trust), and technically by demonstrating 
competence (i. e. competence trust) (Electrical Group Leader at Rover, 7 May 1999). The 
former form of trust could be built in an informal atmosphere where engineers could 
bring to surface what they knew but took for granted, whilst the latter could be built 
through involvement in decision-making. This is illustrated by the following anecdote. 
That idea they [Honda] showed me, how to put things on composite 
drawings. I saw their drawing. They were free with that drawing. In fact, 
they trusted me so much they would leave that drawing to me to modify. 
The more you knew them, you either got on with them socially, or you 
could get on with them technically. 
(Electrical Group Leader at Rover, 7 May 199) 
However, Rover liaison engineers had difficulty in eliciting concern over the R8/YY 
project among engineers based in the UK. As UK-resident engineers had not had the 
experience of working `side-by-side' with the Japanese, they could not relate to the 
concerns of those based in Japan. 
They obviously had other projects to work on. So I was saying no forget 
about the other projects and give me the answer in the R8 project now, 
please. I would plead with them, and bribe them and use different carrots 
and sticks.... what you did find that as soon as an engineer had been to 
Japan and then back, it did not matter what project they were working on. 
Suppose 50 per cent of their work was on the R8 and 50 per cent on 
another project. Still if you went to them and said `oh, we need to know 
the latest info on such and such for those in Japan', they would then do it. 
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That commitment was there once they had been immersed in it. They were 
committed for life really. (Team Leader J at Rover, 27 May 1999) 
Although, on the whole, it was felt that there was a uni-directional diffusion of know- 
how from Honda to Rover, the sharing of knowledge among engineers in a social 
network was strong. 102 
5.4.4 Overview 
Table 5.5 provides an overview of the key characteristics that have an effect on the 
diffusion of Japanese work systems to an engineering project within the Rover-Honda 
collaboration. Initiatives taken by local and Japanese management to introduce 
alternative work systems at Rover are much stronger than those taken at Teniki UK. This 
is presented as `high degree of implementation' in Table 5.5. The degree to which 
alternative work systems are infused with value and accepted by workers at Rover is 
higher than that at Teniki UK. However, there is room for improvement as is described in 
sections 5.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.3. Hence, this is presented as `medium degree of 
internalisation' in Table 5.5. The local institutional context includes medium skills base 
in engineering, location in a deeply rooted manufacturing base, high inward investment 
and a high level of industrial dispute. The technical collaboration commenced in 1978 
and the Rover 200/Honda Concerto (R8/YY) project was launched in 1985. Rover had 
reached a size of 37,675 employees by this year. It had a low level of financial 
dependence on Honda due to the nature of the relationship with the Japanese partner. The 
technical collaboration was aimed at joint design and engineering of automobiles. The 
102 Unlike the senior managers at Rover, the engineers engaged in a "fairly open discussion. I mean it is 
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establishment of a liaison office in 1985 facilitated the imparting of Honda practices to 
Rover engineers. Rover experienced a shift to a project-based structure in 1985 with the 
initiation of the R8/YY project. The commitment to quality improvement schemes in car 
development was low until 1985. With the initiation of the R8/YY project, there was a 
step improvement in the level of commitment to such schemes. The dedication was even 
higher on subsequent projects, particularly upon the launch of the Rover 200 model in 
1989. The approach to discipline was strong between 1985 and 1989, in which Rover 
engineers were seconded to Japan up to a period of one year. The 1985-1989 period also 
marked high levels of investment in quality and car development skills training. 
Engineers' learning process took place mainly through company visits and joint 
engineering team meetings. There was high and direct level of involvement by the 
Japanese partner in design responsibility. This was accompanied by a high 
communication barrier and low level of trust between the Japanese and UK staff until 
1985. As personal relations were built over the course of the R8/YY project, the 
communication barrier was lowered and trust was enhanced. Rover, in comparison to its 
highly advanced partner company, was dominated by a medium level of technology 
diffusion, especially in factory lines. 
between engineers when you get down to it. The physics is the same for both of us. We do not get involved 
in politics" (Principal Electrical Engineer C at Rover, 13 April 1999). 
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Table 5.5 Key Characteristics that have an Impact on the Implementation and 
Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at the Rover-Honda 
Collaboration 
Key characteristics 
Local 
Institutional 
Level 
Company 
characteristics 
Organisational 
Level 
Location: Site 
Skills base 
Inward investment 
Level of industrial 
Size 
Age 
(year of collaboration to the end 
of the project) 
Nature of work 
Form of ownership 
Number of Japanese expatriates 
and their roles in the UK 
Skills level of engineers/ 
Symmetry of expertise with that 
of the Japanese firm 
Financial dependence on 
partner firm 
Nature of diffused practices 
- Organisational 
structure 
Rover-Honda 
R8/YY project 
Traditional home of Britain's 
car manufacturing base 
Medium in engineering skills 
Large 
(37,675 employees at the start 
of the R8/YY project in 1985, 
-39,000 in 1999 and of similar 
size in terms of sales with 
Honda in 1978) 
11 years 
(1978-1989) 
Automobile design, 
engineering, and manufacture 
Technical collaboration, 
20% mutual shareholding 
arrangement in 1990 
Regular visits by Honda 
engineers between 6 and 8 
weeks (1986-1989), liaison 
office established in 1985103 
Advisory role 
Medium [as compared with 
that of Honda] 
Low104 
Shift to team structure in 1985 
103 There is no reliable data on the size of this office. 
104 Rover was funded by the UK Government, and later by British Aerospace, hence there was a low 
dependence on Honda from a financial perspective. However, there was a high dependence on the Japanese 
partner from a technology and product development point of view. 
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- Organisational culture: 
Commitment to continuous 
improvement schemes High in quality skills and car 
* Emphasis on training development system 
- Control-related: Degree of High, Direct 
involvement by the Japanese Strong till 1989/Mediocre 
* Approach to discipline thereafter 
* Trust between the Japanese Low till 1985/Medium till 
and UK staff 1990/High 
* Communication barrier High till 1985/Medium 
thereafter 
- Technological: Technology Medium 
diffusion 
Group Level Attitude of teams towards the Low till 1985/Medium till 
work systems of the source 1989/High thereafter 
firm: level of commitment 
Outcome Degree of 
- implementation High 
- internalisation Medium 
of Japanese work systems at the 
UK adopter firm 
Source: See text 
5.5 Summary 
The results of the case study show that the degree to which Japanese work systems are 
accepted at Teniki UK is influenced by the following characteristics: its 
i) location on a brownfield site in a centre for tourism, 
ii) employment of a low skilled workforce, 
iii) low level of commitment to continuous improvement schemes due to the low 
level of investment in training, 
iv) weak approach to discipline and 
v) indirect Japanese involvement in shop-floor activities. 
240 
There is also a high communication barrier, low trust between the Japanese and UK staff 
and low technology diffusion from the Japanese parent to the UK subsidiary. Overall, 
there is an indirect involvement of actors aiming to diffuse practices with limited 
resources. 
The case study at Nissera UK reveals that the following characteristics: 
i) location on a greenfield site in a centre for manufacturing, 
ii) employment of a skilful workforce, 
iii) direct and high emphasis on training, 
iv) long-term financing with greater number of years spent in operation (than Teniki 
UK) and 
v) a strong approach to discipline, 
are conducive to the acceptance of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. There is 
also a greater willingness to diffuse technology where there is perceived competence, 
ability to develop a knowledge base and successful performance on the part of the UK 
subsidiary. There is a direct involvement of actors in the diffusion of systems where both 
tacit and explicit practices are emphasised, and sufficient resources are available to 
diffuse them. 
The case study findings in the Rover-Honda collaboration site show that the degree of 
learning is highest where there is 
i) direct Japanese involvement in activities, 
ii) formation of goodwill trust within a context of personal relations, 
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iii) company visits and secondment of liaison officers to Japan, 
iv) similarity in goals at strategic and engineering levels, 
v) emphasis on the diffusion of both tacit and explicit components of continuous 
improvement schemes (such as a project-based company structure and 
commitment to quality) and 
vi) an openness in communication. 
Although there were institutional incompatibilities, especially limited discipline on 
Rover's part, and the exercise of power and low formal trust on the part of the Japanese 
partner, Rover members to a large degree accepted Honda's manufacturing system, 
certain engineering processes and managerial philosophies. 
Japanese expatriates in the two subsidiary firms and UK and Japanese engineers in the 
technical collaboration site served as `boundary-spanning' individuals. In other words, 
they were influential actors in the diffusion of the source companies' work systems to the 
UK adopter firms. The internal and external linkages of the boundary-spanning 
individuals were stronger in the case of the technical collaboration site. 105 A subsidiary 
relationship was not necessarily more conducive to stronger knowledge sharing and 
higher trust formation (even though one might expect less secrecy and more willingness 
to share information in a subsidiary relationship) than a technical collaboration. 
Negandhi and Welge (1984) demonstrate that Japanese expatriate managers play a key 
role in facilitating control, co-ordination, communication and management, and 
105 Engineers were able to "gather information from external areas and disseminate that information to their 
colleagues" (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981: 303). 
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production technology diffusion from the parent company to the overseas operation. 
However, this is not necessarily the case at Teniki UK. 
In sum, the descriptions made on the basis of the case studies at Teniki UK, Nissera UK, 
and the Rover-Honda collaboration reveal considerable differences in the degree to 
which Japanese knowledge-driven work systems are put to practice by management and 
accepted by employees in the UK automotive manufacture industry. In the following 
chapter, the degree to which work systems are put to practice (i. e. implemented) and 
accepted (i. e. internalised) will be compared and contrasted across the three cases and 
linked to the influence of nationally distinct social systems. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS FROM THE CASE 
STUDIES 
This chapter comprises a comparison of the findings from the case studies on the degree 
of internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems diffused from Japan to the UK in 
the automotive manufacture industry. The contrasts and similarities identified are 
evaluated against the background of nationally distinct social settings. The resulting 
insights into the process of internalisation of work systems are related to the propositions 
formulated in Chapter 3. This yields empirically supported insights into the collective 
influence of a range of key institutional characteristics relating to the degree to which 
structural, cultural, control-related and technological practices are implemented and 
internalised. 
6.1 Comparison of the Degree of Implementation and Internalisation of 
Japanese Work Systems in the UK Automotive Manufacture Industry 
In the following section, the degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems across three sites in the UK automotive manufacture 
industry is compared and contrasted at the local institutional, organisational and group 
levels. The key local institutional characteristics are analysed first, followed by a 
comparison of the findings at the organisational and group levels. Finally, institutional 
limits to the diffusion of work systems are addressed. 
244 
6.1.1 Comparison of Local Institutional Characteristics 
The degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work 
systems differs across the three companies investigated on the basis of the location area 
and site of the companies, as well as the associated skills base of the workforce in the 
given regions. The location of Teniki UK on a brownfield site in a centre for tourism and 
the associated low skills base in manufacturing contrast sharply with Nissera UK's 
location on a greenfield site in a centre for manufacturing with high skills base in 
manufacturing. Teniki UK's local institutional setting also contrasts with the Rover- 
Honda collaboration's local institutional context. For example, Rover has a medium 
rather than a low skills base. This contrast is shown in Table 6.1, in which results of the 
document analysis on employment trends and levels of inward investment are presented. 
Table 6.1 Key Local Institutional Characteristics that have an Impact on the 
Implementation and Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda Collaboration 
The Local Teniki UK Nissera UK Rover-Honda 
Institutional Level R8/YY project 
Location: Site Brownfield Greenfield Traditional home of 
(pre-existing Britain's car 
culture) manufacturing base 
Area Centre for tourism Centre for (pre-existing 
manufacturing culture) 
Skills base Low in High in Medium in 
manufacturing manufacturing engineering* 
Inward investment Low High High 
* This is the perceived level in comparison to that of Honda. 
Source: Tables 5.2,5.4 and 5.5 in Chapter 5 
Whitley (1999b: 51) argues that the extent to which collective representations are based 
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on certified expertise rather than on industries or enterprises "has significant 
consequences for the internal organisation of work process and division of labour", as 
demonstrated by demarcation disputes and professional specialisation in Britain. 
However, unlike the findings publicised in the Japanisation literature (e. g. Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1992), the level of industrial dispute is not found to have a significant impact 
on the degree of internalisation of Japanese work systems in the current study. A low 
level of industrial dispute in the region in which Teniki UK is located does not 
necessarily facilitate the implementation and internalisation of work systems. Similarly, 
high levels of industrial dispute in the regions in which Nissera UK and Rover are located 
do not impede the internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. On the 
contrary, the Teniki UK workforce displays resistance to alternative methods of work 
despite the low level of trade union strength in the area. This is due to the dominant effect 
of a pre-existing culture and its negative influence on the level of internalisation. 
Inward investment, that is the government initiative for investment, is found to have an 
impact on the implementation and internalisation of alternative work systems. Inward 
investment is low in the centre for tourism in which Teniki UK is located, whilst it is high 
in Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration sites. Low inward investment seems to 
negatively influence the intemalisation of Japanese work systems. There is less attempt 
by the UK government "to raise skill levels, encourage the adoption of quality 
management standards and even to strengthen trade associations" (Deakin et al., 
2000: 60). According to Lane (1996: 275), Britain's limited role in industry has negative 
implications for aligning the social infrastructure with the needs of the industry, 
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"particularly in the fields of financial risk-sharing, research, education, and training". The 
social isolation of enterprises (given the dispersion of individualism and aversion to 
dependency) has had consequences for investment and innovation behaviour. For 
example, small and medium-sized supplier firms tend to lack the social system that can 
provide expertise and skill. This can mean inadequate access to long-term finance due to 
the lack of government sharing and relations regulating competition and co-operation 
(ibid. ). 
In line with Sharpe's (1998b) argument, this study shows that the absence of a pre- 
existing culture on the greenfield site of Nissera UK facilitates the intemalisation of 
highly institutionalised Japanese practices as the new workforce has fewer 
preconceptions about the manufacturing process. A new set of work procedures can be 
introduced with less resistance. Nissera UK can also employ a skilful workforce due to its 
location in a centre for manufacturing. By contrast, in a brownfield site like Teniki UK 
organisational inertia leads to practices that more closely resemble local practices. There 
is a pull for `local isomorphism' at the brownfield site of Teniki UK (Ferner and 
Quintanilla, 1998). In other words, there are nonnative constraints on alternative 
structures and processes for the Teniki UK workforce to consider. To some extent, such a 
limitation also applies to the Rover-Honda technical collaboration site as it is located in a 
traditional manufacturing base. Strong lines of demarcation at Rover have led to a 
defence of job territory and challenged the drive towards increased flexibility in the 
manufacturing area (c. f Sharpe, 1997). However, the engineers, on which this study 
focused, showed less resistance to the implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
247 
knowledge-driven work systems due to the difference in the nature of their work, the 
skills base and learning from previous collaborative work with the Japanese partner, 
Honda. 
Theoretically, high manufacturing skills in a given region can be expected to present a 
challenge to the implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems, if this 
skills base is taken to reflect pre-existing routines. In practice, the case studies at Nissera 
UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration indicate that medium to high skills level in 
manufacturing/engineering is essential in directing resources towards the internalisation 
of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. This would imply fewer resources invested 
in raising basic skills at the adopter companies. 
In this study, it emerged that the degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems tends to be high where there is a favourable local 
institutional context, characterised by a high inward investment and location on a 
greenfield site. This is exemplified by Nissera UK. As far as the cases are concerned, the 
absence of a pre-existing culture is more conducive to the implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese work systems than a non-unionised labour market. In other 
words, the impact of the location site on the intemalisation of alternative work systems is 
stronger than the level of industrial dispute in a given region. In contrast to what is 
depicted in the literature (e. g. Elger and Smith, 1994), a large supply of unskilled workers 
and location in a centre for tourism (as exemplified by Teniki UK), where labour can be 
expected to be relatively free of preconceived ideas in manufacturing, do not appear to 
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facilitate the implementation and intemalisation of Japanese work systems. Where there 
is a low inward investment and location on a brownfield site, as is the case with Teniki 
UK, the degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven 
work systems tends to be low. However, a high level of industrial dispute, location in a 
centre for manufacturing and a large supply of skilled workforce (as was claimed in 
Table 3.3 in Chapter 3) are not necessarily obstacles to the implementation and 
internalisation of diffused work systems, as is illustrated by the Rover-Honda case. 
A closer comparative analysis of the characteristics that have an impact on the diffusion 
of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems is provided in the sections below. This 
analysis provides more detail on the contrasts between Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the 
Rover-Honda collaboration along the following characteristics: company age, size, and 
terms of financing; organisational characteristics such as the nature of diffused practices; 
group characteristic of team attitudes to alternative work systems and the extent of social 
networking. 
6.1.2 Comparison of Organisational and Group Characteristics 
The extent to which Japanese knowledge-driven work systems are adopted at Teniki UK, 
Nissera UK and Rover shows some similarities but, more strikingly, presents contrasts. 
Table 6.2 indicates that the degee of implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
work systems is the lowest at Teniki UK, despite the diffusion of similar processes to 
each local setting. 
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The organisational arrangements at Teniki UK seem more persistent, hence more 
resistant to change, than those at Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration. The 
three firms are created at different times under distinctive conditions and, hence, exhibit 
variation in the way in which Japanese work systems are transplanted (Powell, 199 1). 
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Table 6.2 Key Organisational and Group Characteristics that have an Impact on 
the Implementation and Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda Collaboration 
Outcome Degree of 
- implementation Low High High 
- internalisation Low Medium Medium (Rover- 
of Japanese work (Teniki UK) (Nissera. UK) Honda R8/YY 
systems at the UK Project) 
adopter firms 
Company Size (in 1999) Medium Medium Large 
characte- (170 employees) (300 employees) (37,675 
ristics employees at the 
start of the R8/YY 
project in 1985, 
-39,000 in 1999 
and of similar size 
in terms of sales 
with Honda in 
1978) 
Age 3 years II years II years 
(year of acquisition/ (1996-1999) (1988-1999) (1978-1989) 
establishment to data 
collection/completion 
of the project) 
Nature of work Assembly of Assembly of Automobile 
carbon canister instrument clusters design, 
(37%), for automobiles engineering, and 
Air Intake (830/o), manufacture 
Systems (35%) motorcycles 
(13 0/6), 
construction 
machines (40/6) (in 
1999) 
Form of ownership Subsidiary Subsidiary Technical 
relationship, relationship, collaboration, 
57% of Teniki Parent company is 20% mutual 
shares held by not owned by a car shareholding 
Japanese car manufacturer arrangement in 
! nanufacturer 1990 
Number of Japanese 4 (MD is British) 12 (including MD) Regular visits by 
expatriates and their Advisory role Mainly director Honda engineers 
roles in the UK role between 6 and 8 
weeks(1986- 
1989), liaison 
office established 
in 1985 
Advisory role 
251 
Skills level of the Low Medium Medium [as 
workforce/ compared with 
Symmetry of expertise that of Honda] 
with the Japanese firm 
Financial dependence Medium Low-Medium Low 
on parent/partner firm 
Organi- Nature of diffused 
sational practices 
Level - Organisational Shift to team Shift to team Shift to team 
structure structure in 1999 structure in 1997 structure in 1985 - 
- Organisational 
culture: Commitment to 
continuous 
improvement schemes 
Emphasis on training Low High (till High in quality 
1997)/Medium skills and car 
thereafter development 
system 
- Control-related: High, Indirect High, Direct High, Direct 
Degree of involvement 
by the Japanese 
* Approach to Weak Strong(till Strong till 
discipline 1997)/Mediocre 1989/Mediocre 
thereafter thereafter 
Trust between the Low Low-Medium Low till 
Japanese and UK staff 1985/Medium. till 
1990/High 
Communication High High High till 
barrier 1985/Medium. 
thereafter 
- Technological: Low Low Medium 
Technology diffusion 
Group Attitude of teams Low Medium Low till 
Level towards the work 1985/Medium. till 
systems of the source 1989/High 
firm: level of thereafter 
commitment 
Extent of social Low I Medium High I 
networking_ 
I 
Source: Tables 5.2,5.4 and 5.5 and text in Chapter 5.106 
The impact that the differences in organisational and group settings can have on effective 
diffusion of work systems is detailed below. 
106 'The extent of social networking' and the sub-themes under the 'nature of diffused work systems' 
became apparent during the analysis of the data. 
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6.1.2.1 Company Characteristics 
The influential company characteristics (summarised in Table 6.2 and discussed in 
Chapter 5) are firm's size and age, nature of work, form of ownership, number of 
Japanese expatriates and their roles in the UK, skills level of the workforce and the 
financial dependence on the parent/partner firm. In section 6.1.2.2, the impact of the 
nature of work, the number of Japanese expatriates and their roles in the UK, as well as 
the skills level of the workforce, on the internalisation of work systems is discussed under 
organisational characteristics. This section presents the impact of company size, age and 
the form of ownership together with the financial dependence on the source company 
(labelled here as the terms of financing). 
Company size 
In line with the arguments supplied in the literature (e. g. Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990), 
large organisations can offer greater financial stability and resources for the attaimnent of 
high levels of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems than small 
organisations. Low volumes and variety inhibit the diffusion of technology (Production 
Manager at Nissera, 13 April 2000). For example, the Rover-Honda collaboration's large 
size and the associated economies-of-scale in production, in comparison to that of Teniki 
UK, allow more resources to be allocated to the training of employees necessary for the 
internalisation of alternative work practices. In the initial years of its collaboration with 
Honda, Rover perceived itself as a small company in a huge market that was financially 
too weak to develop cars on its own. In the course of a series of joint projects with 
Honda, Rover's financial situation improved. Rover launched a structural and cultural 
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change programme in 1985 with the commencement of the R8/YY project, which marked 
a turning point for the company in financial terms. 
Teniki UK's medium size (170 employees) and the associated high costs in production 
are putting pressure on the business and inhibiting the release of operators to training. 
Limited financial resources are also discouraging the company from cascading 
information on continuous improvement to operators. Hence, the degree of internalisation 
of work systems is low in this company. 
Although Nissera. UK, with 300 employees, is similar in size to Teniki UK, it displays a 
higher level of implementation and internalisation of work systems. This is found in part 
to be related to the age and availability of resources for hands-on management in the 
company. 
Company age 
The case studies show that the longer the affiliate firm is in operation, the more familiar 
employees become with the alternative work systems. The positive influence of the time 
factor is especially observed at Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration. The 
passage of time (I I years at Nissera, UK and Rover-Honda collaboration sites from the 
year of foundation to the year in which data were collected or the project was completed) 
and the experience of a previous working relationship have encouraged emphasis on 
worker training and education, and learning. For example, the secondment of Rover 
engineers to Japan for six to 12 months, joint engineering team meetings and forging of 
social relations based on trust facilitated the implementation and internalisation of 
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Honda's continuous improvement techniques and philosophies at Rover. In contrast, 
Teniki UK having been acquired by the Japanese company in 1996, finds it difficult to 
replicate team spirit. The length of time that the team-based organisational structure has 
been in place is too brief. Time is needed to increase the skills level of the workforce. 
The company is currently investing its efforts into raising operators' NVQ levels, prior to 
achieving sustainable continuous improvement within the plant. 
Terms of financing 
The recent acquisition of Teniki UK by a Japanese MNC indicates that Teniki UK's 
financial dependence on its parent company is greater than that of Nissera UK on its 
parent or, indeed, that of Rover on its partner company. However, this does not lead to 
'coercive isomorphism' (Westney, 1993) or an imposition of work systems by Teniki on 
its UK subsidiary. On the contrary, the transfer of expertise and financial resources from 
the Japanese parent is limited. In contrast to what is commonly cited in the literature (e. g. 
Sako and Sato, 1997; lida, 1998 in Kubo and Saka, 2002; Morgan et aL, 2000a), Teniki 
UK receives short-term financing from the Japanese parent company. This is due to a 57 
per cent shareholding arrangement between Teniki and a major Japanese car 
manufacturer. The implementation of Japanese work systems is inhibited through 
considerable financial pressure on Teniki UK in terms of demands for rapid profitability. 
The long-term view of the Japanese to development is more commonly observed at 
Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration. For example, Nissera UK does not bear 
the pressure for rapid profitability. A profit is not expected for the first three years of 
operation. It is observed that Nissera, at least till 1997, committed itself to a broad 
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ranging and long-lasting effort to create dedicated organisational capabilities at Nissera 
UK. At the Rover-Honda collaboration, the form of ownership being a technical 
partnership, the degree of financial dependence found in subsidiary relationships was not 
applicable. However, Rover was dependent on Honda in reducing the cost of developing 
and maintaining a complete product range that could boost its sales. The establishing of 
goodwill and competence trust, as well as the similarity in strategic and technical goals, 
led to a 20 per cent cross shareholding between Rover and Honda UK Manufacturing in 
1990. 
As far as the cases in this study are concerned, a long-term outlook on development as 
evidenced by the willingness of the Japanese parent/partner firms to expand the 
knowledge base of the UK affiliates (illustrated by Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda 
collaboration) is more facilitating in the degree to which Japanese work systems are 
implemented and internalised than a short-term perspective. A short-term orientation as 
evidenced by short-term financing and pressure for profitability at Teniki UK inhibits the 
development of a continuous improvement culture at the UK transplant. 
It should be noted that the terms of financing are associated with the company 
characteristics of size and age. As companies grow in size and reach maturity, their 
financial dependence on the parent company (or dependence on the partnering firm for 
cost reduction in the case of the technical collaboration) seems to be lower. Furthermore, 
the cases indicate that the long-term orientation of the Japanese MNC to diffusing know- 
how tends to weaken as the UK affiliate fails to develop its own knowledge base and 
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satisfactory financial results. For example, Nissera UK faces limited diffusion of know- 
how as it has incurred huge losses, despite increasing sales, since 1993. 
61.2.2 Organisational Characteristics 
The present study asserts that the nature of the work systems diffused to the UK- 
whether structural, cultural, control-related and technological-has an effect on the 
degree to which these systems are implemented and internalised. To iterate a point made 
in Chapter 2, cultural and control-related systems are taken in this study as largely 
intangible, tacit systems or the software of the production system, whilst the structural 
and technological systems are seen as representing largely tangible, explicit systems or 
the hardware of the production system. The tacit foundations of continuous improvement 
schemes are seen as high in system embeddedness and, hence, are more difficult to 
difftise to the UK setting. In line with this argument, the cases indicate that tacit cultural 
and control-related systems, unlike explicit structural and technological systems, are 
more difficult for the UK workforce to internalise. Under each type of work system, there 
are key issues that influence the internalisation. of Japanese knowledge-driven work 
systems. These are discussed in the following section. 
6.1.2.2.1 Organisational Structure: The Shift to Team Structure 
There has been a shift in the organisational structure of Teniki UK, Nissera UK and 
Rover towards a flatter team structure. This has had an impact on worker response to 
alternative work systems. Although the operators at the two subsidiary firms are cynical 
with regard to the structural transition, those at Nissera UK have shown a more positive 
response to adopting a team-based structure than those at Teniki UK. Similarly, Rover 
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engineers working on the R8/YY project have relatively been successful in facilitating a 
transition to a project-based organisation. 
Given the segregation between management and workers, the shift to a team structure at 
Teniki UK met a challenge. Breaking this relationship in the UK seems to be a challenge 
for the culture and for the individual history of the company. The company faces 
difficulty in instilling high levels of commitment among operators. At Nissera UK, the 
experience of a shift to a team structure in 1997, resulting from efficiency concerns in the 
factory, 107 was better received by the operators at Nissera UK. However, the fluid job 
descriptions at the Japanese parent company are not widely observed in the UK 
subsidiary and, hence, operators perceive team leaders as above the work group rather 
than as members of the team. As lwata (1982: 52, brackets added) notes, "Unlike the 
American-style [or the UK-style] companies where the institutional structure is quite 
logically arranged on the basis of clearly defined individual tasks, work is allocated to 
sections and divisions in Japanese companies". Teniki UK exemplifies the common 
practice for firms to mimic the explicit parts of work systems, such as the structural 
elements, and to fail to recognise the tacit elements, such as team spirit (or the intangible 
aspect of employee involvement where there is a shared notion of creating knowledge 
collectively), that are integral to the operation of the system (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 
1998). As section 6.1.2.2.2 presents, Teniki UK has not been successftil in generating a 
continuous improvement culture. 
107 There was also the build-up of skills imparted by the Japanese expatriates in the early years of the 
company's establishment. 
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At Rover, a team-based approach to solving problems at an engineering level fostered a 
"synergistic atmosphere because it [brought] together a multidisciplinary team focused on 
achieving a common goal within a deadline" (Loo, 1996: 7). 108 From Rover's perspective, 
common goals in completing the project, in addition to learning from the previous 
project, influenced co-operation and knowledge sharing on the R8/YY project. As Mair 
(1 998a: 41 1) argues, prior to the R8/YY project, "in the early years of collaboration for 
the Ballade-based Acclaim and first Rover 200 (1979-1984), no attempt was made to 
learW'. In line with Fletcher's (1999: 150) argument "effective internal communication, 
leadership and employee issues (such as team building and incentivisation) [were] three 
generic aspects of critical importance in the potential success" of the R8/YY project. The 
project-based approach adopted at Rover with the influence of Honda, was seen as 
beneficial in creating a team effort to delivering projects on time. Nevertheless, from 
Honda's perspective, the implementation of such a structure at Rover could not be carried 
out effectively. The functional managers continued to have more control than project 
managers. The top-down and hands-off management limited the degree to which a team 
culture could complement a team structure. This, once again, relates to the difficulty in 
internalising tacit elements, such as team culture, of a distinct institutional setting, that of 
a highly co-ordinated business system. There is a dichotomy between the demands of a 
business system that is strongly embedded in a network of mutual obligations and 
commitment (as in Japan) and those of a business system that discourages co-operation 
and collaboration between business partners, including employers and employees (as in 
the UK). 
'08 This finding is supported by Bertodo's (1989 in Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992) conclusion that power of 
multifunctional teams was recognised, divisions between different functions were reduced and 
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Although all three firms found it difficult to develop and replicate an 'esprit de corps' of 
continuous improvement, 109 seen as essential for operational improvements (Liker et aL, 
1999), Nissera UK and Rover have, in relative terms, been more successful in running 
team-based activities, such as quality circles. ' 10 In addition to the length of time that the 
team structure has been in place, which is associated with the company characteristic of 
company age, Nissera UK employs a more skilled workforce and has long-term financing 
from the parent company. Unlike their counterparts at Teniki UK, Japanese managers at 
Nissera UK have offered hands-on training to older operators and have been heavily 
involved in shop-floor activities. In other words, Japanese expatriates at Nissera UK have 
attempted to carry over the institutional co-operation feature of their business system that 
encourages investment in skill development to the UK system (e. g. Orra, 1997). 'Self- 
quality control' can be observed in practice among some of the older workers who were 
trained by the Japanese. In spite of what may be seen as adversarial industrial relations in 
the area in which Nissera UK is located, the human resource practices of Japanese 
expatriates in the early years of establishment resulted in a sense of shared commitment 
between workers and management. 
6.1.2.2.2 Organisational Culture: Commitment to Quality Improvement Schemes 
In line with suggestions in the literature, pre-existing sets of strategies, structures and 
technologies shape the pattern of change towards the 'Japanese model' (Fligstein, 1990; 
Dedoussis and Littler, 1994). In the case studies, actual activities do not conform to the 
interdepartmental co-operation increased at Rover. 
109 Similarly, Oliver and Wilkinson's (1992) work shows that creation of a community of interest is found 
to be the most difficult to establish in the UK. 
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prescriptions of practices implemented in Japan (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and diffused 
work practices are renegotiated and adapted. The role of actors in shaping systems or 
interpreting alternative work systems is especially visible where there is lack of 
management initiative in emphasising training and in adopting a strong approach to 
discipline. For example, older workers at Teniki UK work according to their own rules 
and enjoy the freedom created by a weak control mechanism in the factory. They 
manipulate scrap rate figures to present management-expected results. "That is the way 
they want them. The Japanese themselves do not reflect their actual scrap rate" (Team 
Coach, 18 January 2000). Similarly, an operator claims that "Quality Assurance is called 
over when there is a supplier-related problem. If there is pressure to get the order out, 
then they will pass the item that I would normally scrap". The role of actors in reblending 
existing work systems and aiming for adaptation can be observed especially in cases 
where the nature and degree of Japanese involvement is indirect and low. 
The experience of developing interdependency, trust and shared knowledge is unique to a 
specific workplace, context and group of people (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et aL, 1998). 
Hence, Teniki UK, Nissera UK and Rover have had difficulty imparting a source 
company's continuous improvement activities (such as discipline in the workplace and 
'5C housekeeping' principles) by securing the commitment of all parties to the process. 
The ability of the team leaders in the two subsidiary finns and project leaders at Rover to 
maintain good communication within and across teams, and to motivate operators and 
engineers to engage in continuous improvement activities, appears to be, at least in part, 
110 The research focus at Rover was on quality circles applied to problem resolution in engineering rather 
than shop floor activities. 
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influenced by institutional variation in worker commitment and flexibility between Japan 
and the UK. Unlike in Japan, a minimum involvement philosophy has been the tradition 
in the UK (Dore, 1973). Continuous improvement schemes are implemented, even 
though they are not fully intemalised, at Nissera UK and Rover, whilst they have failed at 
Teniki UK. In other words, there have been attempts to extract parts of the continuous 
improvement system for transplantation in the UK subsidiary. For example, unlike the 
practice in Japan (e. g. Imai, 1997), the housekeeping programme at Teniki UK was 
launched before the shift to a team structure in 1999. The Japanese belief that "good 
housekeeping should provide an environment conducive to improved work habits, quality 
and care of facilities" (Schonberger, 1982: 67) is not felt by the operators and those 
enforcing the system at Teniki UK. Hence, the diffusion of the original meaning of the 
source company's practices is limited. As was discussed in Section 6.1.1, the low 
manufacturing skills level of the workforce at Teniki UK (due to its location in a centre 
for service rather than manufacturing) has a negative impact on the degree of 
internalisation of Teniki practices. 
At Nissera UK, the implementation of continuous improvement schemes has not yet been 
institutionalised or internalised by operators because of the way local management 
administers Kaizen initiatives. In accordance with Ackroyd et Ws (1988) view, 
initiatives mediated by the orientation of British management are less straightforward in 
their effects. It is questionable to what degree local management has understood the 
importance of tacit elements in QC efforts. The Japanese emphasis on tacit knowledge 
challenges the diffusibility of work systems from the Japanese business system to that of 
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the UK (see the discussion on micro-level embeddedness in Chapter 3). The UK affiliate 
firms seem to have a limited ability to generate the "organisational cultures, involving 
high levels of worker commitment and flexibility" (Warner, 1994: 5 10) that underlie the 
technical and structural elements of continuous improvement schemes as a result of 
conflicting organisational legacies, as between Japan and the UK. Along Taylorist lines, 
there is rather a standardisation and simplification of jobs so that workers can be easily 
substituted in the UK. This points to the significance of the historical context in one's 
investigation of the diffusion process. 
In the initial years of the Rover-Honda collaboration, learning seemed to be more of a 
'fait accompli' at Rover. The company dealt with results rather than processes that led to 
results (Cooper and Law, 1995). The underlying philosophies were learnt as more 
projects of a collaborative nature were carried out over time. The continuous 
improvement schemes were fully implemented but only partly internalised by Rover 
engineers. Regular visits to Honda, the establishment of a liaison office in 1985 and joint 
engineering team meetings with Honda engineers facilitated the internalisation process. 
Personal relations and the accompanying trust embedded in social networks (discussed 
more fully in Section 6.1.2.4) were an important means by which Rover acquired and 
shared tacit knowledge. Company visits and 'boundary-spanning' individuals encouraged 
socialisation whereby tacit knowledge could be acquired through experience (Tushman 
and Scanlan, 1981; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). However, although ideas that were 
4promoted' by 'boundary-spanning' individuals gave access to know-how about 
alternative practices, such involvement in social networking ran the risk of reinforcing 
263 
supplier image of best practice (c. f. Robertson et aL, 1996). One also needs to be aware 
of the implications of the representational roles of such individuals for the internal 
communication link. According to Tushman and Scanlan (1981: 301), "they may not 
serve as an information linking mechanism for areas within the organisation7. 
Emphasis on Training 
Field studies show that training has a major role to play in the intemalisation of work 
systems at UK adopter firms. The absence of direct Japanese involvement in the training 
of the workforce and limited financial and human resources, limit the internalisation of 
Japanese practices at Teniki UK. As George and Levie (19 84) argue, limited emphasis on 
training and waning interest in the QCs for not delivering the expected quick savings are 
frequently cited as reasons for the failure of QCs in the UK. Whereas at Nissera UK, 
hands-on training of operators by the Japanese in the initial years of the company's 
establishment taught them the skills of 'an apprentice' working with his or her 'master' 
and learning a 'craft', "not through language but through observation, imitation and 
practice" (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 63). Such an emphasis on training promotes 
knowledge diffusion (Tsang, 1999), and is highly influential in the internalisation of work 
systems at Nissera UK. It can also be argued that this emphasis provides a forum for 
socialisation, which in combination with an emphasis on training, has a positive effect on 
the internalisation of work systems. However, bearing in mind the definition of the 
intemalisation of work systems given in Chapter 2, it is predominantly the process of 
'leaming by doing', or action and practice, that helps employees understand basic 
continuous improvement techniques and philosophies (e. g. Nonaka et aL, 2001). For 
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example, at Teniki UK, 
You have not been able to deliver the Kaizen and other activities because 
you have not done the fundamental training. Also the factory people 
around here-this is a farmland around here, so demographically it is not 
an engineering magnet. So we got people that have not worked in an 
automotive factory with all the pressures, all the technology and 
requirements of a Japanese company. Therefore, we need to bring the core 
competencies up to a level and the only way to do that is to train and 
educate. (British Operations Manager, 18 January 2000) 
Although, at Nissera UK, Japanese management's training role has reduced over the 
years, the skills level of the company's workforce (which is relatively higher than that at 
Teniki UK) and the location of the company in a centre for manufacturing on a greenfield 
site contribute to a higher degree of implementation and intemalisation of continuous 
improvement schemes than that at Teniki UK. 
At Rover, habitual routines and pre-existing organisational setting were redesigned to 
integrate Honda practices, which were embedded in a particular web of pre-existing 
social relationships, through company visits, cross-functional teamwork and the 
interaction of boundary-spanning individuals. Some of the integration mechanisms 
involved staff dedicated with liaison roles to the development of the collaboration and 
joint meetings that allowed for co-ordination through lateral communication and 
negotiation rather than hierarchy. Furthermore, inter-personal, inter-firm networks were 
used, along with communication and joint decision-making mechanisms, for co- 
ordination and integration (Grandori and Soda, 1995). 
265 
Nevertheless, the interpretation and use of Honda practices required open-mindedness 
and understanding. It was difficult to break "method[s that were] embedded in individual 
expression" (Manufacturing Integration Manager, 25 August 1999). Doing so 
necessitated heavy involvement in training. There was a high level of training in quality 
skills and the car development system at Rover. "' Direct involvement with the Japanese 
and emphasis on training by local management were two means of avoiding 'watering 
down or dilution' of Honda practices. 
The emphasis on training is related to the local institutional factor of location site and the 
company characteristic of size. As Liker et aL (1999: 24) argue, "greenfield sites afford 
the best chances for successful transfer of a whole set of home-country attributes" and 
brownfield sites pose problems due to the pre-existing routines. As the widespread 
concern to orchestrate worker co-operation at Teniki UK has met resistance, Japanese 
expatriates feel that the transition in organisational structure would have been easier if the 
company was set up from scratch. 
As regards the company size, "large firms and plants are likely to provide higher wages, 
better benefits and services, more training and promotion opportunities, and other 
inducements which small organisations lack the resources to supply" (Lincoln and 
Kalleberg, 1990: 220-221). For example, Nissera UK is financially more stable than 
Teniki UK (even though both companies are medium-sized), hence it can more easily 
111 There was a lack of formal training in familiarising employees with cultural differences between Japan 
and the UK before the early 1990s. Rover expatriates were dispatched to Japan with no or limited training, 
at best "with the assumption that knowledge of the business should compensate for the lack of cultural 
understanding" (Pucik, 1996: 158). 
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allocate resources to training. It should also be noted that the method of executing (not 
only the amount of resources allocated to) training needs to be taken into account in the 
internalisation of alternative work systems. 
6.1.2.2.3 Control Mechanism: Degree of Involvement by the Japanese 
The internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems is also influenced by the 
control mechanism that complements the diffusion of structural and cultural practices. 
The degree of involvement of Japanese expatriate management in strategic and 
operational decisions (including supervision on the shop floor) influences the adopter 
firms' perception of a power exercise by the source company. The cases in question 
demonstrate that the nature of management intervention in the implementation of 
Japanese work systems is crucial in shaping the internalisation process. Such intervention 
points to the active process of internalisation involving actors' decisions to accept new 
ideas. Management's hands-on, direct versus hands-off, indirect means of meeting 
strategic and operational aims influences the degree of internalisation of work systems. 
Although the extent to which Japanese expatriates are involved in the day-to-day running 
of the business and manpower planning differs across the three cases, the pressure 
exerted on the technical and strategic side of affairs is considerable in the two subsidiary 
firrns. In the case of Teniki UK, there is high, indirect involvement 112 by Japanese 
management in the activities of the affiliate firm. There is also financial pressure in terms 
of Teniki demands for rapid profitability, despite the interest on the latter's part in 
developing skills at the UK operation. This arises from Teniki's lack of flexibility in 
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financial control over the UK division's activities due to the role of a major Japanese car 
manufacturer in Teniki's operations: 
Teniki have pressure on them to put pressure on ourselves to make the 
returns faster than normal. In that case, we have had to have very stringent 
sort of budgetary control and cutting of budgets which would affect the 
long-term, that is the training budgets are not as good as they should be in 
my belief. (British Operations Manager at Teniki UK, 18 January 2000) 
By the same token, the parent company of Nissera UK is also heavily involved in its 
subsidiary's decisions with regard to the provision of technology and finances for 
investment. Nissera has not exerted stringent budgetary control over the UK division (at 
least not for its first three years of operation) but, in general, there has been high and 
direct 113 levels of control on the subsidiary since its establishment. Nissera has exercised 
(personal/cultural' control through direct supervision and expatriate control (Harzing, 
2000). According to Harzing, 'personal/cultural' control can be exercised (i) directly or 
explicitly through centralisation, direct supervision and expatriate control, or (ii) 
indirectly or implicitly through socialisation, informal communication and management 
training. For example, Edstr8rn and Lorange (1984) illustrate that the two of the four 
MNCs that followed a global strategy in their comparison had a higher level of 
expatriates in their subsidiaries than the two companies that followed a multidomestic 
strategy. They indicate that having local managers in global companies might lead to sub- 
optimal decisions. As the responsibility for design rests with the parent companies, the 
:2 Japanese expatriates are not involved in shop-floor activities. 
3 This excludes the period after 1997 where there was less involvement in shop-floor activities by 
Japanese expatriates. 
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two subsidiary firms operate more as assembly operations, dependent on imports of 
manufactured inputs from Japan (Elger and Smith, 1994). The heavy use of expatriates at 
Nissera UK serves as one of the ways to bring the firm 'into the fold', that is to establish 
an organisational culture that aligns with the parent company's values (Jaeger, 1983). 
Corporate acculturation in this sense is based on developing informal networks of 
communication (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989) whereby international ethos and practices of 
the parent firm can be observed (Femer et aL, 1995). 
In the case of Rover, local management's pressure to follow the 'Honda' way in design 
and development became apparent during the R8/YY project. Nevertheless, as Rover was 
not 100 per cent owned by Honda, Honda's exercise of control was not of the same 
nature (i. e. in the form of direct supervision) as that of the Japanese parent companies on 
the Teniki UK and Nissera UK. 'Personal/cultural' control was exercised more through 
socialised, informal communication and management training at Rover (Harzing, 2000). 
Although there had been high, direct involvement of Honda in joint development 
practices, the method of diffusing know-how from Honda to Rover had not been as 
smooth as that to Honda's subsidiary in the US. For instance, Rover engineers could be 
shown the assembly line or order of tasks for a given process, but they could not receive 
any information on measurements or dimensions. 114 
Approach to Discipline 
The source firm's approach to discipline is found to affect employee perception of the 
114 Honda felt that such information was too confidential to be disclosed to technical collaborators as it was 
developed over a period of 10 years, with reference to cases of failure and success. 
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control exercised by the source company. It is linked to the exercise of personal/cultural 
control, founded on social interaction (Harzing, 2000). 
The approach to discipline displayed by the local and Japanese management on the shop 
floor of Teniki UK is weak. In comparison, the control mechanism on the shop floor of 
Nissera UK is strong. This was especially the case under the administration of the 
previous MD till 1997. As part of its Kaizen philosophy, Nissera UK's approach to 
discipline remains more forceful than that at Teniki UK. This is applicable in particular to 
housekeeping principles. 
As for Rover, the approach to discipline has not been as overt as that at Nissera UK due 
mainly to the nature of the relationship (a collaboration rather than a subsidiary). A 
covert form of power exercise was observable within Honda assuming the upper hand in 
design responsibility over the course of the collaboration. Side-by-side work also served 
as an implicit means of control in ensuring Rover engineers' commitment to work and the 
attention to detail. The support of local management and the direct involvement of Honda 
engineers over the course of the R8/YY project were strong till the launch of the model in 
1989. The basic underlying principle of discipline was not upheld at Rover. As Ho 
(1993: 83) contends, "it appears that the main difficulty is the lack of willingness to stick 
to rules" in the adoption of continuous improvement schemes. High levels of 
commitment at Rover were observed only where engineers worked in a context of direct 
influence of habitual or tacit elements, such as in joint engineering teams. Consequently, 
learning at Honda rested more on the tools that could be easily diffused than on 
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philosophies, such as attention to detail and discipline, behind those tools. It was 
perceived as important to adopt a proximal rather than distal mode of thinking. Proximal 
thinking privileges continuity, forever approached, processural nature of diffused 
practices rather than "results and outcomes, the finished things or objects of thought of 
action" (Cooper and Law, 1995: 239). Effective communication was important in 
integrating the thinking, methods and tools of quality movement into everyday work (e. g. 
Fletcher, 1999). 
In sum, a low level of internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems is 
observed where there is a weak approach to discipline, as is seen in the subsidiary firms 
in this study. In the case of Rover, Honda techniques were carried out in line with the 
Japanese expectation of attentiveness to detail as long as there was a side-by-side work. 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, work discipline constitutes another tacit underlying 
philosophy of continuous improvement schemes. The focus on explicit knowledge and 
the limited interaction through actions of individuals to synthesise knowledge in the UK 
business system (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993) is seen as inhibiting the extent to which the 
tacit elements of continuous improvement can be intemalised in the given cases. 
Level of Trust and Communication between the Japanese and UK Staff 
The level of communication and trust between the source and adopter firm is also found 
to influence employee perception of the control exercised by the source company. It is 
defined here as the common belief among the members of the adopter firm that the 
source company: 
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(1) makes good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any 
commitments, both explicit and implicit (2) is honest [and open] in 
whatever discussions precede such commitments, and (3) does not take 
excessive advantage of the recipient unit, even when the opportunity is 
available. (Kostova, 1999: 318, brackets added) 
A higher level of trust on the part of employees towards management with regard to the 
introduction of 'new' work systems was found to be conducive to the internalisation of 
these systems. The case studies indicate that perceived high level of trust between the 
Japanese and UK staff, as that found at Nissera UK and among the Rover liaison 
engineers, facilitates the internalisation of work systems at the adopter firms. This is most 
likely due to the reduction in uncertainty over the motives behind the implementation of 
the practice (Szulanski, 1996). 
In the case of Rover, lack of trust and communication were alleviated by means of 
forging social relations over the course of the R8/YY project. 'People transfer' through 
company visits served as a medium for trust building and learning (e. g. Pucik, 1996). As 
Sullivan el aL (1981: 805) argue, Japanese "do not commonly use formal detailed 
contracts stressing strict performance and enforcement in their domestic business 
relations". Rather, responding to unfolding probes in a spirit of honesty and trust is seen 
as crucial among the Japanese. Goodwill and competence trust (Sako, 1992) were 
established through an informal atmosphere or a non-contractual arrangement, where 
engineers could share tacit knowledge (Senker, 1995a). Furthennore, electronic white 
boards and pictorial representations were used to explicate what was difficult to verbalise 
(Zuboff, 1996: 198). 
272 
Teniki UK and Nissera UK demonstrate that employment in the UK, unlike that in Japan, 
is not a "kinship rite inducting a new member into the enterprise family to share in the 
work to be done" (Gregory, 1982: 38). It is, rather, a contractual affair involving the 
performance of a particular work or service. Trust-building and openness in 
communication that are built within a paternalistic social mechanism that fosters long- 
term employment relationships; HRM practices, such as emphasis on job rotation, 
standardised in-house training, internal promotion and fluid job description; and strong 
social networking (Kubo et aL, 2001), are not in practice in the given subsidiary firms. 
This supports Whitley's (1999b) argument that authority relations among firms operating 
in compartmentalised business systems are more contractual than paternalistic. 
Poor communication at Teniki UK creates the perception that the Japanese have nothing 
to learn from their subsidiary when, in fact, there is a high willingness on the part of the 
Japanese parent company to learn the European market preferences and developments. 
Similarly, Nissera, members import European designs to reduce the cost of manufacturing 
electronic components through their UK operation. There is also a high willingness to 
learn European supplier relations and British styling at Honda. However, willingness to 
learn by the Japanese is not applicable to general development in production in all of the 
three companies. 
The degree to which Japanese management is involved in the activities of adopter firms 
relates to the company characteristic of the number of Japanese expatriates and their roles 
in the UK adopter firms. For example, Teniki UK has the least number of Japanese 
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expatriates (four advisors) available for training and strategic and technical decision- 
making. These advisors are preoccupied with start-up projects. Although they are seen as 
advisors, they occupy powerful positions within the informal organisation. In contrast, 
Nissera has reduced its Japanese management composition over the course of its 
subsidiary's development. This reduction has meant delegation of responsibility and 
autonomy to local management with deterioration in the level of commitment on the shop 
floor. 
6.1.2.2.4 Technology Diffusion 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and Rover, in comparison to their parent/partner companies, are 
not profound examples of advanced technology. While George and Levie (1984: 26) 
argue that "the Japanese industry is not leagues 'ahead' of us in terms of use of robots 
and automated equipment", there is evidence from the cases to suggest that the Japanese 
parent/partner companies are more technologically advanced than their UK affiliate 
firms, at least in the automotive manufacture industry. In spite of the low diffusion of 
technology to the adopter firms, such as to Nissera UK, the degree of internalisation of 
work systems is relatively high due to an emphasis on structural and cultural shifts. This 
suggests that technology is secondary to the people problems of implementing Japanese 
work systems. It is also reflective of the Japanese emphasis on the 'soft' dimension of 
management (Pascale and Athos, 1996). In line with the user-oriented perspective in the 
innovation processes literature (discussed in Chapter 2), culture, commitment, 
motivation, involvement and trust emerge as more important than technology in the 
internalisation of continuous improvement schemes. 
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Teniki and Nissera's willingness to diffuse technology and know-how to their UK 
subsidiary firms is greater where there is perceived high level of competence, an ability 
to develop one's knowledge basells, and successful performance in terms*of strong 
financial status on the part of the subsidiary firm. At Rover, this willingness is more 
evident where there is perceived learning from past mistakes, similarity in goals, 
formalisation of processes and the associated discipline in execution, and clear objectives 
and division of responsibility. 
The Rover case clearly indicates that investment in IT could not act as a surrogate for 
people transfer, for Honda strongly emphasised teamwork, personal relations and trust. 
According to Dore (1997: 25), "economic transactions in Japan are much more commonly 
embedded in face-to-face social relations". Interactions are embedded in associative 
cultures, where people tend to utilise associations among events that may not have much 
of a 'logical' basis. Communication is characterised by face-to-face contact, which takes 
place among individuals who share a large body of information based on both historical 
and contextual modes (Hall, 1976 in Kedia and Bhagat, 1988). Taggart (1998: 59) argues 
that where knowledge is tacit and difficult to codify, making it difficult to organise and 
transfer to dispersed contexts, "person-to-person communication is extremely important". 
Using Sivula et Ws (1997) model of knowledge management in alliances, one can 
summarise the successful outcome of the R8/YY project in terms of the Japanese 
partner's willingness to share its knowledge and Rover's willingness and capacity to 
"' There is knowledge asymmetry between the Japanese parent and the UK subsidiary firms. (This 
asymmetry is greater in the case of Teniki UK, as the skills level of its workforce is low rather than 
medium). It is suggested that "if partners, engaged in knowledge sharing, differ too much in the maturity 
level of their knowledge [or knowledge symmetry], communication problems might arise, preventing them 
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absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
61.2.3 Group Characteristic: Attitude of Teams towards Continuous Improvement 
Schemes 
The case study findings show that 'paternalist' group norms of firms embedded in highly 
co-ordinated business systems are not highly compatible with 'Taylorist' group norms of 
firms embedded in compartmentalised systems. There is variation in the institutional 
setting of the source and adopter firms. For example, the UK adopter firms in this study 
do not seem to have a cultural orientation towards learning, innovation and change. The 
distinctive patterns of work system characteristics of task control, workplace relations 
and employment practices and the level of commitment that these characteristics support 
differ between Japan and the UK. The nationally distinct characteristics of social 
institutions in the two countries challenge the diffusion of work systems (see discussion 
on macro-level embeddedness in Chapter 3). From the three companies investigated, 
Teniki UK displays the lowest level of commitment to alternative work systems. Its 
group norms reflect a British tendency to question authority, in contrast with the Japanese 
subtle hierarchy of 'harmony and family unity' (e. g. Lincoln, 1990). There is resistance, 
especially among older Teniki UK operators, because of their preference for traditional 
British manufacturing system. There is also variation in worker responses based. on each 
team leader's style in executing his or her responsibilities. 
At Nissera UK, the level of commitment to continuous improvement schemes is higher 
than that at Teniki UK. This is due especially to the stronger attention paid to the 
to achieve productive collaboration7 (Aken and Weggernan, 2000: 145, brackets added). 
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implementation of such principles being stronger and greater availability of financial and 
human resources. Although company age also contributes to the higher level of 
commitment at Nissera UK, it is not the sole determinant. As the period from 1997 
onwards shows, its local management has not been very successful in sustaining high 
levels of commitment. For one thing, local management could not sustain the training 
system of the Japanese expatriates. There is variation in worker responses across 
departments and cells within the assembly area. For example, a low target cell with long 
working relations and integrated on-the-job training by the Japanese displays a stronger 
sense of commitment to continuous improvement schemes than high target cells with 
short-term outlook on training. 
Rover employees' response to continuous improvement schemes differed between 
factory workers and liaison engineers. This was not only related to the difference in the 
nature of the work carried out, for there was a higher level of commitment among the 
engineers who were based in Japan for six-12 months and were members of joint 
engineering teams in the UK and Japan. The level of commitment was higher during the 
R8/YY project than in the period prior to 19851 16 when the relationship between the two 
companies was defined more as 'arm's length' than 'side-by-side'. 
116 The level of commitment was further enhanced with the projects that followed the R8/YY due to the 
positive influence of the passage of time, familiarity with Honda's practices and expectation, and the 
greater involvement of Honda in design work. "The projects that followed (1989 Rover 200/400/Honda 
Concerto, 1992 Rover 600/Honda Accord (European version), 1995 Rover 400/Honda Civic (European 
version) were led by Honda" (Mair, 1998a: 41 1). 
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61.2.4 The Extent ofSocial Networking 
The focus in the existing literature on 'Japanisation' tends to be on the power and control 
exercised by the Japanese in the diffusion of work systems to overseas operations (e. g. 
Dickens and Savage, 1988; Danford, 1998). However, this study emphasises the 
importance of social networks and relations in the cross-national diffusion of knowledge- 
driven work systems. The emphasis is on members' active involvement in social 
networking rather than their perceptions of the importance of the role of social networks 
in the diffusion of work systems. For example, joint work at the Rover-Honda 
collaboration was about sharing understandings through the synthesis and interaction of 
team members rather than "about moving knowledge around from person to person so 
that each expands their range of knowledge" (Swan, 1999: 10). The internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems is possible where there is investment in relationships, 
shared understandings and attitudes to diffusion of Japanese work systems within the UK 
adopter firms. The low emphasis on training, as that at Teniki UK, does not create the 
enviromnent necessary for the diffusion of a shared understanding. Moreover, pre- 
existing organisational structure, norms and cultural values at Teniki UK create 
heterogeneity in the group that is to adopt alternative work systems. This, in turn, creates 
divergent interpretations of what needs to be done and how best to do it. There is a low 
extent of social networking due predominantly to limited financial and human resources, 
limited involvement of the Japanese in shop floor activities and the emphasis by local 
management on diffusing the tangible systems in continuous improvement schemes. 
Fundamentally, the different values of the Japanese source firm and the UK adopter firm 
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in each case expose differences between individuals. According to Blackler (1995) and 
Swan (1999), such an exposition may lead to conflict, and the creation of new 
knowledge. The negotiation of work systems in this context occurs through interactive 
social networking rather than linear flow of information. The role of actors in facilitating 
the diffusion of knowledge also needs to be considered. In the cases concerned, Japanese 
expatriates serve as influential actors in the diffusion of the parent/partner companies' 
work systems to the UK affiliate firms. They serve to promote particular kinds of 
practices among members of the social system (Swan et aL, 1999). They act as a link to 
the source of information at the Japanese parent/partner firms, and are an effective 
medium for "acquiring and encoding timely, current, and soft information" (Tushman 
and Scanlan, 1981: 290). For example, the direct involvement of the Japanese expatriate 
management in the shop floor activities of the greenfield site has had a positive impact on 
the internalisation of alternative work systems. At Nissera UK, there is higher level of 
involvement in social networking than at Teniki UK. The role of intermediaries or liaison 
officers is especially noticeable in the Rover-Honda collaboration. Rover liaison 
engineers helped to locate expertise at Honda, and forge good working relations with the 
Japanese. The high level of involvement in social networking helped minimise 
communication problems. 
The degree of internalisation of Japanese work systems at the UK adopter firms depends 
on the type of activities or the nature of diffused practices, availability of physical, 
financial and human resources, and the level of interaction between the individuals 
involved, that is the role of the boundary-spanning individuals (see Figure 6.1). Actors, 
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resources and activities in this figure are linked by social networks that have an important 
role in the intemalisation of practices (Newell and Clark, 1990). 
Figure 6.1 Network Framework Conducive to High Internalisation of Work 
Systems 
ACTORS: Boundary-spanning 
individuals (Japanese expatriates 
and UK liaison officers) 
-at different levels 
-aim to diffuse work systems 
Actors control resources. 
I 
RESOURCES: 
-physical, financial and 
human 
*sufficient number of 
boundary spanning 
individuals) 
*financial stability 
*stability in employee 
base 
-dependent on each other 
NETWORK 
Activities link resources to each other. 
Actors perform activities. 
I 
ACTIVITIES: Tacit 
and explicit practices in 
continuous 
improvement schemes 
-structural 
-cultural 
-control-related 
-technological 
Source: See text; figure structure adapted from HAkansson (1986) 
Figure 6.1 shows the interplay of actors, resources and activities within a network that is 
necessary to sustain the internalisation of Japanese work systems in the given cases. 
There is a greater likelihood of Japanese work systems to be internalised by the UK 
adopter firms where actors*at different levels interact intensely to diffuse work systems, 
and heterogeneous-physical, financial and huinan-resources are available to support 
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structural, cultural, control-related and technological components of continuous 
improvement schemes. The network framework in this figure gives one the context in 
which to understand the decisions that managers have to take and the adopters' response 
to those decisions. It should be noted that, the focus here is more on networking relations 
and less on network structures that HAkansson (1986) highlights in his work. The findings 
in this study emphasise structure (i. e. the institutional context) as well as agency. 
In conclusion, the three case companies exemplify the way work systems that are 
strongly institutionalised in character and acquired through engagement in specific action 
contexts can be 'sticky' (Szulanski, 1996) to diffuse to firms located in settings of weaker 
institutionalisation. There are selective attempts to draw upon practices identified with 
the 'Japanese model' (Taylor et aL, 1994). 'Compromise solutions' (Sharpe, 1997) seem 
to be common where only explicit structural and technical aspects of the 'Japanese 
model' are adopted (e. g. Delbridge, 1998). The tacit elements of continuous improvement 
schemes are difficult to internalise in the absence of a given set of local institutional, 
organisational, and group characteristics, as well as social networks that link resources, 
actors and activities together for the diffusion of knowledge. The different degrees to 
which Japanese work systems are internalised by the UK adopter firms tend to reflect the 
institutional variation between Japan and the UK (c. f. Whitley, 1999b). Teniki UK has 
relatively low degree of implementation and low level of internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems. By contrast, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda 
collaboration display high degree of implementation and medium level of internalisation 
(see Figure 6.2 for a pictorial representation). The outcomes observed are due to the 
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availability of greater financial and human resources; direct and high involvement by 
Japanese management, encompassing direct approach to discipline and training; longer 
duration in operation; and higher skills levels or symmetry in expertise at Nissera UK and 
Rover. 
Figure 6.2 The Degree of Implementation and Internalisation of Japanese Work 
Systems at Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda 
Collaboration 
Teniki UK Nissera UK 
Rover 
Degree of implementation A, AA 
Low Medium High 
Teniki UK Nissera UK 
Rover 
Degree of intemalisation AA 
Low Medium High 
Source: See text 
6.2 The Institutional Limits to Diffusion of Work Systems 
The process of work systems diffusion, as suggested by the literature (e. g. Morgan et aL, 
2000a), does not only differ across countries. As the field studies show, substantial 
differences have surfaced in the comparison of the internalisation of Japanese work 
systems across the brownfield, greenfield and technical collaboration sites within the 
same sector. The internalisation of a continuous improvement culture and the 
complementary structural, control-related and technological practices appears stronger at 
Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration than at Teniki UK. For example, 
282 
knowledge diffusion methods, classified into three broad forms by Buckley and Carter 
(1999: 90)---ý'personal communication (talking, meeting, e-mail etc. ), codified 
communication (reports, drawings etc. ) and embodied transfer (e. g. as product or 
equipment)'ý-had a major role to play in the intemalisation of work systems at Rover. In 
addition, diffusion was embodied in practice whereby a new system was learnt-by-doing 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). This was a means of diffusing the original meaning of the 
source companyls practices. 
The cross-site differences in the degree to which Japanese knowledge-driven work 
systems are implemented and internalised can be explained by two levels of 
embeddedness discussed in Chapter 3. 
6. ZI Embeddedness at the National Level 
At first glance, there is a shift towards a team structure in all the three sites. Nevertheless, 
some remarkable differences exist in the translation of these structures in the UK context. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the national business system differs significantly between 
Japan and the UK. ' 17 The operational autonomy provided to individuals in small-group 
activities strengthened by a sense of groupisin in large firms in the Japanese automotive 
industry is incompatible with the low worker discretion and a sense of individualism that 
has traditionally strengthened the management hierarchy in the UK automotive 
industry. 118 The different set of cultures in Japan and the UK is seen as influencing a 
117 For a more thorough understanding of the differences, please refer to the discussion on the structural and 
cultural legacies of organisations in the UK and Japan in Chapter 3. 
118 It is acknowledged here that the UK automotive sector is undergoing transition mainly triggered by 
"continuing developments in the search for higher quality, a wider view of cost savings and new materials 
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particular degree of internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems at the 
brownfield, greenfield and technical collaboration sites in the UK. High levels of 
commitment to continuous improvement schemes are claimed to prevail in Japan, whilst 
such a commitment is found to be limited in the UK firms. This is exemplified by the 
brownfield site in this study. "In Japan, employees are grateful for being given a project 
to do. However, in the UK, there is demarcation, unionisation. Employees will ask 'why 
ask me to do the project? "' (Personnel and Training Manager at Teniki UK, 15 February 
1999). Overall, there is limited commitment to continuous improvement schemes in the 
given cases characterised by an enhanced management hierarchy and hands-off 
management. The differences in the particular set of structural and cultural legacies of 
Japan and the UK are seen as hindering the internalisation of Japanese work systems in 
the given UK adopter firms. 
6. Z2 Embeddedness at the Firm Level 
As was highlighted in Section 3.1.3 in Chapter 3, the emphasis placed on explicit and 
tacit knowledge varies between Japan and the UK. This variation tends to limit the 
diffusibility of work systems from Japan to the UK. The findings relating to Teniki UK, 
Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda R8/YY project highlight the cultural and structural 
barriers to the diffusion of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. Finns face a 
second-level barrier in the diffusion of work systems, in the form of tacit work systems 
embeddedness at the organisational level. In line with Liker el al. 's (1999: 23) argument, 
and technologies" (GEAC, 1999). As the costs of managing the supply base become familiar to automotive 
manufacturers, quality systems become more harmonised. However, this does not mean a convergence in 
the means by which these systems are implemented. 
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"the tacitness of much of the knowledge that underpins the production system imparts a 
marked path-dependent and firm specific quality to the development of these -systems". 
For instance, the findings at Nissera UK point to the need to diffuse explicit knowledge, 
such as QC techniques, in conjunction with tacit knowledge, such as QC philosophies of 
team spirit and discipline. In the case of tacit knowledge, or philosophies underlying 
explicit knowledge, that cannot easily be articulated, such as one's approach to discipline 
(as demonstrated by the Japanese partner in the technical collaboration site) and one's 
method of training operators in the factory (at the two subsidiary firms), it is more 
difficult to implement and intemalise knowledge in the manner in which it is put to use at 
the source company. For example, Honda's engineering philosophy was more difficult to 
implement at Rover in the manner in which it was put to use at Honda. Honda was not 
secretive over its process-related information "because we [Rover members] had to 
understand the process in order to operate" (Electrical Team Leader D, 21 May 1999). 
Some of the engineers at Rover perceived the idiosyncratic-knowledge base (Grant, 
1996) at Honda as the sense of discipline required to carry out continuous improvement 
schemes. To iterate a point made earlier, learning at Rover rested more on the tools that 
could easily be diffused from Honda than on the philosophies, such as attention to detail 
and discipline, behind those tools. By the same token, practices that could easily be 
codified or structured into a set of identifiable rules and procedures, such as the Gebba- 
Kai problem solving technique or Honda's technology and engineering specifications, 
could be diffused relatively with ease to a different cultural setting. 
There are opportunities for people to be involved in quality assessment and problem 
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solving, especially at the greenfield and technical collaboration sites. However, the 
brownfield site is yet to cascade Kaizen-related training to the shop-floor level. Although 
the explicit elements of the Japanese system 119 were implemented at Nissera UK and the 
Rover-Honda collaboration during the R8/YY project, the initiative and co-operation of 
the individual employee to maintain and improve day-to-day operations and to achieve 
continuous improvement in quality and efficiency could not be sustained in the absence 
of the Japanese. In all three cases, an introduction of a team-based structure did not fully 
elicit the tacit continuous improvement philosophy of team culture, which appears to be 
at least in part due to the variation in the degree to which tacit knowledge was shared 
with UK employees across the cases. 
6.3 Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda Collaboration Sites in 
their Institutional Contexts 
In Section 2.3 in Chapter 2, an analytic framework had been constructed about the impact 
of key institutional, organisational and group characteristics on the degree of 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. Figure 
6.3 summarises the results of the match between the analytic framework and the 
empirical findings. 
119 The explicit elements in the processes observed at Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda 
collaboration include team-based organisational. structure, JIT delivery, the quality circle and the associated 
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Figure 6.3 The Impact of Macro- and Micro-level Influences on Work Systems 
Diffusion 
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tools, such as SPC, 5C housekeeping system and the maintenance of tracking charts. 
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Figure 6.3 shows that at the national level, structural and cultural legacies of Japan and 
the UK can influence the degree to which Japanese knowledge-driven work systems are 
implemented and, utimately, internalised by UK adopter firms. At the local institutional 
level, location site and area, inward investment and skills base of labour have an impact 
on the implementation and internalisation of work systems. The level of industrial dispute 
is not found to have a significant influence on the implementation and internalisation of 
work systems, hence is excluded from Figure 6.3. At the level of the firm, company 
characteristics, the nature of diffused work systems and the emphasis placed on explicit 
and tacit components of these systems influence the implementation and internalisation 
of work systems. At the group level, commitment displayed by teams towards the 
organisational practices of the source firm can hinder or facilitate the implementation and 
internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems. 
The findings suggest that the interaction between the local institutional, organisational 
and group levels is a two-way process. There is a reciprocal interdependence rather than a 
one-way determinism. The solid arrows in between the four levels in Figure 6.3 point to 
the influence of each level on the one below it. For example, Rosenzweig and Nohria 
(1994: 234) see "the extent to which [the company] is subject to pressure from local 
institutions such as unions and governmental bodies" as having an impact on human 
resource practices. This points to the impact of the local institutional level on the firm 
level. The broken arrows in the figure represent 'trickling-up' impact 120 of the local 
practices on higher levels such as the industrial relations system, the system of training 
120 The term 'trickling-up' is used to denote the assertion that the impact may not be observed immediately 
in the short run. 
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workers and managers, internal structure of corporate firms, structured relationships 
among firms in the same industry as well as their suppliers and customers, and 
idiosyncratic customs and traditions (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). The local 
institutional level has an impact on the actions of the local actors through a set of 
institutional rules, and is, in turn, influenced by incremental changes in the rule systems 
of a subset of local actors. For instance, Teniki UK's efforts to raise the NVQ level of its 
workforce contribute to the enhancement of the skills base in the given regional area. 
Similarly, the intemalisation of work systems can have an impact on the subsequent 
implementation of alternative work systems. "The users make significant and extensive 
contributions to the eventual shape and uses of an innovation" (Clark, 1987: 169). The 
routinisation of knowledge-driven work systems can create a path-dependency that has an 
effect on the subsequent introduction of alternative work systems. This research focuses 
on single flows of influence from higher levels of analysis to lower levels. The reverse 
flows are not investigated. Future research is needed to investigate the impact of local 
practices on the local institutional and national levels, as well as the impact of 
intemalised work systems on the implementation process (see Chapter 7). 
The following discussion provides a summary of the discussion on the nature of the local 
institutional, organisational. and group contexts and their influence on the degree of 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-drivcn work systems at Teniki 
UK, Nissera. UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration in the automotive manufacture 
industry (see Figures 6.4,6.5 and 6.6). These figures constitute an application of the 
analytic framework to each of the three cases. They present variations in local 
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institutional, organisational and group contexts across the three sites. 
The impact of the variation in the national institutional context between Japan and the 
UK (as discussed in Chapter 3) with regard to the internalisation of Japanese knowledge- 
driven work systems at the three sites is assumed to be the same, as all the three cases are 
located in the UK and are involved in a particular form of ownership with a Japanese 
MNC. The difference in the outcome across the three cases is, rather, determined by the 
variation in local institutional, organisational (including company) and group 
characteristics. 
The nature of the implementation and intemalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work 
systems at Teniki UK (see Figure 6.4) is one of low implementation and low 
intemalisation. Some of the characteristics that influence this development include the 
location of the company in a centre for tourism on a brownfield site, low skills base in 
manufacturing, weak discipline, low training, indirect involvement of Japanese 
management, low level of commitment among workers to continuous improvement 
initiatives, low technology diffusion and low extent of social networking. A low level of 
industrial dispute in the area appears not to influence the implementation and 
internalisation of work systems and, hence, is not included in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 The Implementation and Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at 
Teniki UK 
Local Institutional Context 
-Location site and area: 
Brownfield, Centre for 
tourism 
-Skills base: Low in 
manufacturing 
-Inward investment: Low 
Organisational Context 
Company characteristics: Please refer 
to Table 6.2 
-Structural: Shift to teams in 1999 
-Cultural: Low training 
-Control mechanism: High, indirect 
involvement by Japanese 
Weak discipline 
Low trust 
High communication 
barrier 
-Technological: Low technology 
diffusion 
Group Context 
Attitude of teams 
towards continuous 
improvement 
schemes: Low level 
of commitment 
Low extent of social 
networking 
Source: See text 
Low implementation 
Low internalisation of Japanese work 
systems at Teniki UK 
In contrast with the findings at Teniki UK, the degree of implementation at Nissera UK is 
high and that of internalisation is medium (see Figure 6.5). The location of the company 
in a centre for manufacturing and on a greenfield site, high skills base in manufacturing, 
strong approach to discipline, high emphasis on training (at least till 1997) and medium 
level of involvement in social networking and medium commitment on the part of the 
workers at Nissera, UK facilitate the implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems. Favourable key local institutional characteristics are 
more dominant than the unfavourable characteristic of a high level of industrial dispute in 
the area. In contrast to one's expectation, location in a centre for manufacturing and small 
supply of unskilled workers facilitate rather than hinder implementation and 
291 
internalisation of work systems. High labour dispute in the area does not appear to have a 
significant impact on the implementation and internalisation of work systems. There is an 
appropriation or translation (Clark and Newell, 1993), rather than emulation, of Japanese 
work systems where there is lack of high and direct involvement of key actors (i. e. 
Japanese expatriates) in Nissera UK's shop-floor activities. This is particularly noticeable 
in the period after 1997. 
In the case of Nissera UK, the 'trickling-up, impact on the national level can be observed 
in the area of training and education. The forms of training and education shift from a 
rather transmissive, classroom mode of imparting skills to a more participative and 
interactive mode, whereby workforce gains a more integrated understanding of the 
production system. Local practices can initiate attitudinal change in a piecemeal fashion. 
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Figure 6.5 The Implementation and Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at 
Nissera UK 
Local Institutional Context 
-Location site and area: 
Greenfield, Centre for 
manufacturing 
-Skills base: High in 
manufacturing 
-Inward investment: High 
Organisational Context 
Company characteristics: Please refer 
to Table 6.2 
-Structural: Shift to teams in 1997 
-Cultural: High training (till 1997), 
medium thereafter 
-Control mechanism: High, direct 
involvement by Japanese 
Strong discipline (till 
1997) 
L, ow-medium. trust 
High communication 
barrier 
-Technological: Low technology 
diffusion 
Group Context 
Attitude of teams 
towards continuous 
improvement 
schemes: Medium 
level of commitment 
Medium extent of 
social networking 
t 
Source: See text 
High implementation 
Medium internalisation of 
Japanese work systems at Nissera 
UK 
The findings at the Rover-Honda collaboration (R8/YY project) (see Figure 6.6), as with 
those at Nissera UK, suggest high implementation and medium internalisation of 
Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. This outcome is facilitated by a medium skills 
base in engineering, high level of training, high and direct involvement by Honda 
members, a strong approach to discipline (till the completion of the project in 1989), a 
medium level of technology diffusion, high level of involvement in social networking 
and medium level of commitment to continuous improvement schemes among Rover 
members. The location of the company in a traditional home of Britain's car 
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manufacturing sparked worker resistance, particularly on the shop floor. However, as far 
as this research is concerned, a high level of industrial dispute in the area did not have an 
impact on the implementation and internalisation of work systems by Rover engineers. 
Honda practices were 'edited' by those who had not been to Japan or worked with Honda 
members, as illustrated by the way Gebba-Kais were implemented upon the divorce of 
Rover from Honda in 1994. In other words, the process of 'editing' or local interpretation 
of alternative work systems that involved multiple actors and logics was moulded by the 
current norms and structures. Consequently, in the absence of these key templates, which 
were articulated through joint engineering team meetings, company visits and any other 
form of direct interaction with Honda members, full acceptance of Japanese practices was 
discouraged. 
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Figure 6.6 The Implementation and Internalisation of Japanese Work Systems at 
the Rover-Honda Collahoration 
Local Institutional Context Group Context 
-Location: Traditional home 
Organisational Context Attitude of teams 
of Britain's car Company characteristics: Please towards continuous 
manufacturing base refer to Table 6.2 improvement 
-Skills base: Medium in -Structural: 
Shift to teams in schemes: Low till 
engineering 1985 4*_ 1985, medium till 
-Inward investment: High -Cultural: 
High training 1989, thereafter high 
-Control mechanism: High, level of commitment 
direct involvement High extent of social 
by Japanese networking 
Strong discipline (till 
1989), mediocre 
thereafter 
Low trust till 1985, 
% 
medium till 1990, 
% 
high thereafter 
%% High communication 
% barrier till 1985, %% medium thereafter 
-Technological: Medium 
High implementation 
Medium internalisation of Japanese 
work systems on the R8/YY 
project at Rover 
Source: See text 
In spite of the unfavourable institutional characteristics, such as location in a traditional 
manufacturing area and high level of industrial dispute, the degree of implementation and 
internalisation. of Japanese work systems at Rover on the R8/YY project has relatively 
been high. Favourable organisational and group characteristics have a major influence on 
this outcome. 
6.4 Revisit to the Propositions 
In Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), a total of five propositions had been formulated about the 
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combined influence of nationally and locally distinct institutional settings on the 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. The five 
propositions run across a scale (based on Table 3.3 in Chapter 3) composed of distinct 
combinations of favourable and/or unfavourable key institutional, organisational and 
group characteristics that are likely to have an impact on the implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese work systems in varying degrees. Figure 6.7 (on page 301) 
summarises the results of the match between the propositions and empirical findings. 
Propositions I and 2 represent the extreme points on the scale. Propositions 3 to 5 cover 
the possible impact of intermediate institutional settings on the degree of implementation 
and internalisation. The propositions are iterated with follow-up discussions below. 
Proposition I 
Affiliates of firms in highly-institutionalised environments that are operating in 
unfavourable institutional settings (as those delineated in Table 3.3) are likely to 
exhibit a low degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work 
systems. 
Proposition 2 
Affiliates of firms in highly-institutionalised envirorunents that are operating in 
favourable institutional contexts (as those delineated in Table 3.3) are likely to 
exhibit a high degree of implementation and intemalisation of Japanese work 
systems. 
These two propositions, which represent 'ideal' states, are not observed in the cases 
296 
examined. They can be tested through future research on cross-national comparison of 
the diffusion of work systems in Japan and the UK (see Chapter 7). The same applies to 
proposition 5. 
Proposition 5 
Incoherent pattern of high and low degree of implementation and internalisation is 
likely to develop in settings which lack key institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics that are favourable or unfavourable. 
As the three cases rather display 'intermediate' settings, where some of the favourable 
key institutional, organisational and group characteristics are more dominant than 
unfavourable ones, the fifth claim cannot be tested here. This also deems future research. 
However, the combined research findings across the three sites indicate that shifts in the 
nature of institutional, organisational and group characteristics can lead to changes in the 
degree of implementation and internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems. 
Proposition 3 
Affiliates of firms in highly institutionalised environments that are operating in 
settings in which unfavourable key institutional, organisational. and group 
characteristics are more dominant than the favourable ones are likely to exhibit a 
low degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems. 
The research findings on the degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese 
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work systems at Teniki UK support this claim. The nature of the business system typified 
by 'compartmentalised' structural legacy and 'Taylorist' cultural legacy is representative 
of Teniki UK's national institutional context. The diffusion of Japanese knowledge- 
driven work systems is negatively influenced by the company's location on a brownfield 
site in a centre for tourism (which provides low skills base in manufacturing, hence needs 
to be taken as unfavourable rather than favourable in this context). 121 Moreover, there is a 
large supply of unskilled workers (which is also taken here as unfavourable rather than 
favourable) in the area. Teniki UK management focuses on diffusing explicit practices. 
At the group level, there is a low level of commitment and low extent of social 
networking. These multilevel characteristics in combination tend to be more dominant 
than the positive impact that a low industrial dispute in the region can have on the 
implementation and internalisation of work systems. 
Proposition 4 
Affiliates of firms in highly-institutionalised envirom-nents that are operating in 
settings in which favourable key institutional, organisational and group 
characteristics are more dominant than the unfavourable ones are likely to exhibit 
a high degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems. 
There is strong evidence from the case studies to suggest that the extent to which 
altemative work systems are accepted is higher at Nissera UK than at Teniki UK. The 
local institutional setting of Nissera UK is marked by a large supply of skilled workers 
12 1 Location in a centre dominated by the service industry was expected to limit the implementation and 
internalisation of work systems (see Table 3.3 in Chapter 3). 
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(taken as favourable in this context as opposed to what was delineated in Table 3.3 in 
Chapter 3) and location on a greenfield site with a high inward investment. Moreover, the 
company is located in a centre for manufacturing, which tends to be more desirable to 
Japanese management as the workforce has the basic skills necessary for fundamental 
training in continuous improvement schemes. The national institutional environment is 
not characterised, by a 'highly co-ordinated' organisational structure and a 'paternalist' 
organisational culture, given that the firm is located in the UK business system. 
Nevertheless, favourable key local institutional and organisational characteristics, such as 
heavy emphasis on cultural and control-related practices or tacit work systems, as well as 
a medium level of commitment and medium extent of social networking at the group 
level, are more dominant than the unfavourablc characteristics. An analysis of the 
national institutional setting alone would have led to a conclusion that the degree of 
intemalised work systems was low. 
The Rover-Honda case has a similar institutional make-up as that of Teniki UK in terms 
of its embeddedness in a 'compartmentalised business' system and the existence of pre- 
established work routines. However, Rover's emphasis on both tacit and explicit 
knowledge over the course of the R8/YY project, relatively high skills base in 
engineering, high inward investment and key organisational strategies dominate to yield a 
medium level internalisation of Honda systems. 
It should be noted that, unlike what was expected in Section 2.2.1.4 in Chapter 2, a high 
level of implementation of alternative work systems is not necessarily associated with a 
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high level of internalisation. Nissera UK and Rover cases indicate that despite high levels 
of implementation, the internalisation of Japanese work systems is medium. Future 
research can shed light upon the characteristics that are likely to have an impact on the 
level of implementation alone, separate from those that are likely to influence the level of 
internalisation (see Chapter 7). 
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Figure 6.7 Feedback to the Propositions 
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This chapter has compared and contrasted findings from the case studies on the 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems in two 
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UK subsidiary firms and an Anglo-Japanese technical collaboration in the automotive 
manufacture industry. It has discussed the variation in the degree of implementation and 
internalisation of Japanese work systems that reflects locally distinct settings across the 
brownfield subsidiary (Teniki UK), greenfield subsidiary (Nissera UK) and technical 
(Rover-Honda) collaboration sites. The extent to which work systems are implemented 
and intemalised contrasts greatly between Teniki UK and the combined Nissera UK and 
the Rover-Honda collaboration (R8/YY project) findings along the following key 
dimensions: the local institutional characteristics, such as location site and area and 
inward investment; the company size and age and terms of financing; the nature of 
diffused practices; and the nature of group attitudes and the extent of social networking. 
It is argued here that work systems are embedded at the national and firm levels. The 
empirical findings support the third, fourth and fifth propositions. In other words key 
national and local institutional, organisational and group characteristics have 
predominantly high or low impact on the degree of implementation and internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This concluding chapter presents a review of the key findings that are fed back to the 
central research question. In addition, the implications of research findings for theory 
development and practice are discussed. Moreover, attention is paid to the limitations of 
this study. Lastly, an agenda for future research is presented and concluding remarks are 
made. 
7.1 Key Findings in Response to the Central Research Question 
The degree of implementation and internalisation of knowledge-driven work systems in 
three Japanese affiliate firms in the UK automotive manufacture sector has been 
described, analysed and compared (see chapters 5 and 6). In this context, work systems 
are taken as continuous improvement activities that are driven by people's tacit 
knowledge as well as the explicit structural and technical systems (see Chapter 2). The 
diffusion of work systems is seen as incorporating people management (or management 
intervention) as well as the internalisation of these work systems by users (see Chapter 
2). The degree of internalisation is examined at two levels, in relation to institutional 
embeddedness at the macro national level and embeddedness of tacit work systems at the 
micro firm level (see Chapters 2 and 3). The macro-level embeddedness is understood as 
the shaping of work systems by structural and cultural understandings of a country, which 
constitute distinct business systems. Japanese and UK business systems represent 'highly 
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co-ordinated' and 'compartmentalised' business enviromnents (see Chapter 3). The 
highly co-ordinated business systems and paternalist cultural legacies of firms are seen as 
limiting the diffusibility of work systems. In other words, the embeddedness of Japanese 
firms in distinct institutional legacies challenges the diffusibility of their work systems to 
other institutional settings. The micro-level embeddedness is taken as the extent to which 
work systems are bound to tight networks of social relations, whereby the emphasis rests 
more on tacit than explicit knowledge. The emphasis on tacit aspects of work systems is 
also discussed here as limiting the diffusibility of work systems (see Chapter 3). 
The degree of implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems has been 
addressed with regard to the nature and relevance of local institutional, organisational. and 
group characteristics. The location site and area and the associated skills base are taken as 
key local institutional characteristics. Strong government support for investment 
(constituting another local institutional characteristic) in the region is seen as encouraging 
the diffusion of quality management standards to and the enhancement of skills at the UK 
adopter firms. At the organisational level, company size, age and terms of financing, and 
the nature of the diffused practices are seen as influencing the implementation and 
intemalisation of work systems. At the group level of attitudes, norms and values, the 
level of commitment to the diffused practices and the degree of involvement in social 
networking are seen as critical to the implementation and internalisation of work systems 
(see Chapters 2 and 6). Based on the review of the literature, along the dimensions of the 
nature and historical roots of social institutions, on Japanisation, innovation processes, 
and neo-institutionalism, debates on the user-oriented perspective within the innovation 
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processes literature and the historical neo-institutional perspective within the neo- 
institutional literature are seen as appropriate in identifying a list of key national- and 
firm-level characteristics that are influential in the diffusion of work systems. The social 
institutions operating at a national level include the state, financial system, public training 
system, legal system, authority relations and union strength. In terms of cultural legacies, 
the following aspects are regarded as significant in shaping the diffusion of work 
systems: task fragmentation, worker discretion and involvement, managerial control of 
work organisation, separation of managers from workers and employer commitment to 
employment security (see Chapters 2 and 3). At the firm level, the role of actors in 
editing alternative practices at adopter firms is highlighted. The worker response to 
alternative work systems, incorporating their values and interests, is acknowledged in an 
effort to consider the social patterns shaping the diffusion process (see Chapter 2). 
This study reveals considerable differences with regard to the diffusion or the extent of 
implementation and internalisation across the three cases in the UK automotive sector. 
The observed differences are associated with the variation in key local, institutional, 
organisational, and group characteristics. The combined influence of the national and 
local institutional, organisational and group characteristics differs greatly across the three 
cases. At Teniki UK, the local institutional environment is not supportive of a high level 
of internalisation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. The location of the 
company on a brownfield site in a centre for tourism is challenging the acceptance of 
alternative work systems. The emphasis on tourism in the region creates low skills base 
in manufacturing, which is not found to be a favourable condition to imparting 
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continuous improvement principles to operators at Teniki UK. In addition to the large 
supply of unskilled workers, there is low inward investment and emphasis by 
management on the diffusion of structural practices and 'decontextualised' continuous 
improvement techniques. There is also a low level of commitment by groups to such 
techniques. The low level of commitment is associated with the conflict between pre- 
existing group norms and those required by the new practices. Teniki UK's limited 
financial and human resources and emphasis on explicit practices in continuous 
improvement schemes hinder efforts to sustain high levels of acceptance of such schemes 
among operators. The indirect involvement of a limited number of Japanese expatriate 
managers and low extent of social networking at Teniki UK results in appropriation of 
alternative work systems. Work systems are translated by workers who are accustomed to 
an alternative organisational routine and adhere to group norms that are different from 
those expected by the Japanese. 
The local institutional environment of Nissera UK is considerably more supportive of the 
internalisation of Japanese work systems. The combined influence of key institutional, 
organisational and group characteristics encourages a higher degree of internalisation of 
work systems at Nissera UK. The company is located on a greenfield site in a centre for 
manufacturing. This is an area marked by a large supply of skilled workers, providing 
Japanese management with the foundation necessary for operators to grasp continuous 
improvement techniques and philosophies. A sufficient number of Japanese expatriates 
work in the subsidiary to diffuse both tacit and explicit practices in continuous 
improvement schemes. They work within a context of financial stability. There is also a 
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higher level of commitment to alternative work systems and involvement in social 
networking at the group level than at Teniki UK. Given the absence of any tradition of 
manufacturing under British ownership and the long period spent in operation under 
Japanese ownership, Nissera UK workers demonstrate a higher level of internalisation of 
the principles of teamwork and self-discipline in improving process efficiency and 
product quality than their counterparts at Teniki UK. 
The institutional make-up of the Rover-Honda collaboration does not seem encouraging 
at first glance. The location of the UK partner in a centre for traditional British 
manufacturing can be expected to limit the implementation and internalisation of work 
systems, as pre-institutionalised group norms and organisational routines conflict with the 
requirements of alternative work systems. For example, the management system of Rover 
did not provide much 'independence' to individuals or work groups prior to the 
company's collaboration with Honda. The widely-perceived Japanese characteristic of 
commitment to small-group activities was not widely followed by Rover workers. 
However, the management initiatives of establishing a liaison office, shifting to a project- 
based structure and emphasising discipline, training, trust formation, social networking 
and commitment to joint engineering in 1985 encouraged the implementation and 
internalisation of Honda practices by Rover engineers. The research findings show that 
the interplay of actors, resources and activities is more noticeable in the technical 
collaboration case than it is in the brownfield subsidiary case due to the direct 
involvernent of actors and availability of resources in the diffusion of both tacit and 
explicit systems. 
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On the whole, the diffusibility of work systems from a strong institutional context, such 
as Japan, to a relatively weak one, such as the UK, is hindered by conflicting 
organisational structures and cultural legacies (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998). The degree of 
intemalisation of work systems is not extremely high in any of the three firms. The 
original meaning of Japanese source firms' practices appears to be difficult for the UK 
adopter firms to grasp. The work systems in Japan are embedded in a wider social 
context, characterised by high levels of state risk-sharing, a credit-based financial system, 
strong intermediaries, high market regulation, some union strength, limited public 
training system and high trust in formal institutions (Whitley, 1999b). Highly co- 
ordinated business systems encourage firms to rely on established relationships to reduce 
uncertainty and create paternalist organisational cultures. In spite of the current transition 
in Japanese economy and doubts over the success of Japanese management system, 
employment stability, flexible personnel policies and employee identification with the 
company are still predominantly at play in the automotive sector in Japan. They work to 
create a habitat conducive to participative, hands-on management, as well as commitment 
to continuous improvement schemes, teamwork and OJT and technical advancement 
(McMillan, 1996). In contrast, work systems in the UK are embedded in a 
compartmentalised business system characterised by industrial relations that are 
predominantly marked by 'arm's length' and typically adversarial relations between 
management and employees, formal systems of rules and procedures that minimise 
reliance on personal relationships and weak systems in skills training and control. 
Compartmentalised systems discourage sharing of idiosyncratic knowledge with 
employees and business partners. Pronounced differences among managers, supervisors 
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and workers and the desire for bureaucratic control tend to hinder the development of 
teamwork (see Chapter 2). Moreover, lower employment security and the associated 
lower investment in skills development in compartmentalised systems have meant less 
attention paid to the significance of employee interests on decision making (e. g. Sako, 
1992). 
The diffusion of work systems is also complicated by the variation in emphasis on tacit 
and explicit practices between Japan and the UK. Work systems are seen as of high 
tacitness in Japan due to the reliance on an enviromnent of organisational learning, 
consensus decision-making and on-the-job and continuous education at the operational 
level. The human element of knowledge production is brought to the forefront. However, 
the UK managers, as discussed in Chapter 3, focus more on explicit knowledge that is 
relatively easy to measure, control and process. There is separation of ownership from 
control and greater inclination to resort to legalistic measures in interactions. As the cases 
in this study indicate, there is a tendency for UK management to show interest in the 
diffusion of structure and technology as opposed to a complex set of meanings attached 
to work systems. There have been efforts, such as that of the DTI with Towards 
Integration Programme launched in 1987, to increase awareness of UK management 
towards philosophies rather than technology as key to Japanese competitors' success. In 
spite of such efforts, processes of adoption in the UK still seem to be characterised by a 
diffusion of one or two particular management techniques in isolation from the broader 
strategy and philosophy of lean production. 
309 
The influence of nationally distinct social institutions that show divergence in business 
systems across countries, local institutions that point to divergence within a particular 
business system, and organisational and group characteristics that highlight the role of 
actors (management initiatives and interpretation of alternative work systems by 
adopters) is reflected by the degree of implementation and internalisation across Teniki 
UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration (the R8/YY project). 
The degree of implementation and intemalisation of knowledge-driven work systems is 
remarkably higher at Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration than it is at Teniki 
UK. Figure 7.1 provides a condensed overview of the research results. 
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Figure 7.1 Summary of the Degree of Implementation and Internalisation and Key 
Institutional, Organisational and Croup Characteristics at Play at 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda Collaboration 
Degree of 
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to data project) 
collection/end Long-tcn-n 
of project) and orientation 
terrns of 
financing 
Emphasis on Explicit Tacit cultural, Tacit cultural, 
the nature of structural control-related control -rcl ated 
diffused work practices and explicit and explicit 
systems structural structural and 
practices technological 
practices 
Key Group Attitude of Low Medium Mediurn 
Characteristics teams towards 
diffused work 
systems: level 
of commitment 
Extent of social Low Medium High 
networking 
Source: Chapters 5 and 6 
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The results of this study show that UK adopter firms display different levels of 
implementation and internalisation despite their presence in the same national business 
system. This will be elaborated in Section 7.2 on theoretical implications. 
7.1.2 In Response to the Central Research Question 
The research findings enable the formulation of the following answers to the central 
research question: 
"at is the impact of national and local institutional variation on the 
diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems in multinational corporations' 
internationalisation efforts? 
It has been found that firms are embedded in both national and local institutional contexts 
which are comprised of a range of distinct characteristics that are either favourable or 
unfavourable to the development of particular degrees of implementation and 
internalisation. The empirical findings at Teniki UK show that the combined influence of 
nationally distinct structural and cultural legacies and local institutional, organisational 
and group characteristics are unfavourable to the implementation and internalisation of 
Japanese work systems. At Teniki UK, the combination of a compartmentalised structural 
legacy and a Taylorist cultural legacy with location on a brownfield site in a centre for 
tourism is found to have a negative impact on the implementation and internalisation of 
work systems at the UK adopter firm. The low degree of implementation and 
internalisation of work systems is also related to a large supply of unskilled workers, low 
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inward investment in the region, an emphasis by management on the diffusion of explicit 
practices and low level of commitment at the group level. In contrast, despite an 
unfavourable national business system, the combined influence of favourable local 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics is found to encourage the 
implementation and internalisation of Japanese work systems at Nissera UK and the 
Rover-Honda collaboration. At Nissera UK, it is found that the combined influence of a 
large supply of skilled workers, location on a greenfield site in a centre for 
manufacturing, high inward investment; heavy emphasis by management on explicit and 
tacit practices; and a medium level of commitment and medium extent of social 
networking facilitates the implementation and internalisation of Japanese knowledge- 
driven work systems. The positive influence of an emphasis on both tacit and explicit 
practices, and high skills base and high inward investment in the area on the 
implementation and internalisation of alternative work systems also applies to the Rover- 
Honda collaboration. The impact of these three characteristics is more dominant than that 
of Rover's location site. The time element in working with alternative work methods 
strengthens the impact of the three characteristics. It should be noted that both Nissera 
UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration are older sites than Teniki UK. In short, the 
empirical evidence found in this study underpins the conclusion that the relative ease 
with which work systems of multinational corporations are implemented and internalised 
by adopter firms varies with the nationally and locally distinct nature of a range of key 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics. 
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7.2 Theoretical Implications 
7.21 The Institutional Embeddedness of Economic Organisations 
The propositions that were deduced from the analytic framework in Chapter 2 were 
linked to the empirical findings in Chapter 6. In-depth analysis of three case studies; 
namely Teniki UK, Nissera UK, and the Rover-Honda collaboration (the R8/YY project) 
in the UK automotive sector have generated insights into how UK adopter firms 
implement and internalise Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. A comparative case 
study across three UK affiliate firms of Japanese MNCs has shed light upon the influence 
of nationally and locally distinct institutional environments on the diffusion of Japanese 
work systems to the UK (see section 7.1). This supports the arguments in the neo- 
institutional literature on the institutional embeddedness of economic organisations (see 
Chapter 2). A striking point to note here is that the nature and influence of key 
institutional characteristics can differ from region to region within the same sector in the 
same country (see Chapter 6). The degree of implementation and internalisation of work 
systems is likely to vary accordingly. In other words, the nature of the same type of 
institutional characteristics, such as skills level in a given region, can vary considerably 
across different sites that are located in a single country, or in the same national business 
system. This variation also applies to characteristics at the organisational and group 
levels. The degree of implementation and internalisation, shaped mainly by location site, 
company age and size, terms of financing, nature of diffused practices, group attitudes 
and extent of social networking, across the three firms is specific to the given sites, 
despite the fact that the firms are under the influence of the same national institutional 
characteristics. 
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The findings here contribute to the debate on the divergence of capitalist systems to 
which authors such as Campbell et aL (1991) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) have 
contributed. At the same time, the findings differ from existing observations on neo- 
institutionalism in that empirical evidence is provided on different regional institutional 
systems in the UK within the same sector, taking into account the difference in the nature 
of diffused practices. Finn level analysis complements regional level analysis by 
considering the differences in organisational and group characteristics across different 
local institutional settings. Consequently, this study rejects the argument that there is 
convergence in institutional systems due to the pressures of globalisation. Whilst there is 
some evidence to suggest that the 'path-dependent' distinctiveness of national forms of 
capitalist organisations still apply (Ferner, 2000), firms are not as unifonn or isomorphic 
within each capitalist system as is suggested by authors such as OrrU' et aL (199 1). As the 
study shows, the diffusion of practices across nations does not necessarily promote 
convergence. Rather, there is 'persistent differentiation' (Djelic, 1998) when local 
institutional differences and the role of actors at the firm level are taken into account in 
order to examine the diffusion of work systems across nations. 
In brief, the contribution of this research is two-fold: first, it contributes to the historical 
neo-institutionalism. by highlighting the historical influences of a business system on the 
subsequent development of institutional arrangements and the associated limits to 
homogenisation of ways of operating; second, it contributes to the debates in the 
innovation processes literature by demonstrating the importance of actors and agency in 
the diffusion of work systems in a new empirical context, that of a shop floor in the 
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automotive sector. Knowledge diffusion and learning occur with equal importance on the 
shop floor as they do in knowledge-intensive firms such as consultancies, software 
companies and innovation centres. Hence, the research is not based on a single- 
organisational type, that is the commonly researched knowledge-intensive firms. 
This study also presents multilevel influences on the intemalisation of Japanese 
knowledge-driven work systems. There are very few multilevel comprehensive studies 
that focus on both structure and process in the diffusion of work systems across nations 
(exceptions include Maurice et aL, 1986; Sorge, 1989,1996; Child and Loveridge, 1990). 
For example, Sorge (1996: 73) highlights the structure and flow aspects of organisational, 
human resources, industrial-sectoral, labour market and technical dimensions in the 
creproduction of societal patterns'. However, the empirical sample in his work includes 
European firms alone. The significance of the present study rests on its efforts to bring 
together discrete strands of work. The focus is not on social patterns of interaction at the 
firm level alone. This study contributes to the minority of studies that have addressed the 
sectoral characteristics of nations (e. g. Porter, 1990) and technological innovation (e. g. 
Pavitt, 1984). The focus is on the role of social institutions in explaining the dynamics of 
work systems diffusion. Hence, there is an attempt to highlight the structural influences 
on diffusion as well as the process of internalising work systems within organisations. 
The focus on the internalisation process eliminates a static orientation that is commonly 
observed in innovation research that focuses on implementation alone (Wolfe, 1994). In 
other words, the study considers both technical and social arrangements (Sorge, 1989). In 
accordance with the findings of Rogers (1983), this study shows the following influences 
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on the diffusion of work systems: (i) the adopter firm characteristics, and (ii) the social 
network to which adopters belong. Hence, structural characteristics are not taken as the 
primary determinants of the diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems. The study also 
demonstrates that the nature of work systems (i. e. tacit cultural and control-related and 
explicit structural and technological features) can influence the implementation and 
interrialisation process. 
The current study moves away from a deterministic perspective on diffusion towards an 
investigation of the nature of characteristics that are likely to influence diffusion 
processes and how the influences interact. The unit of analysis is the diffusion process 
itself. Hence, the study incorporates process-oriented research that involves cross- 
sectional description of the conditions that influence the implementation and 
internalisation process. This research differs from the work of researchers in the 
innovation processes literature, such as Norton and Bass (1987) and Attewell (1992), by 
extending its scope beyond the influence of organisational and work systems 
characteristics on the extent of work systems diffusion to include the influence of the 
national and local institutional characteristics. 
Work systems are treated here as relatively changing entity. At the micro-level, the 
highly context-dependent Japanese knowledge-driven work systems can be 
gappropriated' upon their diffusion to a different business system (Clark, 1987). At the 
macro level, work systems that are closer to institutional norms and practices of adopter 
firms may be more widely diffused. In contrast to the isomorphism and convergence 
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arguments in the neo-institutional theory (e. g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Abrahamson, 
1996), adopter firms do not necessarily mimic a particular work system that they consider 
highly effective and efficient. The research findings suggest that firms attempt to locally 
interpret alternative work systems rather than submit to environmental pressures toward 
isomorphism. Incompatibility in institutionalised patterns of operating is not shaped by 
technical efficiency criteria. There is an enactment through social patterns of interaction 
in organisations. Organisations are simply not driven to incorporate practices and 
procedures defined by prevailing rationalised concepts of organisational. work that are 
institutionalised in society. As the cases in this study show, there is not a standard 
acceptance of alternative work systems. The diffusion of systems incorporates variability 
in actors' responses in similar institutional environments such as the same national 
institutional setting. For instance, in the context of this study, similar continuous 
improvement activities vary in the extent of their implementation and internalisation 
across the three companies. This is due, at least in part, to variations in the social 
environments in which they are embedded (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). 
7.3 Practical Implications 
7.3.1 General Implicationsfor Management 
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the diffusion of work systems can be regarded as a 
critical management issue, for it is closely associated with competitive strength. The 
implementation and internalisation of work systems has implications for the quality and 
productivity of the output produced. The quality and productivity concerns require well- 
thought-out and planned human resource practices that can allow tacit knowledge of 
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employees to develop and interact with the firm. Firms that are familiar with the 
knowledge-driven nature of their work systems can be expected to invest in the people 
they hire and train in order to impart both the techniques and philosophies of continuous 
improvement schemes to them. For example, high employee turnover, which is seen as a 
problem in sustaining the Japanese training system in UK adopter firms, suggests a need 
to adopt a long-term perspective to developing employees. It is argued that the largest 
return on investment in training can be recovered only over a long-term relationship 
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld ef aL, 1998). Hence, it is important to allow time to build sustained 
interdependent relationships and to invest in social contracts. This also means 
emphasising tacit as well as explicit practices in continuous improvement to create an 
environment that is a nexus for learning and creativity. Some of the specific micro-level 
characteristics identified in this study as salient in the implementation and internalisation 
of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems can serve as inputs to knowledge creation. 
For example, the level of trust and communication assumes an increased significance in 
knowledge creation of the added importance of people in organisations. 
This study shows that the sense-making process of employees has a role to play in the 
effective implementation of alternative work systems. A long-term perspective and 
hands-on approach to management may build the employee commitment necessary in the 
implementation of alternative work systems. It is also advantageous to be sensitive to the 
local institutional characteristics or social attributes pertaining to each location site in 
nurturing and recreating finn-specific skills across national boundaries. As Fruin (1997) 
shows, emulation and adaptation rather than imitation tends to work. The interpretation of 
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employment practices such as employment security, seniority and job definition, job 
designs, staffing and skilling deployments has implications for the effective 
implementation of continuous improvement schemes. Given that "workplace-centred, co- 
operative human resource strategies are at the heart of Japan's industrial success and 
several features of this approach are distinctive" (Fruin, 1997: 212), it is important to 
recognise and reflect the understanding of continuous improvement as is held at the 
source company. Having a comprehensive view of the practices to be diffused can be 
helpful in facilitating the implementation and internalisation of work systems within the 
firm. In other words, structural, cultural, control-related and technological practices need 
to be diffused in combination for an integrated understanding of a source firm's work 
systems. This has implications for generating innovations that provide opportunities for 
growth. It is the process of sense-making and knowledge creation, not just the results, 
that drives continuous improvement. 
This study raises managerial awareness to the implementation of corporate policies at 
different organisational levels. The intention has been to highlight the inner workings and 
tensions within affiliate firms of multinational corporations through a multilevel study 
that systematically compares workers' and managers' views through interviews and 
participant observation. The interest in the process of internalising work systems can 
reveal insights into the dynamics between forces of convergence and divergence in 
organisation of work, as well as in managerial forms and institutions of industrial 
relations. Management can consider the fit with institutional envirom-nents, in addition to 
economic indicators, when carrying out strategic analyses prior to investments in 
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overseas markets to reduce the risk of failure of start-up operations or international 
alliances. 
7.3.2 Implicationsfor Firms in the Automotive Sector 
Apart from the general implications for management addressed in the previous section, 
issues applicable to the current fundamental shifts in the UK and Japanese institutional 
environments can be discussed. 
Changing Institutional Environments 
By now, firms in the automotive sector are well aware of the changes in work systems 
that have swept through those vehicle manufacturers of the 'West' which have sought to 
emulate their Japanese competitors. "In Europe and in the USA, that process of change 
has been given added impetus by the arrival of Japanese transplant assembly plants and a 
growing R&D presence, together with the arrival of Japanese components suppliers" 
(GEAC, 1999). The automotive sector has been continually transforming in the way in 
which business is carried out, with 'Western' vehicle manufacturers emulating the new 
lean manufacturing and supply practices of the Japanese component suppliers and car 
manufacturers. This transformation tends to blur the boundaries of national business 
systems. The accelerating internationalisation of Japanese work systems sets the rules of 
competition in the UK automotive sector in that firms in this sector are urged to invest 
heavily in the development of knowledge and sufficient production capacity to avoid 
slipping into the role of marginal players with unfavourable prospects in the future. 
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With respect to the rapid industry-wide restructuring, the UK automotive sector seems to 
have an advantage over its Japanese counterpart. In comparison to the business system of 
Japan, the compartmentalised system of the UK is weakly institutionalised in terms of the 
nature of its obligational ties (see Chapter 3). Hence, competences of firms located in 
compartmentalised systems can be regarded as more mobile across borders. 122 For 
example, Ferner (2000: 32) argues that "knowledge stored in codified form is relatively 
transparent and accessible and, therefore, is readily transferable between business 
systems". He regards the business knowledge and organisational capabilities of the US 
firms as explicit and codified, in comparison with those of Japanese firms, allowing them 
to be reproduced in foreign settings. It is argued that weak obligational ties allow 
compartmentalised systems to be more receptive to altemative work practices and 
competences (Whitley, 1999c). Firms in compartmentalised systems have the relevant 
institutional make-up to capitalise on the knowledge of others, as they are likely to be 
more extemally-oriented to accommodate fragmented training systems, discourage 
collaboration and emphasise explicit knowledge than those in highly co-ordinated 
business systems. 
The Japanese business system has also witnessed an ongoing restructuring process since 
the early 1990s. However, this change is more commonly observed in the financial than 
manufacturing sector. For example, Japanese company analysts' roles and tasks have 
changed to include responsibility over primary as well as secondary market transactions 
122 However, mobile competences are not necessarily associated with effective and efficient systems of 
production. For example, the fact that firms in compartmentalised systems may not have major overseas 
operations is not dependent on the mobility of competences alone. Such firms' systems may not be seen as 
efficient and effective. 
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with the liberalisation of the Japanese financial market (Kubo and Saka, 2002). The 
traditional Japanese management system, based on lifetime employment and a seniorityý- 
based salary system (Sako and Sato, 1997), faces challenges with the 'Westernisation' of 
the financial industry (Hamada and Horiuchi, 1999). It should be noted that the Japanese 
financial industry interacts more readily with the 'Western' financial industry. Hence, it 
is influenced to a greater degree than, for instance, the Japanese automotive or the 
electronics industry. 
The interactions of Japanese firms with generally Anglo-Saxon firms in home or 
international markets appear to have an impact on the broader institutional context, 
especially the labour market in Japan (Koike, 1993 in Kubo and Saka, 2002). Although 
there is a shift away from traditional, centralised bureaucracies to greater inter-firm 
collaborations, this is not strongly felt across all institutions in Japan. The threat of 
external competition has only recently been perceived as a -problem. The blurring of 
institutional boundaries of the Japanese business system is much slower than that 
observed in the UK. It is far more difficult to initiate change in institutions that have 
grown strong roots in distinct cultures and social processes. For example, the 
egalitarianism embedded in Japanese society is claimed to deprive researchers and 
scholars of the economic incentives to pursue creative and innovative studies (Hirao, 
2001). The national system of industrial relations in Japan is strongly institutionalised 
and integrated in tightly-knit, obligational. networks (Alter and Hage, 1993; see Chapter 
3). Its highly co-ordinated business system tends to discourage receptivity to alternative 
work systems. Given the strong embeddedness in networks of mutual obligations and 
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commitment, firms in the Japanese business system implement incremental, continuous 
change. This is well illustrated by the slow transformation of the Japanese economy since 
the burst of the bubble in the early 1990s (e. g. Dirks et d, 2000). 
7.3.3 Implicationsfor Government Policies 
The results from the analysis in Chapter 6 reflect the role of government in the 
automotive sector in the implementation and internalisation of alternative work systems 
by UK adopter finns. 
The government has a drive to pursue a policy of extending 'manufacturing excellence' 
in every part of the UK. The diffusion of work systems in the spread of such 'excellence' 
is seen as vital to the country's ability to compete in the future and to create wealth 
through productivity improvements across the whole economy. This is no wonder given 
that manufacturing "accounts for about a fifth of our [UK's] national income with almost 
E150 billion of output per year" (Byers, 2001). Manufacturing processes are undergoing 
transfonnation as a result of increasing competition from newly industrialising countries, 
improvements in productivity, generally consequence of automation and new technology. 
The role of government is to help manage this change in the manufacturing sector. It 
could equip people to create conditions that enable individuals to meet the challenges. In 
other words, the government can invest in skills in order to make the most of 'new' work 
systems to raise innovation in every region as well as provide a platform for economic 
stability with low inflation and steady growth. 
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The findings of the present research provide a partial answer to the following government 
policy related question: "what is the impact of foreign investment on the UK labour 
relations and management systems? ". Although commitment to improving UK's 
manufacturing base has improved in terms of an increase in inward investment (some L6- 
8 billion in 2000) in the automotive sector in general, resources are specifically allotted to 
regions that are most affected by industrial restructuring and most dependent on the 
manufacturing industry (Byers, 2001). This means that regions popular for tourism, such 
as that of Teniki UK, are not given the opportunity to benefit from the activities of 
industry forum adaptation programmes, 'best practices' in production and supply chain 
management or the activities of Manufacturing Excellence Centres. An increase in the 
skills level in regions that are less dependent on manufacturing may facilitate the 
adoption of manufacturing philosophies and techniques in coping with shifting demands 
in the industry and encourage long-term outlook on sustaining expected quality, cost and 
delivery outcomes. Government initiatives to increase the skills level of the workforce in 
the location area of Teniki UK may (in combination with the appropriate managerial 
strategies) create the environment necessary for the implementation and internalisation of 
knowledge-driven work systems. For instance, the UK government's investment in Wales 
to create a 'premier' location, infrastructure and cost base is seen as having yielded some 
of the following key benefits: commitment to quality, loyal skilled workforce, low unit 
labour costs and high productivity, vibrant economy geared for significant growth, 
facilities and infrastructure geared to suit the needs of international businesses, and 
administration that is supportive and welcoming (Invest. UK, 2000). 
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The government could be sensitive to the impact of institutional (local as well as 
national) characteristics on the effective running of knowledge-driven Japanese work 
systems at the firm level in the UK for the following reasons: first, the manufacturing 
sector is regarded as vital to the country's ability to compete globally (Byers, 2001) and, 
second, the manufacturing sector is seen as only running second to the service sector in 
recent years in terms of output and employment growth (Invest. UK, 2000). 
7.4 Limitations of the Present Study 
The research design and conceptual framework are not without their limitations. As 
regards the external validity of findings, the generalisability of results to sectors other 
than that of the automotive, such as the service sector or other sectors within 
manufacturing, should be taken with caution. The context-specific perceptions of 
research participants may not be directly applicable to other sectors. If the nature of the 
relationship between the Japanese source and the British adopter firm members can 
distinguish the meanings attached to the use of alternative work systems across sites, then 
differences can be expected to arise between different manufacturing sectors themselves. 
However, the focus of this study has been on the process of work systems diffusion rather 
than a comparison of structural characteristics and their impact on easily codiflable 
performance outcomes such as profit ratios and efficiency rates. Hence, there are reasons 
to believe that the salient organisational characteristics identified in the study, particularly 
the interplay of actors, resources and activities in a network, would have a wide level of 
applicability (Mansson, 1986). An attempt has been made to be comprehensive in this 
research with regard to the levels of investigation and nature of diffused practices. This 
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broad coverage may at times have been more prevailing than the need to provide an in- 
depth analysis within a particular level of investigation and/or form of practice. For 
example, the study has not allowed the researcher to investigate macro-level processes in 
detail. Rather, the diffusion of work systems is systematically analysed at the local 
institutional and firm levels within a specific sector. A cross-national comparison of 
paired companies in Japan and the UK has not been carried out due to the limited scope 
of the research. 123 Hence, it has not been ascertained in great detail how key national 
social institutions-the state, financial system, public training system, legal system, 
authority relations and union strength listed in Chapter 2-directly or indirectly influence 
the local institutional characteristics or the actions of management. Future research is 
needed to detail the nature of the influence of national institutional characteristics on the 
diffusion of work systems within the two countries. As this study stands, the impact of 
national social institutions is only theoretically discussed. 
Another limitation of this study is that the range of key characteristics that are identified 
as having an impact on the diffusion of alternative work systems is not all-encompassing. 
Future research that is ethnographic in nature can identify other relevant characteristics 
that can explain the same outcome. Nevertheless, influential characteristics are identified 
here through a multilevel analysis. Insights into the diffusion of work systems are 
provided through research that combines micro- and macro-level analyses. Hence, it has 
been possible to identify organisational- and group-level characteristics that channel and 
constrain actions of adopters in the putting to practice and accepting knowlcdge-driven 
123 Under a different research design, it would have been possible to conduct a comparative study of the 
diffusion of work systems in the UK and the Japanese contexts. 
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work systems. A process dimension to investigating the diffusion of work systems, 
highlighting the role of managers and workers in the process, has been added to the 
study. Moreover, possible mutual influences between various local institutional and 
organisational. characteristics have been suggested wherever possible. For instance, the 
nature of Japanese involvement in the activities of the adopter firms could be linked to 
the organisational characteristic of company age. In addition, this research lends itself to 
'method of difference' in comparative case study (Djelic, 1998). For example, firms 
located in the same industry are selected in such a way that two of the companies (Teniki 
UK and Rover) are of similar local institutional environment, whilst the remaining 
company (Nissera UK) has a dissimilar local institutional setting. This research design 
provides stronger empirical evidence about the influence of local institutional 
characteristics on the diffusion of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. 
The present study has been limited to analysing the combined influence of characteristics 
at multiple levels. Furthermore, salient characteristics that are likely to influence the 
degree of implementation alone have not been detailed or distinguished from those that 
are likely to have an impact on the degree of internalisation. Rather, it has been assumed 
that higher level of implementation of a particular practice is associated with higher level 
of internalisation of that practice (see Section 2.2.1.4 in Chapter 2). 
It should also be noted that although, at the firm level, salient tacit elements of 
continuous improvement schemes, such as the level of commitment and trust, have been 
highlighted in this study, a particular sequence and priorities that can guide the process of 
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putting alternative work systems to practice is not reported. Instead, the importance of 
managing the interdependence between tacit (i. e. largely the intangible) and explicit (i. e. 
largely the tangible) components of continuous improvement schemes in diffusion efforts 
is highlighted. 
7.5 A Future Research Agenda 
The outcomes of this study show pointers to the future as follows: 
First of all, the impact of nationally distinct institutions on the implementation and 
internalisation, of alternative work systems can be examined in the UK and Japan. The 
research findings that were fed back to the propositions in Chapter 6 revealed that ftirther 
research is needed in testing the full presence of favourable and unfavourable key 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics through a direct comparison of 
diffusion processes in Japan and the UK. Research into more cohesive institutional 
environments than those investigated here require a cross-national study of firms that are 
highly reflective of their national business system, rather than research based on MNCs. 
For example, Ferner (2000) contends that host systems just as much as parent systems are 
prone to institutional heterogeneity. In other words, national business systems may be 
characterised by heterogeneous sub-systems, reflected by regional or sectoral differences. 
Stronger empirical evidence can be provided with regard to the impact of the institutional 
variation between the structural and cultural legacies of 'highly co-ordinated' systems 
and those of 'compartmentalised' systems by expanding the empirical base to include the 
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US business system, which is also classified as a 'compartmentalised' system (Whitley, 
1999b). Furthermore, the conceptual framework can be expanded to test for the degree of 
and patterns in learning by source firms. Although there has been a mention of the extent 
to which Teniki, Nissera and Honda were willing to learn from their affiliate firms, this 
has not been discussed in detail here. Future research can investigate the diffusion of 
work systems from UK adopter firrns to Japanese source firms. This would be a highly 
relevant investigation in the light of the current debates on the inefficiency of the 
Japanese management system. Sectoral differences in patterns of learning can be 
explored. Functions that are undergoing transformation in highly co-ordinated systems 
and the impact of this transfon-nation on performance outcomes can be systematically 
reported. For instance, according to Westney (1993: 65), Japanese firms may "try to learn 
from and adapt some of the adjustments to their organisational patterns not only for their 
future plants in Europe but for their Japanese plants as well, as the Japanese institutional 
environment changes over time,. 124 The investigation of the diffusion of organisational 
practices can be extended to include the impact of these practices on stakeholder 
relations. For example, in the case of the automotive sector, one can examine how the 
Japanese cultivate close supplier linkages. Do the Japanese want to reinforce and 
institutionalise the production organisation of the branch plant? As the Rover-Honda 
collaboration case in this study shows, diffusion of structural, cultural, control-related and 
technological practices can include the shift towards enhanced supplier relations, 
whereby the adopter firm can use suppliers as guest engineers on its site in a partnership- 
style working relationship. If there is an intention to reinforce the production 
124 These changes can include shortage of skilled labour, which may necessitate greater employment of 
women and the move to greater flexibility of rewards (Westney, 1993). 
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organisation, how is this affected by recent advances in IT, global procurement, increased 
outsourcing and change to the supply chain that are currently influencing the shape of the 
automotive sector? How is the development of firm-specific skills influenced by these 
recent trends? 
Secondly, the research findings can be linked to financial indicators so as to demonstrate 
how the diffusion of knowledge-driven work systems in intemationalisation efforts 
relates to MNCs' performance such as profitability and growth. For example, it became 
apparent during data collection in the two subsidiary firms that Japanese management 
was increasingly reluctant to diffuse know-how as the concerned firms displayed weak 
financial performance and inability to develop their own knowledge base. The link to 
financial indicators would allow for a stepwise anchoring and weighing of the more 
qualitative field study findings. A survey could complement qualitative case study 
research. 
Thirdly, further research could be carried out to provide evidence of the impact of 
institutional variation across sectors within the same and/or different national business 
systems. This can enhance the external validity of the present research. For example, the 
financial services sector can be included to increase the empirical base. The research 
could aim to answer the following question: are practices of firms in the financial sector 
such as task specialisation, structures for communicating and adding value to information 
and personnel development programmes more diffusible than the core practices of firms 
in the automotive manufacture sector? Child and Loveridge (1990: 12) demonstrate that 
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there are variations in choice, dialogue, power and process across banking, health care 
and retailing sectors in Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, China, Poland and Yugoslavia "arising from influences specific to the 
historical, cultural, social and economic context as well as from a degree of 
indeterminacy in the process of deciding on a given technological innovation7'. They 
argue for multiple paths to introduction of information technology (IT). They show that 
the process of discussing and negotiating results in different applications of the same 
microelectronic-based technology in different sectors and countries. The institutional and 
legal framework for decision-making and values that impinge upon authority, control, 
solidarity and job definition are shown to be among the key influences. 
Similarly, even though the research takes into account the nature of the relationship 
between the Japanese source and the UK adopter firms in the diffusion of work systems, 
it does not include different ownership structures such as the variation between state- 
owned and private firms or unionised and non-unionised firms. The sample of firms 
investigated can be enlarged depending on the dominance of a particular ownership 
structure in the institutional setting of interest. 
Fourthly, during the analysis of data, it became evident that Japanese expatriates acted as 
crucial agents in the diffusion of work systems within the firm. Similarly, Sharpe et aL's 
(2000) findings show that expatriate managers play a central role in creating networks, 
co-ordinating and mediating expectations and realities or 'translating' understandings 
between local managers and members at the Japanese headquarters. Future research can 
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provide greater detail of information on their role in skills and trust formation in 
partnerships and the implications of their diffusion efforts across international 
collaborations for building firm-specific competences. Such research could focus, for 
example, on how and under what circumstances Japanese expatriates translate their 
experiences in a particular business system to suit the local needs in other institutional 
enviromnents. 
Fifthly, actors' process of translating alternative work systems can be studied in more 
detail. For example, one can examine how tacit knowledge is converted into explicit 
knowledge (and vice versa) in the context of an engineering design? As Ferguson 
(1997: 58) contends, "the machines and structures designed by engineers could not be 
built if sensual knowledge in shop and field did not range far beyond its visual 
component". In other words, sensual non-verbal knowledge and subtle acts of knowledge, 
that is the knowledge and skills of workers, is crucial to engineering design. An empirical 
investigation can provide insights into how knowledge of current practice and products 
and a growing base of first-hand knowledge and insights gained through critical field 
observation of engineering projects and industrial plants yield creative designs. Such 
research on processes conducive to the extemalisation of knowledge can be linked to the 
notion of creativity, and this may vary across nations (e. g. Appleyard, 1996). In the 
1950s, this notion became a fad that swept through the US engineering schools. The 
interest in a creativity craze waned a decade later (Ferguson, 1997). However, the notion 
of creativity is as important today as it was in the 1950s. The training systems that 
encourage the use of intuition and non-verbal thought, rather than single-answer 
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problems, may be more conducive to the production of creative designs. 125 One can 
consider the home country effect in one's investigation of such training systems. 
Research does hint that knowledge creation processes in different sectors such as science, 
technology and legal may differ, for example, in terms of the reliance on explicit 
knowledge as in documentation (e. g. Robertson, 1999). Therefore, it would be interesting 
to look at this further. 
Lastly, it was suggested in this study that the firm level could have 'trickling-up' impact 
on the regional and national levels (Djelic, 1999). This impact could be observed on the 
nature of industrial relations in the location areas of the adopter firms. As was discussed 
in Section 7.3.2, the UK institutional enviromnent is in the process of transfon-ning with 
the growth in Japanese FDI and emulation of Japanese manufacturing processes. The 
impact of this transformation on public training systems, role of the state, financial 
system, legal system, authority relations and union strength can be explored through 
future research. This can be a means of avoiding environmental determinism that can be 
ascribed to neo-institutional theory. 
7.6 Overview 
A comparison of the degree to which work systems are implemented and internalised in 
three affiliate firms of Japanese MNCs in the UK automotive sector has raised 
contrasting extents in diffusion. The Japanese source company's systems, embedded in 
the distinct national context of highly co-ordinated systems, are found to be challenged at 
125 The use of intuition and non-verbal thought refers to the ability to think pictorially, not just 
mathematically (Ferguson, 1997). 
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the national and firm levels by a conflicting set of structural and cultural legacies and an 
emphasis on explicit practices embedded in compartmentalised, systems. The Tcniki UK 
case displays a setting in which predominantly unfavourable institutional, organisational 
and group characteristics contribute to a low degree of implementation and internalisation 
and an appropriation of Japanese knowledge-driven work systems. The company is 
embedded in an institutional environment that discourages high levels of commitment to 
continuous improvement schemes. In contrast, the Nissera UK and Rover-Honda 
collaboration cases exhibit a setting in which predominantly favourable institutional, 
organisational and group characteristics contribute to a relatively high degree of 
implementation and internalisation of work systems. At the national level, similar to 
I 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration are embedded in a business 
system that discourages emphasis on tacit knowledge, team culture, sense of discipline, 
co-operation and knowledge sharing. Nevertheless, a combination of favourable local 
institutional, organisational and group characteristics, including supportive managerial 
initiatives and worker response, has a positive impact on the implementation and 
internalisation of work systems at Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration. 
This thesis has highlighted the influence of nationally distinct structural and cultural 
legacies; and local institutional, organisational and group characteristics (including the 
variation in the emphasis placed on knowledge at the firm level) on the diffusion of work 
systems in affiliate firms of Japanese MNCs. The results indicate that, despite the trend 
towards globalisation, there is in effect-a diversity or differentiation in the adoption of 
alternative work systems that are strongly embedded in distinct forms of business systems 
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by adopter firms that are embedded, comparatively, in weakly institutionalised settings. 
This issue has implications for management and the government, in particular, due to the 
association of work systems diffusion with competitive strength. Nevertheless, there is 
still a large uninvestigated field of research with regard to institutional compatibility in 
the area of work systems diffusion, especially in demonstrating the impact of the 
diffusion process on MNC's financial performance. This would provide for more 
practical solutions to management. 
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Appendix I Overview of Organisations Involved in the Explorative Stage of the 
Research 
Explorative study 
Organisation Form of Participants Interview date 
ownership 
Ikeda Hoover Ltd. Joint venture (British) 12 June 1998 
(manufacturer of car seats) Ikeda Bussan, General 
Japan (5 1 %) Proj ect 
Johnson Manager 
Controls, USA 
(49%) 
2 Hoya Lens UK Ltd. Subsidiary of (British) MD 22 June 1998 
(manufacturer of optical Hoya Holdings 
products, vision care) N. V. 
(Netherlands) 
which is part of 
the Hoya 
Corporation, 
Japan 
3 Telecom Modus Joint venture (British) MD 17 August 1998 
(telecommunications) ERA of ERA 
Technology Technology 
Ltd., UK (40%) Ltd. 
NEC, Japan 
(60%) 
4 Teniki UK Ltd. Subsidiary of (British) MD 21 August 1998 
(carbon canisters, air Teniki Ltd., 
intake systems) Ja an 
5 Unipart Yachiyo Joint venture (Japanese) 26 August 1998 
Technology Ltd. Unipart Group MD 
(manufacturer of pressed of Companies 
steel body components and (UGC), UK 
sun roof assemblies) (48%) 
Honda UK 
Manufacturing 
(10%) 
Honda Trading 
Europe (5%) 
Employee 
Benefit Trust 
(3%) 
Yachiyo Kogyo 
of Japan (34%) 
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6 R-TEK Ltd. 
(manufacturer of door trim 
products for automobiles) 
Joint venture 
Reydel Ltd., UK 
(50%) 
Kasai-Kogyo 
Co. Ltd., Japan 
(50%) 
(Japanese) 
Company 
secretary 
16 September 
1998 
7 Unipart Yutaka Systems Joint venture (Japanese) 22 October 
Ltd. Unipart Group MD 1998 
(manufacturer of exhaust of Companies 
systems, catalytic (UGC), UK 
converters and precision (48%) 
pressed components) Honda UK 
Manufacturing 
(10%) 
Honda Trading 
Europe (5%) 
Employee 
Bencfit Trust 
(3%) 
Yutaka Giken of 
I Japan (34%) 1 
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Appendix Il List of Interviewees 
List of interviewees at Teniki UK 
Tcniki UK Participants Interview date 
(Permission for a I (British) MD 21 August 1998 
visit per month; and 
poor financial 15 February 1999 
circumstance 
discouraged visits 
from April 1999 to 
June 1999 
2 (Japanese) Senior Advisor in Sales 17 December 1998 
& Marketing 
3 (Japanese) Technical Advisor in 17 December 1998 
Design 
4 (British) Quality Engineer 17 December 1998 
5 (British) Product Engineer 17 December 1998 
6 (British) Account Manager 15 February 1999 
7 (British) Personnel and Training 15 February 1999 
Manager 
8 (British) Canister Supervisor 15 February 1999 
9 (British) Design Manager 16 March 1999 
10 (British) Product Engineer 16 March 1999 
11 (Japanese) Senior Advisor in 16 March 1999 
Engin ering 
12 (Japanese) Senior Advisor in 18 January 2000 
Engineering 
13 (British) Team Coach in Carbon 28 July 1999 
Canister 
Work experience as 14 (British) Team Coach in Air 26-29 July 1999 
an operator Element 
15 (British) Quality Auditor 28 July 1999 
16 (British) Personnel & Training 29 July 1999 
Assistant 
17 (British) Team Coach in Air 18 January 2000 
Element 
18 (British) Operations Manager 18 January 2000 
Teniki Ltd. 19 (Japanese) Deputy GM, 7 April 2000 
(interviews at the International Operations 
parent company in Department 
Japan) 
20 (Japanese) Senior Manager, 7 April 2000 
Development Division 
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List of interviewees at Nissera UK 
Nissera UK Participants Interview date 
I- (British) Account Manager 30 April 1999 
Work experience as 2 (British) Senior Team Leader in 14 June 1999 
an operator Assembly 
14 June - 17 June 
1999 
3 (British) Senior Team Leader in 14 June 1999 
Assembly 
Worked in CeIll 4 (British) Team Leader in 14 June 1999 
and CeI12 Assembly (in charge of CeIll and 
CeI14) 
5 (British) Team Leader in 14 June 1999 
Assembly (CeI12 and S 1) 
Worked in CeI13 6 (British) Team Leader in 15 June 1999 
and Ce114 Assembly (CeI13 and CeI17) 
Worked in CeI15 7 (British) Team Leader in 16 June 1999 
and CeI17 Assembly (CeI15 and CeI18) 
Worked in CeI18, 8 (British) Team Leader in PCB 17 June 1999 
S1 and visited PCB 
9 (British) PCB and Moulding 17 June 1999 
Manager 
10 (British) Purchasing and 30 July 1999 
Production Control Manager 
II (British) Production Manager 30 July 1999 
12 (British) Group Leader in 30 July 1999 
Customer Quality 
13 (British) Management Accounts 30 July 1999 
Manager 
14 
. 
(Japanese) Quality Director 13 September 1999 
Nissera Ltd. 15 (Japanese) Deputy Manager, 12 April 2000 
(interviews at the General Affairs Department 
parent company in 
Japan) 
16 (Japanese) Manager in Production 13 April 2000 
Dep ent 1 
17 (Japanese) Manager in Quality 13 April 2000 
Assurance Supervision 
Department 
18 (Japanese) Manager in Corporate 14 April 2000 
Finance Department 
19 (Japanese) Manager in Electronics 14 April 2000 
Engi eering Department 1 
20 (Japanese) Manager in Corporate 14 April 2000 
Planning and Control Department 
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List of interviewees at Rover Group and Honda Motor Co. 
R8/YY, Rover Positions of the participants at Interview date 
200/Honda the time of the R81YY project 
Concerto project (principal engineers are coded 
for anonymity) 
Rover Group I (British) Ex-director of Honda 21 January 1999 
Collaboration 
2 (British) Senior Purchasing 16 February 1999 
Manager of Rover Group Proi 
3 (British) Principal Electrical A 1 24 February 1999 
Engineer 
4 (British) Chief Predevelopment 11 March 1999 
Electrical Engineer 
5 (British) Chief Advanced Power 2 April 1999 
Train Engineer 
6 (British) Principal Electrical B 9 April 1999 
Engin er 
7 (British) Principal Electrical C 13 April 1999 
Engineer 1 
8 (British) General Manager of 15 April 1999 
Honda Collaboration 
9 (British) Electrical Team D 16 April and 21 
Leader May 1999 
10 (British) Logistics Operations 23 April 1999 
Mana er 
11 (British) Electrical Group E 7 May 1999 
Leader 
12 (British) Principal Electrical F 7 May and 21 June 
Engineer 1999 
13 (British) Principal Systems G 10 May 1999 
Engineer on Rover 800 
14 (British) Principal Electrical H 12 May 1999 
Engineer 
15 (British) Chief Designer 14 May 1999 
16 (British) Principal Electrical 1 24 May and 21 
Engineer June 1999 
17 (British) Team Leader J 27 May 1999 
IS (British) Principal Electrical K 2 June 1999 
Engineer 
19 (British) Design Director 22 June 1999 
20 (British) Principal L 22 June 1999 
Mechanical Engineer 
21 (British) Design and Development 23 June 1999 
1 Engineer 
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22 (British) Project Engineer on 21 July 1999 
Central Components 
23 (British) Senior Manager in 25 August, 9 
Manufacturing Integration September and 6 
(current) October 1999 
Honda Motor Co. 24 (Japanese) Ex-director of Rover 17 April 1999 (by 
Ltd. Collaboration at Honda Motor e-mail) 
Europe (HME) and 30 March 2000 
(in Japan) 
(Interviews in the 
UK) 
25 (Japanese) Manager at Rover 29 April 1999 
Liaison Office of Honda Motor 
Europe 
26 (British) Purchasing Divisional 22 September 1999 
Manager, Honda UK 
Manufacturing (HUM) 
(Interviews in 27 (Japanese) Executive VP of Honda 29 March 2000 
Japan) R&D Europe 
28 (Japanese) Principal HA 29 March 2000 
Engineer (currently 
Assistant Chief Engineer) 
29 (Japanese) Principal HB 29 March 2000 
Engineer (currently 
Assistant Chief Enaineer) 
30 (Japanese) Principal HC 29 March 2000 
Engineer (currently 
Assistant Chief Engineer) 
31 (Japanese) Project member on the 3 and 4 April 2000 
XX project (currently Production 
Planning Manager) 
32 (Japanese) Project Manager 5 April 2000 
(currently MD of Honda 
Foundation) 
33 (Japanese) Project Leader 13 April 2000 
(currently MD of Car 
Development Department at 
Nissera Ltd. ) 
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Appendix III The Interview Protocol 
The research participants were familiar with the research objectives and the background 
of the researcher prior to the scheduled meetings. General information on the name, 
position and roles and responsibilities of the participants, interview dates and times, as 
well as the name of the organisation, were recorded at each sampled firm. 
Name of the organisation: 
Name of the participant: 
Position of the participant 126 : 
Date of the interview: 
Start and end time of the interview: 
Nature of the job (i. e. roles and responsibilities): 
List of interview questions 
I. Institutional level 
Institutional level questions were directed to local development agencies such as the 
Economic Development and Tourism Units and the District and Borough Councils. 
Secondary sources of information such as newspaper articles were also used. Questions 
(which were in general the same for all three sampled firms) centred. on the following 
issues: 
126 In the case of Rover, participant's current position as well as that at the time of the R8/YY project was 
asked. 
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1. Age and skill level of the labourforce 
2. Employment by sector as an indicator of tradition of manufacturing 
3. Level of unemployment in the area 
4. Number of overseas companies in the region 
5. Government initiative for (inward) investment 
6. Level of industrial dispute 
Questions directed to Teniki UK and Nissera UK 
ii. Organisational Level 
1. What was the organisation like before the acquisition by Teniki? (only applicable to 
Teniki UK) 
2. With what purpose was the subsidiary established? 
3. How is the subsidiary financed? 
4. Would you say that you have 'Japanised'? 
4.1 What is the role of technology in this process? 
S. How different is managing a brownfield site from that of a greenfield site? 
6. Have there been structural changes? 
7. What is the role of the parent company in the subsidiary firm's operations? 
7.1 What is the nature of the relationship with the parent company? 
7.2 How successful is it? 
8. What kind of cultural and managerial differences between the subsidiary and the 
parent finn do you perceive? 
8.1 How are these managed? 
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9. Which practices* of the parent finn are transferred* to the subsidiary9 
10. Do you feel that the working relationship between the parent company and subsidiary 
finn could be better? 
10.1 What could be done differently to improve it? 
11. What is the parent company learning from its subsidiary? 
11.1 What mechanisms are there for sharing ideas? 
III. Group Level 
12. How are parent company's practices, such as continuous improvement activities, 
transferred to the subsidiary firm? 
12.1 Is there an emphasis on documentation? 
13. How did the Japanese train senior managers? 
14. What are the barriers preventing the adoption of Japanese practices at the subsidiary 
firm? 
I S. Is quality assessment effectively implemented at the subsidiary firm? 
16. Is there a different level of resistance to different types of transferred practices? 
17. Which factors* make it easier for the employees at the subsidiary firm to accept* the 
parent company's practices? 
18. Which practices could not be successfully implemented at the subsidiary firm? 
18.1 Why? 
19. What implications has the introduction of Japanese practices had for the subsidiary 
firm's pcrformance? 
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* The terms 'transfer', 'practices', 'factors' and 'accept' were used instead of 'diffusion', 
'work systems', 'characteristics' and 'internalise' in the interviews for ease of 
communication with practitioners. Effort was made to avoid the use of academic terms. 
Questions directed to the Rover Group and Honda Motor Co. Ltd. 
ii. Organisational Level 
1. What was the nature of your relationship with Honda [Rover]? 
I How successful was it? 
1.2 Why? 
2. Was there a clear division of responsibility between Honda and Rover? 
3. Which Honda practices were transferred to Rover in general? 
4. How did the local practice/custom limit the extent to which Honda ideas were 
accepted at Rover in general? 
4.1 Was there a different level of resistance to different types of practices? 
5. Which practices could not be successfully implemented at Rover? 
5.1 Why? 
6. Which practices disappeared over time at Rover? 
6.1 Why? 
7. What kind of cultural and managerial differences between Rover and Honda did you 
perceive? 
7.1 How were these managed? 
8. What did Honda learn from Rover? What did Rover learn from Honda? 
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III. Group Level 
9. Which Honda practices were transferred specifically to the collaborative project you 
were involved in? 
9.1 Did you make use of these practices in the joint project? 
9.2 How were these practices transferred? 
9.3 Was there an emphasis on documentation? 
10. Which factors helped in the transfer process? 
11. Which factors made it difficult to transfer practices? 
12. How did the local practice/custom limit the extent to which Honda ideas were 
accepted at Rover, specifically at the joint project level? 
12.1 Was there a different level of resistance to different types of practices? 
13. In your joint development of the Rover 200/Honda Concerto, what mechanisms were 
there for sharing ideas? 
14. Would currently available knowledge databases on the intranet have contributed to 
effective working relations if they were available at the time of the Rover 200/Honda 
Concerto project? 
IS. Do you feel that the working relationship between Rover and Honda engineers could 
have been better on the Rover 200/Honda Concerto project? 
15.1 What could have been done differently to improve it? 
16. What did you learn from Rover at a project and an individual level? 
16.1 How would you implement what you learnt on the Rover 200/Honda Concerto 
project on a joint project of a similar nature with another British [Japanese] firm? 
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Appendix IV Conference and Seminar Papers Presented to Scholars on the 
Theoretical Framework and Preliminary Findings of the Cases 
I Date I Conference I Title of the paper I Venue I 
September 16-19, 
2000 
July 2-4,2000 
June 11 - 16,2000 
April 10,2000 
September 24-28, 
1999 
ESRI Thematic 
Workshop on Forms 
of Transnational 
Governance and 
Paths of Economic 
Development 
(granted free 
accommodation and 
travel grant up to 
DKK 4000) 
16"' EGOS (European 
Group for 
Organisation Studies) 
Colloquium 
(granted scholarship 
in the amount of FIM 
2000) 
The 3'" European 
Project Management 
Conference 
(chaired the Cross- 
Cultural Issues 
stream) 
Visit to MIST 
(received a grant of 
Y50,000) 
ESRI (European 
Summer Research 
Institutes) Ph. D. 
Summer School on 
Comparative Study of 
Economic 
Institutional Limits 
to Implementation 
of Work Systems: 
A Comparative 
Study of Two 
Japanese MNCs in 
the UK 
The Role of 
Institutional 
Elements in 
'Economic' 
Organisations: A 
Comparative 
Study of Two 
Japanese MNCs in 
the UK 
Barriers to 
Embedded 
Knowledge 
Transfer in an 
Anglo-Japanese 
Engineering 
Project 
Barriers to 
Embedded 
Knowledge 
Transfer in an 
Anglo-Japanese 
Engineering 
Project 
Institutionalising 
the Economic 
Organisation 
Lisbon, 
Portugal 
Helsinki School 
of Economics 
and Business 
Administration, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Project 
Management 
Institute (PMI), 
Jerusalem, 
Israel 
Schoolof 
Knowledge 
Science, Japan 
Advanced 
Institute of 
Science and 
Technology 
(JAIST), 
Institute of 
Organisation 
and Industrial 
Sociology, 
Copenhagen 
Business 
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Organisation School, 
(granted ESRI Copenhagen, 
scholarship up to Derunark 
ECU 700 and travel 
grant up to ECU 250) 
September 1-3, British Academy of Institutional Manchester 
1999 Management Sociological View Metropolitan 
Conference (BAM of Knowledge: Its University, 
'99) Transfer from a Manchester, 
Japanese Parent to U. K. 
a UK Child 
Company 
July 4-6,1999 15th EGOS Different University of 
Colloquium Epistemological Warwick, 
Positions of Coventry, U. K. 
Knowledge: 
Advocacy of the 
Institutional 
Sociological View 
May 5,1999 IROB (Industrial Beyond an University of 
Relations and Economic View of Warwick, 
Organisational Knowledge Coventry, U. K. 
Behaviour) Seminar 
Series 
November 16, BPRC Focus Group Knowledge University of 
1998 on Knowledge Management in Warwick, 
Management and Inter- Coventry, U. K. 
Networking organisational 
ft invitation) Alliances 
July 9-11,1998 l4uEGOS Inter- Maastricht 
Colloquium organisational University, 
Alliances- Maastricht, The 
Transition Zone? I Netherlands. 
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Appendix V Change in Employment at Teniki UK 
Sourcc: Teiliki UK Ltd. 
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Appendix VI Sales and Profit Trends between 1993 and 1999 
Fiscal Year Sales (f) Profits 
1991 25,259,000 -0.2 
1994 28,891,000 -41.7 
1995 34,487,000 -268.3 
1996 42,251,000 -241.3 
1997 52,984,000 5.1 
1998 59,936,000 45.4 
1999 50,750,000 100.0 
N. B. Profits are calculated in comparison to the figure in 1999 
Sales and Profit Trends 
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60,000,000 
50,000,000 
40,000,000 
-% Change in Profits 
30,000,000 ----Sales Figures 
20,000,000 
10,000,000 
Year 
Source: General Affairs Department, Nissera 
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Appendix VII Key Events in the Rover-Honda Relationship 
Date Event 
September 1978 First contact in Tokyo 
October 1978 Working meeting in San Francisco 
April 1979 First joint press release 
December 1979 Triumph Acclaim agreement signed 
1981 Triumph Acclaim launched 
1982 Rover 800/ Honda Legend project commenced 
1984 Rover 200 launched (replaced Triumph Acclaim) 
1985 R8/YY Project commenced (2 nd generation Rover 
200/400, Honda Concerto) 
1986 Rover 800 launch, Rover build subcontract Legend for 
Honda, Rover build subcontract Ballade for Honda 
1987 Honda build subcontract Rover 800 in Japan 
1989 Rover 200/Concerto launch, Honda open UK factory 
at Swindon (HUM), HUM supplies power units for 
Rover 200/Concerto 
1990 20% cross shareholding between Rover and HUM, 
Rover 600/Accord project commenced 
1991 2 nd generation Rover 400/Civic commenced 
1992 HUM-built Accord launched 
1993 Rover 600 launched, Crossroad launched 
1994 BMW purchase Rover Group, HUM-built Civic 
launched 
1995 Rover 400 launched 
Source: Liaison Office, Rover Group 
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Appendix VIII The Benefit Scale 
The benefit scale, in which the vertical axis indicates Rover-perceived benefit gained 
from the relationship with Honda over time. 
In the early years, from 1981 to 1988, the benefit was in excess of incremental product. 
From 1988 onwards, in addition to incremental product, Rover was claimed to have 
benefited by'learning from Honda'. 
Benefit 
Gained 
Time (years) 
Product: - Learning: 
Source: Rover Group, Liaison Office 
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81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Appendix IX Honda Motor Company's Communication Network 
A data link is not available in Honda's 50-50 collaborations. Rather, there is heavy 
emphasis on people transfer. 
HCMT(HoW-d Dealer 
factory)' 
I( 
ASH 
(Asianfrhalland 
Operation) 
Honda R&D 
H=da R&D 
9r a America 
Honda 
R&D 
Toch g' Honda paper Etrope Honda UK copies America Ma., Wurin 49ý Hon: Honda Honda 
a aq rters Headquarters GHENT 
E = 
C 
I wa u 
A Paris wig OMPLA C . 
lel 
Dealer 
Sarvices 
Source: Interview with Japanese project member on the XX at Honda Motor Co. Ltd. (3 
April 2000) 
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